Democracy and peace are not guaranteed when a dictator falls — sometimes, a country’s fate turns uglier and messier.
Look no further than Iraq. The aftermath of Saddam’s fall demonstrates that even most well-intentioned policies under the guise of a “new democracy” can backfire abysmally. Today, Iraq still reels from the consequences of de-Baathification, transitional justice failures and a vague constitution that have contributed to decades of needless sectarian violence and terror.
This does not have to be true of Syria.
In a recent address to the nation, Syria’s new self-appointed president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, pledged a reformed government that protects the rights of all minorities and expressed aspirations of a modern Syria, comparable to Saudi Arabia and its latest reforms.
The outlook is far from promising. Recent reports of intense clashes, allegedly between al-Sharaa’s security forces and members of the Alawite religious minority, have resulted in more than 1,000 deaths just two days, casting serious doubt on the country’s stability.
Yes, Syria faces its own distinct set of challenges. But at a minimum, it must move quickly avoid the sectarian fractures that devastated post-Saddam Iraq.
Iraq’s policy of de-Baathification stands as one of its most disastrous decisions. The government dismissed approximately 100,000 Baathist professionals — party members under Saddam’s regime — from their jobs, disbanded the military, and restructured the government under predominantly Shia leadership, disproportionately affecting Sunnis.
To make matters worse, despite ambitious plans to address Saddam’s legacy of human rights abuses, transitional justice measures focused on purging and persecuting former Baathists. Plans for truth commissions by the best Iraqi lawyers and judges failed to materialise, and working-class educators, doctors and civil servants were treated the same as Saddam’s murderous accomplices. Consequently, thousands of young Sunni men joined violent insurgent groups seeking retribution, including The Islamic State. Among them were Saddam’s most skilled commanders, who became key lieutenants to Caliph al-Baghdadi, head of ISIS.
Syria must avoid a similar policy of de-Alawitization. For decades, more than 80 percent of Alawites — Bashar Assad’s own ethnic group — worked under his government, despite comprising around 10 percent of the country’s population. In reality, however, most soldiers earned as little as $35 a month after the Syrian pound had lost 99 percent of its value since the 2011 civil war. Al-Sharaa has assured Alawites there will be no mass purges and has granted amnesty to most of Assad’s former soldiers.
However, thousands of Alawites remain uncertain about their fate following the dissolution of Syria’s army, security forces and Baathist government. Reports indicate that the new administration has illegitimately replaced thousands of senior administrators across key institutions with unqualified individuals. Meanwhile, the state is planning a major economic overhaul including cutting one-third of public-sector jobs to reduce waste and corruption and transitioning to a “competitive free-market economy.”
Alawites also look to al-Sharaa’s government for protection against active radicals in the country seeking to settle scores with their former tormentors. A major challenge will be balancing sufficient security in Alawite communities despite the severe strain on existing resources and the overwhelming demands of the country.
Although officials have held meetings with the local Alawite leaders emphasizing security and accountability to sectarian agitators, Alawites remain justifiably nervous about their future. Fresh reports from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights state over 162 Alawite civilians have been executed in “field executions” in Syria’s coastal Latakia province. Additionally, heavy fighting erupted in Alawite-concentrated cities early this weekend, resulting in an estimated 830 Alawite civilian deaths, allegedly by Al-Sharaa’s security forces. Analysts are calling this by far the worst violence in Syria since rebels toppled Assad in December.
The situation echoes a warning from a Syrian source quoted in The New York Times: “If the new government cannot guarantee their safety, they will take matters into their own hands to protect themselves.”
These sectarian tensions could be a strategic asset for a country like Iran, which lost a major national ally and access to its critical land routes through Syria used for smuggling weapons to its Lebanese proxies. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated the presence of 70,000 Syrian fighters loyal to Iran and Hezbollah since 2014, organized by Tehran. Ominously, senior Iranian military figure Brig. Gen. Behrouz Esbati hinted at their potential utility early this year: “We can activate the social layers that our guys lived among for years; we can be active on social media, and we can form resistance cells.”
Alarmingly, Syria expert Aaron Y. Zelin of the Washington Institute confirmed that Iran-linked Assad remnants were indeed responsible for triggering the crisis, and have been involved in 46 attacks across multiple provinces since January.
How Syria’s new constitution addresses these fundamental issues will prove extremely consequential. Under immense pressure to stabilize the country and meet tight U.S. deadlines, Iraq hastily drafted a constitution that left key issues of power sharing and the governance of oil-rich regions ambiguous, contributing to a shift toward greater authoritarianism. In an Al Arabiya News interview, al-Sharaa seemed to acknowledge these complexities, outlining a generous three- to four-year timeline for drafting and elections.
However, his administration must reconcile the differing perspectives of Syria’s diverse ethno-sectarian population — including Kurds, Druze and Christians — each with distinct moral and cultural attitudes. More difficult will be striking a balance between state and religion and upholding democratic values, which has historically been a challenge in the Middle East.
A former leader of the al Qaeda-affiliated group Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Sharaa today is positioning himself more as a pragmatist. But his interim government still includes many members of conservative Salafi-jihadist factions that have already removed Darwin and the Big Bang from the public school’s curriculum.
Syria’s future depends on precisely these nuanced policies and tactics evolving behind closed doors. Al-Sharaa’s government should de-escalate sectarian tensions now and develop policies that, unlike those of Bashar Assad, uphold the individual rights and freedoms of all Syrians — rights that were denied for more than five decades.
Syrians must hold their new leaders accountable. Their future and lives depend on it.
Sally Michael is pursuing a master’s degree in conflict and terrorism at The University of Auckland in New Zealand.
