The Trump administration’s recent decisions to quietly sideline two high-profile visits by Taiwanese leaders have raised concerns in both Washington and Taipei, raising doubts about the U.S. commitment to Taiwan. But these moves – postponing President Lai Ching-te’s New York stopover and canceling a meeting between Taiwan’s defense minister, Wellington Koo, and U.S. officials – are more likely about short-term trade diplomacy. History has shown that it may be too early to assume that Trump’s concessions on Taiwan represent a fundamental, long-term shift in U.S. policy.
First of all, the timing matters. In mid-July, as reports surfaced of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s planned stopover in New York, Beijing immediately voiced its protests – a common practice. Meanwhile, U.S. and Chinese officials were preparing for a round of trade talks in Stockholm. This marked the third round of negotiations, following the June talks in London that attempted to repair the short-lived agreement reached in Geneva in May. As a result of these successive negotiations, tariffs that had soared into triple digits were now trimmed, Washington eased export restrictions on Nvidia’s H20 AI chips, and Beijing resumed rare-earth shipments to the United States.
In the context of this tentative détente, the White House advised Lai to postpone the stopover in New York and quietly hold off on Taiwanese Defense Minister Wellington Koo’s visit to Washington D.C. By demonstrating symbolic restraint, the Trump administration appeared to be signaling a willingness to create a more conducive atmosphere for a potential summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and China’s President Xi Jinping.
This is not the first time Trump has leveraged the Taiwan issue in an attempt to de-escalate tensions during trade talks. In 2019, the Trump administration delayed a long-anticipated fighter jet sale to Taipei – an action widely interpreted at the time as an effort to improve prospects for a trade deal with China. However, that overture collapsed a month later when the administration raised tariffs from 10 percent to 25 percent on $200 billion of Chinese goods after futile talks between Washington and Beijing. By the end of his first term, Trump had approved more arms sales to Taiwan by value than any of his predecessors since 1990.
This precedent suggests that the latest moves by the Trump team are more likely short-term tactical adjustments rather than indicators of a long-term recalibration of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. As in his first term, for Trump flexibility on Taiwan remains a bargaining instrument that can be dialed up or down depending on the state of negotiations. Moreover, given both Trump’s own unpredictability and the fact that bilateral trade talks are still in flux, these gestures are unlikely to signal a lasting shift – and could easily be reversed.
Moreover, Trump has largely adhered to the long-standing U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding Taiwan. Asked in February whether the United States would defend the island, he demurred: “I never comment on that.” Even before taking office, Trump framed his response similarly, emphasizing flexibility: “I never say… I have to negotiate things, right?” Those non-answers are in fact in line with U.S. practices in the past four decades: keep options open and refuse to pre-commit to any specific response to a military move by Beijing against Taiwan.
While Trump himself keeps the message deliberately vague, his senior Cabinet officials have at times drawn a clearer line of deterrence. In a July interview, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated: “We remain as committed as ever to our partners… in places like Taiwan.” And at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned bluntly about the Chinese military’s threat to Taiwan and the need to accelerate preparations.
Actions may speak louder than words. In June, senior Taiwanese officers were invited as observers to learn from a U.S.-led multilateral air exercise in Alaska, showcasing continued U.S. security assistance to Taiwan. In February and April, the Trump administration sent U.S. naval ships to the Taiwan Strait – a routine practice demonstrating U.S. deterrence and reassurance toward Beijing and Taipei, respectively. The Trump administration has also pressed to accelerate deliveries and clear the years-long backlog of approved arms for Taiwan.
Nor is the White House the only actor that matters in shaping U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Members of Congress have long set guardrails, which are grounded in the Taiwan Relations Act, to uphold U.S. commitments to the island.
Lee Teng-hui’s 1994-95 saga is the textbook example of congressional influence. When the Clinton administration allowed Lee only a refueling stop in Honolulu, lawmakers bristled and exercised their legislative authority to compel the State Department to relax transit rules. Similarly, in 1995, when the White House tried to head off Lee’s “private” visit to Cornell, Congress passed H.Con.Res. 53 by lopsided margins urging approval. Faced with near-consensus, President Bill Clinton reversed course yet again.
Congressional support endures and has intensified in recent years. From 2017 to 2023, lawmakers introduced 124 Taiwan-related bills, double the number introduced in the prior eight years. Congressional delegations show the same trend: while trips to Beijing outnumbered visits to Taipei before 2020, the flow has reversed since then.
Although Republicans have refrained from criticizing Trump’s recent moves sidelining Taiwan, their silence has not precluded the upcoming congressional delegation to Taipei led by Sen. Roger Wicker (R-MS), chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a longtime advocate for Taiwan.
In short, the Trump team’s decisions to postpone Lai’s New York transit and reschedule Koo’s visit are likely tactical steps to protect a fragile trade track, instead of a strategic retreat on Taiwan. The administration’s past actions suggest these gestures may be reversible, particularly if trade talks stall, and Trump’s public statements continue to align with the doctrine of strategic ambiguity. Meanwhile, continuity in Taiwan-U.S. military cooperation and congressional support remain key sources of assurance and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.
