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Your guide to what the 2024 US election means for Washington and the world
The writer served as Nato secretary-general from 2014 to 2024. He will become the new chair of the Munich Security Conference in February 2025
The American people have spoken: Donald Trump is set to return to the White House. His comeback has led many to despair that he may act on past threats to cut back US support, leaving Europe to address its security challenges alone. These fears are not unfounded — Trumpâ€s campaign rhetoric has raised legitimate concerns about his commitment to European security. But in the end it may depend more on us than on Trump himself whether these become reality.Â
At the time when Trump took office in 2017, many European politicians were also anxious about what his election would mean for the future of the transatlantic partnership. Trump felt that the US was getting a bad deal. He believed allies werenâ€t pulling their weight and initially viewed the alliance as a burden rather than an asset. While he eventually accepted the undeniable advantages of having allies, he did have a point: Europe had indeed allowed its forces to atrophy, and several nations had become dangerously reliant on Russian gas. These oversights would later cost Europeans dearly.Â
During his time in the White House, we established a good and reliable working relationship. Sometimes we had turbulent meetings in Nato, but we got things done. When Trump left office, Nato had become stronger — and it is even stronger today. As our collective response to Russiaâ€s war against Ukraine has shown, todayâ€s Nato is neither obsolete nor brain-dead. That is good — but it is not good enough.Â
While the Europeans have become better allies, the security environment has deteriorated dramatically. Consequently, the baseline for what a good ally must do has shifted further. In 2014, Nato allies agreed to target 2 per cent of GDP on defence spending by 2024. This goal has been met by most. But the 2014 target is simply not enough in the 2024 security environment — itâ€s a floor, not a ceiling. European leaders know they need to do more. Trumpâ€s return to the White House only reinforces that message. If Europe lives up to its part of the bargain, I am confident the new US administration will meet theirs.Â
Trumpâ€s scepticism about our current strategy to support Ukraine may also contain a grain of truth. The US and Europe have provided Ukraine with significant, but, at the end of the day, insufficient military support — enough to survive but not enough to bring the war to an end on favourable terms. Putin still seems to believe he can achieve his goals on the battlefield and just wait us out, banking on the assumption that our societies will waver. Giving in to the aggressor would be the quickest way to end the war. But this would neither mean peace nor would it save costs. This is the basic paradox: the more weapons we deliver, the more likely it is that we can reach peace. The more credible our long-term support is, the sooner the war can end. And the more we do now, the less we will have to spend later.Â
Such an approach may not sound in line with Trumpâ€s thinking. But in his first term, Trump already advocated a policy of strength. We must not forget that after all it was Trump who first decided to deliver lethal weapons to Ukraine, including the anti-tank Javelins that proved so decisive when Russia invaded. If Trump wants to end this war, as he has promised, he must demonstrate to Putin that continued aggression is senseless. Putin recognises weakness but respects strength. European allies should be prepared to back such a strategy, working with Trump to bring about a negotiated settlement that is acceptable to Ukraine and does not reward aggression.Â
And while Trump should understand that continued US commitment to Europe to deter another costly war is in Americaâ€s best interest, Europe can do more to support the US elsewhere. In line with previous presidents, Trump has argued that the US should focus on challenges in the Indo-Pacific. European allies could prove their worth by helping him do so, for instance by offering to compensate specific capabilities the US might need there.Â
In a world where authoritarian powers are more aligned and increasingly capable, alliances are not a liability, they are Washingtonâ€s greatest force multiplier. The emerging axis of autocrats may have partnerships of convenience, but the US has a strong network of highly-institutionalised alliances, backed up by friends all over world. Â
Fortunately, most Americans value this unique asset. While they may currently disagree on many fundamental issues, transatlantic co-operation is not one of them. Support for and pride in the most powerful military alliance the world has ever seen remains strong across the political spectrum. We must do our part to ensure this will not change. For this we need to invest more in defence and shoulder more responsibility. That way we can remind the incoming administration that, far from being a burden, the transatlantic relationship is a key strategic asset in this era of great-power competition.
We should thus not despair but act. Trumpâ€s return challenges us to step up and prove that we are true partners rather than free riders.
