The optics of this trip, and his careful decision to return home before China’s September 3 military parade, reveal the fine balance New Delhi is trying to strike between Beijing and Tokyo.
Modi will travel directly from Tokyo to Tianjin for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit (August 31–September 1). By skipping the parade in Beijing, he avoids a gesture that Japan sees as deeply antagonistic.
Japan has urged countries not to attend the event, arguing that Beijing’s commemorations are laced with anti-Japanese overtones.
China, a member of the Allied Powers that fought Germany, Japan and Italy during World War II, will hold a parade at Beijing’s Tiananmen Square on September 3.
The event will mark what Beijing describes as its victory in the 1937–1945 “War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression” and the “World Anti-Fascist War.”For India, whih is mending ties with China after years of border tensions, attendance might have been interpreted as neutrality.But as Ivan Lidarev of the National University of Singapore told the South China Morning Post, Modi’s presence would have been viewed at home as “cosying up to India’s rivals” and abroad as “a major dig” at Japan, a country India simply cannot alienate.
Quad and critical minerals
Ahead of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Tokyo, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri underlined the growing importance of the Quad partnership with Japan, Australia and the United States.
“The Quad is indeed an important platform for working on and promoting peace, stability, prosperity and development in the Indo-Pacific region,” Misri said at a press briefing, as reported by Reuters.
But the grouping is not without strain. India’s ties with Washington, another key Quad member, have come under pressure after President Donald Trump imposed tariffs of up to 50% on Indian imports.
The uncertainty has also cast doubt on India’s plans to host a Quad leaders’ summit later this year. The last such meeting took place in the US in September 2024.
One area where the Quad has been pushing ahead is critical minerals.
“There’s an initiative with regard to critical minerals that has been discussed recently overall with regard to how to make supply chains more resilient and also infrastructure development,” Misri noted, without elaborating.
These minerals are essential for supply chains of the future, and a space where India and Japan’s interests increasingly converge.
Still, India’s position is complicated. In June, Reuters reported that New Delhi asked a state-run miner to suspend a 13-year agreement on rare earth exports to Japan, citing the need to safeguard domestic supply.
Export volumes are limited, but as per Reuters, analysts point out that India lacks the scale, infrastructure and technology to compete with China in mining or processing rare earths, a group of 17 elements crucial for everything from lasers and military equipment to EV magnets, wind turbines and consumer electronics.
Against this backdrop, Modi will travel to Japan for the eighth time since taking office in 2014. He is set to meet Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, with both leaders expected to launch new initiatives to tackle “emerging opportunities and challenges,” Misri said.
For India, cooperation with Tokyo is not just strategic, it is indispensable.
Why Japan matters
Bilateral trade between India and Japan stood at $22.85 billion in FY 2023–24, with Japanese exports at $17.69 billion and imports at $5.15 billion, according to the Indian Embassy in Tokyo. India ran a trade deficit of $12.54 billion with Japan that year.
India ranks 18th among Japan’s trading partners, while Japan is 17th for India. The figures may look modest, but they don’t capture the weight of Japanese investment in India.
The Japan Bank for International Cooperation’s 2024 survey once again ranked India as the “most promising country” for Japanese investors in both the medium and long term.
Since 2000, Japanese firms have invested about $43 billion in India, largely in automobiles, electronics, telecom, chemicals and insurance.
Today, nearly 1,400 Japanese companies operate in India across 5,000 business establishments, while just over 100 Indian companies maintain a presence in Japan.
Several Japanese giants have tied their future to India’s growth.
Just this week, Suzuki Motor announced an $8 billion investment in India’s electric vehicle sector, underscoring its long-term bet on the market.
Looking ahead, both sides are preparing to deepen cooperation further. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri has said Prime Minister Modi and his counterpart Shigeru Ishiba are expected to launch “several new initiatives” spanning semiconductors, artificial intelligence, space and defence.
Japanese media also report that the leaders will travel to Miyagi Prefecture to tour the Tohoku Shinkansen plant, highlighting Japan’s central role in India’s bullet train project.
As part of that, India and Japan are set to sign an agreement for the transfer of Japanese E-10 coaches in 2030 for the Mumbai–Ahmedabad high-speed rail line. Additional documents on economic security, technology and defence cooperation are also likely to be formalised during the visit.
The strategic logic is clear.
Japan is one of the few countries whose political establishment, businesses and public opinion align in supporting closer ties with India.
From the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) of 2011 to the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative launched with Australia in 2020, Tokyo has consistently sought to embed India in its economic and strategic orbit.
India and Japan share civilisational links that stretch back more than a millennium.
The India Brand Equity Foundation traces the first connections to the visit of the Indian monk Bodhisena in 752 AD. The relationship took modern shape in 1952, when the two countries established diplomatic ties.
Since then, the partnership has steadily deepened, evolving from cultural affinity into one of strategic and economic importance. Today, Japan is recognised as a key partner in India’s economic transformation.
India was the first country with which Japan signed a peace treaty after WWII, and the two nations now enjoy what they call a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.”
The China factor
Yet, this partnership exists in the shadow of China.
As Vijay Prashad of the Tricontinental Institute suggested on Chinese media outlet Guancha.cn, Modi could have used the WWII parade in Beijing to strengthen a trilateral front with Russia and China.
“[China, India, and Russia] can hold a tripartite meeting and, by leveraging the power of Russia as an ally, effectively resolve the differences between China and India,” Prashad said during a live show on Guancha.cn on July 26.
But as Lidarev and other analysts stressed, doing so would risk alienating Japan and invite domestic backlash.
The South China Morning Post quoted Li Hongmei of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies as saying that Modi’s presence at the parade was “not a key indicator” of India-China ties.
What mattered, she argued, was participation in the SCO summit. That distinction explains New Delhi’s choreography: re-engage Beijing cautiously, but never at the cost of Tokyo.
Walking the tightrope
India’s strategy, then, is not about choosing sides but avoiding the wrong gestures. For a country that depends on Japanese investment, technology transfer and supply chain diversification, undermining the partnership would be self-defeating.
The Dalai Lama controversy, Pakistan’s use of Chinese jets and border flare-ups remind New Delhi that China remains unpredictable. Japan, on the other hand, has been a consistent partner in trade, infrastructure and defence.
As Misri put it, “This will also be an opportunity to launch several new initiatives in order to build greater resilience in the relationship, and to respond to emerging opportunities and challenges.”
That’s diplomatic understatement for a simple truth: India cannot afford to upset Japan, even as it seeks a working relationship with China.
as a Reliable and Trusted News Source
