The choreography looked promising when Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) hosted India’s Border Security Force (BSF) in Dhaka on August 25–28, 2025, for the 56th director general–level conference. The agenda was wide, the timing sensitive and the stakes unmistakably high. Both sides pledged cooperation on border killings, pushing people across the border without proper procedures, smuggling, riverbank protection and infrastructure near the frontier.
The question now is simple and unforgiving: Will these commitments travel from communiqués to communities living along one of South Asia’s most fraught borders?
The scale and composition of the delegations signaled intent. Dhaka fielded a 21-member team that pulled in the Home and Foreign Affairs ministries, shipping and land agencies and the Rivers Commission. That breadth matters. It reframes the border from a purely security problem to a layered challenge that touches diplomacy, ecology and livelihoods.
India’s 11-member delegation, led by BSF Director General Daljit Singh Chawdhary, brought operational depth and a security-first frame. The subtext on both sides was clear. Border management cannot sit only in uniformed hands. It needs whole-of-government solutions.
Dhaka’s red lines
Bangladesh’s core concerns are stark and long-running. First is lethal force at the border. Fatalities among civilians, including minors, have left deep scars and persistent anger inside Bangladesh.
As BGB chief Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ashrafuzzaman Siddiqui asked during the meetings, how risky could a child be? The emotional force of that question rests on a durable pattern, not episodic tragedy. Over two decades, cumulative deaths and injuries attributed to BSF shootings have created a trust deficit that speeches alone cannot repair.
Second is the problem of push-ins and irregular repatriations. Since early May, Bangladesh has recorded large numbers of people being forced across including Rohingyas, Bangladeshis and some Indian nationals.
New Delhi has pointed to verified handovers through formal channels and to thousands of pending verifications. Dhaka’s bottom line is equally blunt: people must move through procedures, not through riverine darkness at gunpoint.
Third are sovereignty worries around infrastructure within 150 yards of the zero line. Dhaka’s view is that fencing and riverbank work must follow bilateral protocols. That technical point masks a political one. Construction without consultation reads as a sovereignty slight, and it interacts with Bangladeshi resentment over hostile media narratives across the border.
New Delhi’s security lens
India’s priorities are different in emphasis, if not always in destination. The BSF came to Dhaka with a strong focus on curbing smuggling and human trafficking, addressing drone incursions and mitigating threats tied to Indian insurgent groups that New Delhi says have found cover in Bangladesh.
The immediate tactical ask was a faster build-out of a single-row fence to deter illegal crossings. The strategic frame was to operationalize existing frameworks — especially the 2011 Coordinated Border Management Plan (CBMP) and related confidence-building measures — so that day-to-day practice converges with paper promises.
The joint record of discussions reflected some common ground. Both sides pledged to work toward zero fatalities, to intensify night patrols in known hotspots, and to launch border-awareness campaigns that warn communities of the risks of illicit crossings.
They also recognized that enforcement cannot stand alone. Socioeconomic initiatives for frontier villages can shrink the market for smuggling and reduce incentives for risky mobility.
Intelligence sharing and synchronized patrols were cited as the enforcement hinge. Finally, both parties committed to meet again in New Delhi in March 2026, an acknowledgement that continuity is a precondition for credibility.
From promises to proof
Yet the history here is sobering. The border has a long memory, and that memory is saturated with grief. The killing of teenager Felani Khatun in 2011 remains an emblem far beyond the specific tragedy. Even as absolute annual death figures have fluctuated, Bangladeshis perceive a pattern that has not been decisively broken.
The wider region also watches how a large democracy polices its edges with a smaller neighbor. If lethal incidents continue, even at reduced rates, the political cost for Dhaka is real, and the reputational cost for New Delhi is non-trivial.
There is also an implementation gap that no communiqué can hide. The CBMP is more than a decade old. Its core logic — coordinated patrols, real-time communication, graduated response and joint problem-solving — is sound. What has lagged is consistent application and transparent follow-through. Without public benchmarks and regular disclosure, progress becomes unmeasurable and, eventually, unpersuasive to the people who live with consequences.
What tangible trust would look like
- Publish measurable targets and report quarterly. Both sides should release dashboards on key indicators: lethal incidents and injuries; the share promptly investigated and resolved; the proportion of returns processed through formal procedures; and fencing or riverbank work reviewed through bilateral mechanisms. Numbers alone will not restore faith, but numbers that are timely, comparable, and jointly certified can discipline bureaucracies and puncture rumor.
- Create independent, joint inquiries for every fatal incident. Public summaries should be released on a fixed timeline. The unit of accountability should be the event, not the institution. Families need answers. Forces need clear rules and predictable consequences. Officers on both sides benefit when the line between necessary force and excessive force is not only written but enforced.
- Bring communities into the conversation. Cattle traders, farmers and day laborers do not attend DG-level conferences, yet they are the first to feel policy on their skin. Community grievance cells with participation from both forces and local administration can defuse tensions before they turn violent. Monitored joint patrols in select sectors, accompanied by outreach to village councils and religious leaders, can replace myth with contact.
- Formalize humane, rules-based returns — and halt pushbacks. If India’s position is that a significant number of returnees are Indian nationals or irregular migrants, the answer is verification under law, not expulsions by night. If Bangladesh’s position is that some of those pushed in without due process in are Rohingyas or Bangladeshis, the answer is clear documentation and agreed pathways. Neither side benefits from the erosion of procedure. Both gain when due process is seen to work.
- Defuse infrastructure disputes with a standing technical panel. Treat works within 150 yards of the zero line as a confidence problem, not a fait accompli. A panel with a 30-day review clock on proposed projects can convert an irritant into a routine. Where riverbank protection or flood control is genuinely urgent, provisional approvals with transparent documentation can move fast and avoid surprise.
None of these is naïve. Smuggling networks are persistent. Election seasons intensify temptations to dramatize toughness. And any single fatality is enough to reopen old wounds. But the list is precise because the problem is hard and the solution must be boring: procedures that run on time, data that arrives on schedule, and investigations that conclude with decisions people can read.
Bangladesh’s posture in hosting the Dhaka talks was not merely reactive. It was an assertion of agency in a relationship that often gets narrated as asymmetrical. For India, the opening is to align practice with principle and to show that its security at home does not depend on insecurity at a neighbor’s doorstep. For both, the test is whether border diplomacy can move beyond optics.
Trust is cumulative. It accretes in dozens of small encounters where no one dies, no one is humiliated and no one is pushed across a line under threat. If the next meeting in March 2026 arrives with fewer funerals, fewer night crossings and more routine approvals than disputes, Dhaka and New Delhi will have earned the right to use the word “progress.” Until then, the only honest standard is outcomes at the fence, not words at the table.
Meherab Hossain is a research associate at the Center for Global Migration Studies (CGMS), Department of Development Studies, Daffodil International University, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Md Obaidullah is a visiting scholar at Daffodil International University, Dhaka. He is also a graduate assistant at the Department of Political Science, University of Southern Mississippi. He has published extensively with Routledge, Springer Nature and SAGE. Obaidullah also regularly contributes to prominent platforms, including the LSE South Asia blog, The Diplomat, Asia Times, The Geopolitics, Modern Diplomacy, The Business Standard, Daily Observer, New Age and Dhaka Tribune.
