Last week Canada’s Mark Carney and Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy taught the world some lessons about how to deal with Donald Trump. Yet what Ukraine’s success has also shown is that reaching a deal with Trump brings only limited benefits, and even those are unreliable.
The broader and deeper lesson is that whatever deals are made, the world will now have to learn to live without America. We cannot operate as if America does not exist, but we need to adapt ourselves to make America’s influence as unimportant as we possibly can.
When you share an 8,900-kilometer border with the United States, and that country is the buyer of 75% of your goods exports, it is pretty hard to make America unimportant. That is the reality that Canada’s prime minister, Mark Carney, will now have to face following his election victory.
He has shown that standing up to the American bully helps you win patriotic votes at home. He has also shown that a determined leader can force Trump to treat him and his country with respect. But this does not reduce the damage that Trump’s tariffs are doing on both sides of that border.
The deal that Ukraine signed this week with the United States concerning the future development of Ukraine’s large holdings of critical minerals also shows the value of standing up to the bully, as well as how readily tempted that bully is by money.
The idea of a joint fund to develop mines and processing factories once the war with Russia is over was first proposed by Zelenskyy to President Joe Biden last September, but was then re-shaped in the hope of appealing to Trump.
The often rancorous negotiations since Trump’s January inauguration, which were conducted at the same time as the Trump administration was re-opening talks with Russia about ending the war and re-starting diplomatic and business relations, also certainly have taught us some lessons. Whether this whole process will make any difference to the war is doubtful, however, which may be a lesson in itself.
One lesson is that when he sees the chance, Trump is willing to make extortionate, outrageous demands just to see how the counterpart reacts and to try to put them on the defensive. America’s opening demand that its mineral rights in Ukraine should be as large as $500 billion and should represent repayment for its past military aid was in the style of a gangster.
But the second lesson is that this American gangster will back down quickly if you push back hard and show that you have alternatives.
In the minerals deal that was signed this week, America has agreed to almost every economic or commercial demand that Ukraine asked for. Unlike America’s opening demands, the joint fund that will manage investments will be under proper control by the country’s government and parliament, and will not be obliged to pay any profits to America for ten years.
In fact, it is hard to see what benefit the deal brings to Trump, beyond the simple news that a deal has been signed, for any commercial benefits to US companies will come long after he has left the scene.
This is the third and perhaps most serious lesson: that a deal with Trump may be of little value, beyond the initial media headlines. Ukraine did not succeed in getting the one thing it originally hoped for: a continuing American commitment to supply weapons and to contribute to a security guarantee after any peace settlement or ceasefire has been reached with Russia.
The one small comfort is that the minerals deal gives America an interest in Ukraine’s remaining an independent, sovereign country, an interest that could provide a counterbalance to whatever benefits Trump might think he can get from Russia. But that comfort cannot really be relied upon, for Trump could in the future equally tear up the deal he has made with Zelenskyy.
The harsh truth is that as things stand this minerals deal will make no difference to what happens in the war, and may never even come to fruition. From Ukraine’s point of view, it is better to have signed it than not, for it does promise theoretical benefits. But the daily struggle of survival will continue, as does the task of trying to find ways to protect Ukraine’s, and therefore Europe’s, security in the long term.
For the other, rather fundamental, lesson from the past week is that, while Trump’s foreign policy can be destructive regarding old alliances and global institutions, it is so far lacking in any constructive goals or strategy. His removal, announced as always on social media, of his National Security Adviser, Mike Waltz, and Waltz’s nomination as US Ambassador to the United Nations, demonstrated this with clarity and even cruelty.
Commentators tried to find a policy-related rationale for this reshuffle: perhaps Waltz argued for a more aggressive American stance towards China or Iran than Trump feels comfortable with? Perhaps Waltz was too negative about Russia? We will never know the full answer, but in the end the decision was likelier to be personal, about the “Chat-gate” scandal, rather than policy-related, for that is the way Trump appears to operate.
With Trump engaged in a trade war with China that currently amounts to a blockade against each other’s’ exports it is hard to see how being too aggressive would have counted against Waltz, even though there are signs that China and America might be preparing to open talks.
Vice President JD Vance told Fox News soon after the minerals deal was signed that he did not expect the war in Ukraine to end “any time soon,” making it sound as if America is giving up its half-hearted attempts to push the two sides towards a ceasefire. This at least has the merit of clarity.
Ukraine, Russia and the rest of Europe will have to assume that from now on America will not be involved in any serious way. When Friedrich Merz is formally appointed Germany’s new chancellor on May 6 he will need to speak and act accordingly: Europe, led by Germany along with France, Britain and Poland, will have to become Ukraine’s main supplier of weapons and missile defense systems, will have to do what it can to step in if America ceases to offer intelligence or communications support to Ukraine, and will have to play a leading role in any negotiations from now on.
Deals may come and deals may go, but the reality is that the future of Europe now depends solely on us Europeans.
Formerly editor-in-chief of The Economist, Bill Emmott is currently chairman of the Japan Society of the UK, the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the International Trade Institute.
This English original of an article published in Italian by La Stampa was itself first published on his Substack, Bill Emmott’s Global View. It is republished here with permission.
