European security and the limits of Trump flattery

Welcome back. It beggars belief that during the biggest war on the continent since 1945, European security should hinge on the good humour of one man. But Nato and its secretary-general Mark Rutte knew what they needed to do at the alliance’s annual summit in The Hague this week: deliver a political victory to Donald Trump to convince him to stick by Nato.

Of course, the meeting was about more than this. Nato members agreed to raise military spending to 3.5 per cent of GDP in order to fulfil new battle plans and capability targets, although Spain refused to go along, a decision it will come to regret if Trump extracts revenge.

But optics are everything. The higher spending promise was designed to appeal to Trump’s vanity, as was his invitation to stay, unique among leaders, at the Dutch royal palace. This was not so much a Nato summit as a Trump summit, as US secretary of state Marco Rubio helpfully put it. Tell me what you think at [email protected].

Obsequiousness

“How far must one go to accommodate a US president who makes no secret of his disdain for his European partners and the hatred he feels for the European Union?” asked Sylvie Kauffmann in Le Monde.

Quite far, it seems.

Rutte lavished praise on Trump for the defence spending pledges only to suffer the indignity of seeing his fawning private messages relayed to the world by the president on social media. Rutte admitted his extravagant flattery was a “matter of taste” but insisted that the praise for Trump was merited. In any case, it worked.

Trump reassured his Nato allies he was “with them all the way” and that he no longer regarded the alliance as a “rip-off”. He signed up to a summit statement reaffirming its “ironclad commitment to collective defence”. The meeting presented a picture of unity. But it is only as good as Trump’s next utterance. 

European security rests on assumptions that can no longer be taken for granted. 

The sense of political solidarity and shared perception of the risk from Russia that underpin a mutual defence commitment no longer exist.

A transition plan

In the short term there is the pressing question of how far the US will pull back from European security as it shifts its focus to Asia.

As Oana Lungescu, a former long-serving spokesman for Nato, put it in a commentary for the Royal United Services Institute:

Sooner or later, the withdrawal of some combat troops and key capabilities from Europe seems inevitable. How soon and how much will make all the difference . . . The secretary-general’s next battle will be to ensure that there are no surprises, and that any US withdrawals are done gradually, without leaving any gaps in Europe’s defence before Europeans are ready to fill them.

The FT’s editorial board argued:

The alliance needs a co-ordinated transition plan so that the Europeans can step up as the Americans step back. This is especially true when it comes to so-called “critical enablers” — such as satellite intelligence, reconnaissance and targeting, heavy transport aircraft or air defence — where Europe depends heavily on the US.

According to the German Marshall Fund think-tank:

A realistic midterm target could be a 70/30 (Europe/United States) burden-sharing split, with Europe assuming political leadership and primary responsibility for conventional defence, while the United States retains its nuclear umbrella and a tailored conventional footprint.

It would mean the Europeans “limiting their demands to a few critical capabilities that they cannot replace in the short term”, the GMF report says. It would require the Europeans to assume far greater leadership for defence, it adds.

Very nice, actually

Trump adopted a tougher tone on Russia in The Hague, saying Vladimir Putin “really has to end that war”, while warming to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, whom he described as “very nice”. Zelenskyy was positive about his own conversation with Trump and believes the president is beginning to see that Putin does not want to end the war.

But Trump’s attitude to the Ukrainian and Russian leaders oscillates. He has shown flashes of irritation with Putin before, but has refused to impose sanctions on Russia or blame it squarely for attacking Ukraine. There is still no sign of substantive change. 

“If we did what everybody here wants us to do, and that is come in and crush them with more sanctions, we probably lose our ability to talk to them about the ceasefire and then who’s talking to them?” Rubio told Politico.

The Nato summit statement contained only one reference to Russia, describing the country as a “long-term threat”, and one brief statement of support for Ukraine — a striking difference from previous meetings.

Not so nice

After joining the backslapping in the Netherlands, European leaders headed to Brussels for an EU summit where one of the main issues is how to fend off a trade war with their American partner. Another Trump-focused summit. As French President Emmanuel Macron said in The Hague, agreeing among allies to lift their spending on defence only for the US and EU to declare trade war on each other is an “aberration”.

The US president may have reaffirmed his commitment to Nato’s Article 5 mutual defence clause. But, as former Nato boss Anders Fogh Rasmussen told Le Grand Continent (French language), he is clearly in breach of Article 2, whereby members will “seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them”. 

How far will US antagonism towards Europe go? It is not just the trade war but ideological rivalry that risks undermining collective security. European leaders were stunned when US vice-president JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference in February lectured them that if they failed to accommodate far-right views, “there is nothing America can do for you” in terms of security.

“Trump’s second coming has changed America’s understanding of who to count as friends — and foes — in Europe,” writes Ivan Krastev in the FT.

A US state department essay accusing Europe of waging a campaign against western civilisation suggests Washington is starting to “operationalise” a policy of ideological alignment, Daniela Schwarzer of the Bertelsmann Foundation told me.

The political theorist Luuk van Middelaar reckons Europeans may be underestimating the potency of the Maga sphere of influence argument. 

European leaders and diplomats spend most of their energy on ensuring decent outcomes for security (Nato and Ukraine) and prosperity (tariff wars). Yet, ultimately, the battle for ideas and values will shape the long-term trajectory of Europe-US relations and risks the future of Europe’s own pluralist civilisation.

How confident are you that the Trump administration is committed to collective defence in Europe? Vote in our poll.

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