On May 18, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen raised the idea of an European Union (EU)-Australia security and defense partnership with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in Rome, where world leaders gathered for Pope Leo XIV’s inaugural mass.
Von der Leyen made the argument to Albanese: “We are predictable, we share the same values… So we can offer each other stability and we’re very grateful for that. And this is the reason also that we do not only see you as a trading partner, but we see you as a strategic partner, and we would very much like to broaden this strategic relationship.”
Albanese indicated cautious interest in the proposal, though the idea is still in the early stages.
The EU signed security and defense partnerships with Japan and South Korea in November, and indicated a desire to follow a similar model with Australia. The agreements with Japan and South Korea each specify a General Framework that includes: a series of dialogues and consultation mechanisms, exploring the possibility of an Agreement on the Security of Information, exploring the possibility of coordinating capacity building and support to other partners – including through EU-funded programs such as Critical Maritime Routes in the Indo-Pacific (CRIMARIO) and Enhancing Security Cooperation In and With Asia (ESIWA) – and cooperation in multilateral forums. The EU-Japan agreement also highlights the importance of economic security under the General Framework.
There is significant overlap in the areas where the EU has separately pledged cooperation with Japan and South Korea: maritime security; space security and defense; cyber issues; hybrid threats, including strategic communications and countering foreign information manipulation and interference; non-proliferation, disarmament, and control of conventional arms (including small arms and light weapons; bilateral defense initiatives, including exchange of information on defense industrial related matters; counterterrorism and preventing/countering violent extremism; women, peace, and security; and international peace, peace mediation, conflict prevention, and crisis management. The EU-South Korea agreement also lists as areas for cooperation peacekeeping operations and Common Security and Defense Policy missions and operations; training and education in security and defense; external aspects of human trafficking and transnational organized crime; external aspects of economic security; and approaches to resilience of critical infrastructure
Currently, the Framework Agreement between the European Union and Australia, which entered into force in October 2022, guides Australia-EU relations. Areas of cooperation listed in the Australia-EU Framework mirror the EU-Japan and EU-South Korea agreements. In fact, five of the nine areas of cooperation listed under the section on “Political Dialogue and Cooperation on Foreign Policy and Security Matters” in the existing Framework are also listed in the Japan and South Korea agreements, including: crisis management; countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; trafficking of small arms and light weapons and other conventional weapons; cooperation in combatting terrorism; and international security and cyberspace. Two of the nine areas of cooperation – political dialogues and cooperation in regional and international organizations – are listed under the General Framework of the Japanese and Korean agreements.
In other words, an EU-Australia defense and security partnership that is molded on the EU-Japan and EU-South Korea agreements already has strong support and momentum from the existing EU-Australia Framework, but will allow the EU and Australia to both elevate the importance of, and dive deeper in the details on, these critical issues.
Australian analysts were quick to point out the pros and cons of a security and defense partnership with the EU. On the one hand, skeptics argue that Australia should be focusing its attention on shoring up relationships in the Indo-Pacific, not forging new ties with faraway partners in Europe. On the other hand, proponents of the pact point out that it would help diversify Australia’s security relationships, especially as U.S. involvement in AUKUS makes the trajectory of that trilateral pact much more difficult to predict.
More broadly, having more options would help Australia deal with a more uncertain future; after all, the impetus for the European overture – and European strategic rethinking more generally – was not a qualitative change in Russia’s aggressiveness but new levels of U.S. unpredictability and unwillingness to defend Europe. Furthermore, though the EU is farther away from Australia than regional partners, in today’s interconnected world, Europeans also have significant interests in the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific.
It is too early to assess the benefits of an Australia-EU defense agreement to Australia and the EU when so much hinges on the details. At the most incremental end of the spectrum, it could simply be a “formalization” of existing arrangements and practices that Australia already has with countries like Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. However, with Australia due to publish a new National Defense Strategy by early 2026 – which will need to account for the Trump factor – the EU overture provides a good opportunity for Australia to reevaluate its existing and potential security relationships.
One consideration for both Australia and the EU will be if and how NATO would fit into this.
Any Australia-EU agreement will almost certainly not include a mutual defense obligation. However, studying what concerns states have with regards to defensive alliances may help us think about how an Australia-EU agreement might be crafted to address or avoid raising these concerns. Based on a close reading of alliance dynamics between other partners, Australia and the EU may worry that they do not share the same threats, or prioritize common threats differently. There may be concern that a defense agreement would provoke Russia and/or China; would foreclose arrangements with other states, including Russia and China; or would unduly constrain Australian or EU foreign policy. Finally, there may be worries that the other party is not capable enough to be worth signing an agreement with. Given that an Australia-EU agreement will not be an alliance in the strict sense of the word, these concerns should, in general, be less intense but are still likely to emerge in domestic debates.
Despite the lack of a formal security partnership, Australia continues to be a strong supporter of Ukraine. While in Rome, Albanese also met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and promised continued aid against Russia, including the delivery of Abrams trucks. Albanese also reiterated that Australia would consider sending peacekeeping troops as part of a coalition of the willing “if a peace process emerges.”
Meanwhile, Australia and the EU are also still in negotiations for a free trade agreement. The last attempt, which began in 2018, ended in October 2023 when Australia rejected the EU proposals because it did not meet Australian expectations regarding agricultural products.
