Taiwan’s security is too often reduced to a number on a spreadsheet or a partisan talking point. Commentators such as Alexander B. Gray have issued valid warnings: that Taiwan’s defense spending remains inadequate, that the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait is tilting toward Beijing, and that U.S. support is not guaranteed. These are legitimate concerns. But the exclusive focus on budget figures and political blame games risks obscuring the far greater challenge: Taiwan’s misallocated budget and energy on domestic politics rather than managing military procurement projects.
The most urgent reality is that the ambitions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are no longer limited to Taiwan; Beijing’s military modernization is aimed at achieving political reordering. Taipei cannot be expected to shoulder the burden alone, because the defense of Taiwan is not a parochial issue. Taiwan’s arms procurement plans and military doctrine, no matter how ambitious, cannot by themselves pose a credible counterweight to the PLA’s systemic rise.
Just as Europe’s security depends on NATO’s collective strength, Asia’s stability requires multilateral coordination. A formal alliance structure akin to NATO may be politically unrealistic in the short term, given the region’s fragmented geopolitics. But this does not invalidate the need for multilateral thinking. When planning for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait and assessing the regional implications of PLA expansion, leaders must resist the temptation to demand that Taiwan engage in an unsustainable arms race – such as calls to increase its military budget to over 10 percent of GDP. This is not only fiscally irresponsible; it is strategically misguided.
Instead, the United States should lead efforts to embed Taiwan into a broader, institutionalized network of regional resilience. This includes automated and secure intelligence sharing, joint logistical and ammunition planning, and cooperative frameworks for maritime security and coastal defense training with key regional partners. For its part, Taiwan must orient its defense priorities toward this multilateral strategy – not reduce defense policy to a domestic contest over political credit or procurement contracts.
Inside Taiwan, debate is frequently dominated by a single question: how much money should be spent? But this question misses the point. The critical issue is not the topline budget figure, but what capabilities are acquired, how fast they can be delivered and deployed, and whether they meet Taiwan’s operational requirements in a modern battlefield. Repeated delivery delays – especially in the aftermath of U.S. commitments to Ukraine and the Gaza conflict – have left Taiwan exposed at a time when urgency is rising.
Equally important is the composition of Taiwan’s future force. While asymmetric capabilities such as mobile missile units, sea mines, and drones are indispensable to defending a geographically small island, Taiwan should not exclude the option of balancing these tools with other conventional systems – including fighter aircraft and frontline naval assets – that support broader deterrence goals.
Overcommitting to asymmetric warfare may send an unintended message. To Beijing, it might suggest that Taiwan has abandoned its longstanding goal of maintaining air and naval superiority within 24 nautical miles of its coastline, and is instead preparing for a prolonged urban war, hoping to impose reputational costs on China through civilian destruction and international condemnation. To Taiwan’s own people, it could imply that in the event of invasion, entire towns may suffer Mariupol-style devastation, shaking public confidence in the value – and feasibility – of national defense.
Such a posture would also undermine morale within Taiwan’s conventional forces. If pilots and naval officers believe they will be sent into battle without adequate platforms or modernization plans, their willingness to fight and sustain operational effectiveness will erode – especially as the PLA’s fleets of modern warships and advanced aircraft continue to expand.
Looking ahead, Taiwan must remain adaptive and forward-looking. The September 3 military parade in Beijing is expected to unveil new PLA platforms – probably including large long-range drones, autonomous land vehicles, amphibious robotic units, and underwater systems designed to neutralize aircraft carriers. If these systems are deployed, not only Taiwan but also its regional partners will need time to re-evaluate procurement strategies and update defense doctrines. Taiwan should avoid placing hasty orders for legacy platforms based on outdated assumptions, and instead pursue a sober reassessment of its future force structure in line with emerging PLA capabilities.
Military preparedness, however, extends beyond equipment. Taiwan also needs trained personnel, resilient infrastructure, and secure supply chains. One of the island’s greatest vulnerabilities is energy security. By phasing out nuclear energy, the current Democratic Progressive Party government has left Taiwan dependent on natural gas supplies that would last only 14 days in a crisis, making it dangerously exposed to economic and military coercion.
A national referendum on August 23 is expected to support restarting Taiwan’s Third Nuclear Power Plant. While welcome, this is only a first step. Taiwan must go further: embracing advanced small modular nuclear reactors, which offer safe, decentralized, and environmentally friendly power solutions. Such systems are not only pragmatic – they are essential to a modern defense strategy.
Finally, any serious strategic calculus of Taiwan must account for U.S. domestic politics. U.S. foreign policy has historically oscillated between global engagement and retrenchment. These pendulum swings are driven by domestic debates, not alliance obligations, and are beyond Taiwan’s control.
In this context, Taiwan must demonstrate that it is not a reckless actor, and that it will not trigger crises that pull Washington unwillingly into conflict. By exercising strategic restraint and prudent decision-making, Taiwan can help preserve the bipartisan consensus in the United States – a consensus that views Taiwan as a model democracy worth protecting, a reliable high-tech powerhouse that benefits the liberal order, and a beacon of hope for Chinese-speaking communities in the future.
But Taiwan must also recognize a hard truth: U.S. support is not unconditional. The primary burden of defense lies with the Taiwanese people and their military. And that defense must be grounded in sound strategy, fiscal sustainability, and timely, deliverable procurement commitments.
Alexander Gray is right to caution against complacency. But the solution is not to chase arbitrary spending thresholds. Taiwan’s future security depends on its ability to integrate into regional strategies, adapt to evolving PLA capabilities, and manage its cooperation with the United States and its partners responsibly.
