The longstanding diplomatic and economic partnership between China and Israel finds itself increasingly strained as escalating tensions between Washington and Beijing force Jerusalem into an uncomfortable balancing act.
What was once a pragmatic relationship built on mutual technological cooperation and trade has become a complex geopolitical calculation, with Israel caught between its most important ally and one of its largest trading partners.
For over three decades, China and Israel developed robust economic, technological, and diplomatic ties that seemed to transcend geopolitical rivalries. Chinese investment flowed into Israeli technology companies, bilateral trade flourished, and both nations benefited from cooperation in sectors ranging from semiconductors to agricultural technology.
However, recent events have fundamentally altered this dynamic, creating tensions that neither side anticipated.
The relationship began deteriorating significantly following Hamas’s attacks on Israel in October 2023 and Israel’s subsequent military response. Beijing’s reaction to these events marked a sharp departure from its previously more neutral stance.
Rather than maintaining diplomatic balance, China increasingly aligned itself with pro-Palestinian positions, condemning Israeli actions and supporting UN resolutions critical of Israel’s military policy.
The most significant impact of US-China tensions on Israel has manifested in the technology sector, where Israel finds itself at the center of what experts call a “technology triangle.”
Washington has intensified pressure on Israel to limit technology transfers to China, particularly in sensitive areas like semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and defense technologies that could enhance Chinese military capabilities.
This pressure has produced tangible results. Israeli exports of semiconductors to China declined from US$21 million in 2020 to just $11 million in 2022, while Chinese semiconductor exports to Israel also contracted.
The broader US-led technology restrictions have forced Israeli companies to make difficult choices about their Chinese partnerships, with some deals canceled under American pressure.
The semiconductor industry provides a stark example of these constraints. Israeli companies, despite their technological prowess, have found themselves increasingly restricted in their ability to engage with Chinese partners.
This has economic implications for Israel’s tech sector, which had viewed China as a crucial growth market, but also strategic ones as Israel seeks to maintain its position as a global technology hub.
Despite political tensions, economic ties between China and Israel have shown remarkable resilience. Trade volume reached $16.3 billion in 2024, representing a significant increase from the previous year and demonstrating that commercial relationships can sometimes withstand diplomatic pressures. However, this economic interdependence also creates vulnerabilities for both sides.
China remains heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil, importing roughly 13 percent of its crude from Iran, which creates its own set of complications given Iran’s adversarial relationship with Israel. This energy dependence forces Beijing to balance its support for Tehran against its economic interests in maintaining regional stability, including its relationship with Israel.
The October 2023 Hamas attacks and Israel’s military response in Gaza fundamentally altered Chinese perceptions of Israel. Beijing’s support for UN resolutions critical of Israel and its increasingly vocal criticism of Israeli military actions marked a departure from its previously more balanced approach. Chinese officials have condemned Israeli strikes, particularly those targeting Iran, viewing them as destabilizing to regional security.
This shift in Chinese policy has not gone unnoticed in Israel, where public opinion polling in 2024 showed a majority of Israelis now consider China to be unfriendly or hostile toward their country. The perception that China has chosen sides in the Middle East conflict has damaged the foundation of trust that previously underpinned bilateral cooperation.
The crisis has highlighted broader strategic realignments in the Middle East, where both Washington and Beijing are competing for influence. While the United States has maintained its traditional role as Israel’s primary security guarantor, providing military aid and diplomatic support, China has positioned itself as a potential mediator in regional conflicts, though with limited success.
Beijing’s attempts to cast itself as a peacemaker in the Middle East have been complicated by its strategic partnerships with Iran and its support for Palestinian positions. This alignment has effectively sidelined China from playing a meaningful mediating role in the Israel-Palestine conflict, leaving Washington as the dominant external power broker in the region.
US concerns about Chinese access to Israeli technology have intensified, particularly regarding dual-use technologies that could enhance Chinese military capabilities. Washington has established new dialogue mechanisms with Israel specifically focused on technology cooperation and China policy, indicating the priority it places on preventing technology transfers that could benefit Chinese military modernization.
These concerns have practical implications for Israeli companies and research institutions that had previously engaged freely with Chinese partners. Investment screening mechanisms have been strengthened, and certain types of technological cooperation have been restricted or subjected to enhanced scrutiny.
A relationship in transition
The future of China-Israel relations will likely depend on several key factors. First, the trajectory of US-China competition will continue to influence Israel’s strategic calculations.
As long as Washington maintains its position as Israel’s primary security partner, Israeli policymakers will need to carefully weigh the benefits of Chinese cooperation against American concerns.
Second, regional stability in the Middle East will play a crucial role. If tensions between Israel and Iran escalate, China’s strategic partnership with Tehran could further complicate its relationship with Israel. Conversely, regional stabilization could provide space for China and Israel to rebuild their partnership on new terms.
Finally, the evolution of global technology governance will shape the parameters of China-Israel cooperation. As the United States and China compete for technological supremacy, Israel’s role as a technology innovator places it in a unique but challenging position.
Overall, the relationship between China and Israel is undergoing a fundamental transformation driven by broader geopolitical tensions and regional conflicts. What began as a pragmatic partnership focused on economic and technological cooperation has become entangled in the larger contest between Washington and Beijing for global influence.
For Israel, this transformation presents both challenges and opportunities. While the country must navigate increased pressure from its American ally to limit Chinese cooperation, it also must consider its economic interests and regional security concerns. The path forward will require careful diplomatic balancing and strategic clarity about Israel’s long-term interests in an increasingly multipolar world.
The China-Israel relationship serves as a microcosm of how great power competition affects smaller states’ foreign policy options. As tensions between the United States and China continue to evolve, countries like Israel will find themselves making increasingly difficult choices about alignment and cooperation in a more polarized international system.
The ultimate outcome of this triangular relationship will have implications not only for the three countries involved but also for the broader patterns of international cooperation and competition in the 21st century.
How Israel navigates these competing pressures may serve as a model for other middle powers facing similar dilemmas in an era of renewed great power rivalry.
Leon Hadar is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and contributing editor at The American Conservative. He is the author of “Quagmire: America in the Middle East” and “Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East.”
