When President Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Ivan Chenin left his comfortable life as a student in Moscow to deliver aid as a volunteer to the separatist Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics of eastern Ukraine, which Russia now claims as its “new territories”.
After returning from a trip to the occupied areas of Ukraine last year, Chenin jumped further into the fray, enlisting in the Thunder Cascade volunteer unit.
“I served as an operator of a reconnaissance UAV [drone],” Chenin told Al Jazeera.
“My duties included surveillance and reconnaissance of enemy territory. If a target was detected, I reported to the commander, after which we controlled it. Then the artillery or missile systems worked.”
Chenin is one of nearly half a million people who took on a military career in Russia last year, whether as contract soldiers or members of volunteer units.
While Ukraine struggles with manpower to the point that recruitment officers are accused of dubiously detaining young men off the street, Russia, for now, does not appear to have this problem.
In March, Putin claimed at a meeting that Russia is recruiting new servicemen at twice the rate Ukraine is.
Ukrainian officials in Kyiv said in April that the Russian military plans to increase its grouping in Ukraine by 150,000 soldiers this year. Earlier this month, the deputy head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Vadym Skibitsky, stated that “the Russian Federation’s recruitment plans are being fulfilled by at least 105 to 110 percent each month”, putting it well on track to fulfil its quotas by the end of the year.
‘Reduced casualties’
The British Ministry of Defence says more than a million Russian soldiers have been killed in wartime – a toll that is impossible to independently verify, given that Russia keeps these statistics secret, but is consistent with other estimates by Western intelligence agencies and think tanks.
But according to Oleg Ignatov, senior Russia analyst at Crisis Group, one reason behind Russia’s swelling number of troops is that it is now suffering fewer losses.
“This is explained by a change in tactics,” he told Al Jazeera.
“Russia has almost stopped using heavy equipment on the battlefield because it is highly vulnerable to drones. The last time Russia used heavy equipment on a large scale was during the Kursk operation in winter,” he added, referring to Ukraine’s counterattack in western Russia.
“Russia has not attacked with large groups of soldiers for a long time. Russia uses small groups, sometimes one or two people, to gradually infiltrate Ukrainian army positions under the cover of drones and artillery. This reduces casualties.”
There are also other factors at play.
In the first year of the war, thousands of young men eligible for military service fled towards neighbouring countries such as Georgia and Mongolia. Police patrolled subways and raided accommodation housing migrants to round up potential draftees.
These fears of being press-ganged have now largely dissipated.
“In reality, since November 1, 2022, there is no call-up for mobilisation,” said a human rights lawyer from Appeal to Conscience, a collective that helps eligible recruits avoid military service.
“At the same time, the mobilisation period is ongoing and has not been lifted; that is, those who are mobilised and already serving cannot quit until the end of mobilisation. Since 2022, instead of conscripting for mobilisation, the regions have been given the task of recruiting contract soldiers. Only those recruited under contract can … participate in the war.”
The lawyer added that the confusion is exploited by unscrupulous recruiters who tell their targets that, since conscription is still in place, they are obliged to sign a contract. There have been cases where conscripts have had contracts signed on their behalf, which is illegal in Russia.
Others are attracted by the generous salaries.
Last year, Putin signed a decree that offered new contract soldiers a welcome bonus of 400,000 roubles (roughly $4,970) from the federal government. Local authorities were encouraged to at least double that sum, plus provide a minimum monthly salary of 204,000 roubles ($2,500) and additional perks such as assistance with loans. For those down on their luck or from poorer, underdeveloped rural areas, the offers are attractive.
“One way or another, the most vulnerable to recruitment for a contract are people suffering from poverty, as well as those who have come to the attention of the police, for example, those who … are caught for petty thefts and other crimes,” the lawyer, who requested anonymity, continued.
“Also vulnerable to recruitment and coercion to serve under a contract are labour migrants, foreign citizens or new citizens. It is clear that the poorer and more [economically] depressed the regions are, the more they suffer from recruitment.”
A significant portion of Russia’s front-line forces are fighting for something even more alluring than money: freedom. Throughout the war, prisoners, including those convicted of murder and rape, have been let loose from their cells, issued a rifle and sent to fight in Ukraine.
Seen as disposable, they were ordered to storm Ukrainian positions in human wave assaults in battles, such as the fierce fighting in Bakhmut in mid-2023, where Russian forces were accused of war crimes. If they survived, they returned to Russia as free men and were embraced as heroes worthy of redemption.
But rehabilitation is not always successful: recidivism is a problem among veterans, emboldened by the fact that if they are caught again, they can simply re-enlist.
Last year, the government expanded the scheme to include those awaiting trial or merely under investigation.
“On average, 50 people leave [prison] colonies in a single stream, about once a week, so you can imagine the scale of the outflow,” estimated Ivan Chuviliaev, spokesman for Go By The Forest, an organisation that helps soldiers avoid mobilisation.
Partly as a result, Russia’s once-massive prison population has plummeted by 120,000 in the past two years to a record low of 313,000, according to a report in the Moscow daily MK in February. Correctional facilities around the country are now closing.
But these tactics are not always necessary. A survey earlier this year by the independent pollster Levada showed 75 percent of the Russian public supporting the war; recruits such as Chenin are drawn by patriotism.
“The first and most important thing is love for the motherland. Everything else is secondary,” he said.
“All the guys I served with were real Russians in the broadest sense of the word, because they went to war at the call of their hearts. I especially remember my Buryat brother in arms – for me, he is an example of true brotherhood and loyalty.”
