When Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite minority member, seized control of the Ba’ath Party in Syria in 1970, he faced a significant backlash. The Syrian Constitution stipulated that only Muslims could hold the presidency, and the Alawites were deemed non-Muslim by many Sunni groups.
In this critical moment, the Iranian mullahs salvaged Assad’s presidency by declaring the Alawites a branch of Shia Islam. This marked the beginning of a partnership that would shape the Middle East for the next five decades.
Syria under the Assads was the first Arab state to recognize the Islamic Republic of Iran. They supported the nascent regime against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq during the war with Iraq between 1980 and 1988.
In 2011, Bashar al-Assad – fearing for his regime’s survival – invited Iranian military, logistical, and political support into Syria. Iran seized the opportunity to transform Syria into a pivotal state within the so-called “Shia crescent”: a cross-border region predominantly inhabited by Shia populations and Iran-backed groups, stretching from Iran-backed militias in Iraq to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Dubbed the “axis of resistance” by Iran, this geopolitical formation has been instrumental in maintaining Assad’s power, supporting Hezbollah and Hamas against Israel, and consolidating the influence of the Quds forces. The Quds is the military unit tasked with “operations external to Iran to advance the Islamic revolution,” as one analyst put it.
But the Shia crescent has now collapsed. Iran, confronting a new reality in Syria, now faces several options, each with significant regional and global implications.
Early reports indicate that Tehran has adopted a conciliatory approach toward the victorious rebel forces in Syria. But the future of this relationship partly hinges on whether the new Syrian government permits Iranian logistical support to Hezbollah via Syria and invites the Quds forces back to continue their operations against Israel.
Should Tehran perceive this as unlikely, it might resort to destabilizing Syria, as it did in Lebanon in the 1980s and Iraq following Saddam’s fall.
Another possibility is that Iran, believing the “axis of resistance” is lost, might leverage its uranium enrichment capabilities. Iran has already accelerated its uranium enrichment efforts, provoking outcry from the United Nations and European nations, including the U.K.
Facing a second Trump presidency, the Iranian regime might view developing nuclear weapons as the sole deterrent against western and Israeli aggression. It is estimated that Iran has invested $30 billion to $50 billion over the past 13 years in Syria. This sort of funding can now instead be made available for uranium enrichment.
Both scenarios could escalate regional uncertainty beyond the impacts of the past 13 years. Potential conflicts in Syria among rebel groups and a nuclear confrontation between Iran and Israel, which maintains a policy of ambiguity, could further destabilize regional and global geopolitics.
A third possibility could bolster China’s influence in the Middle East. In December 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping, visited Saudi Arabia to establish the China-Gulf Cooperation Council Summit.
A few months later, in February 2023, then-Iranian President, Ebrahim Raisi visited Beijing. By March 2023, China successfully brokered a deal ending the diplomatic isolation between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Despite the resumption of diplomatic relations, several obstacles remain. In November, the Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, thwarted Iranian efforts to arm the Palestinians and sever Gulf Cooperation Council diplomatic ties with Israel. Riyadh has also stipulated that any Saudi investment in Iran would be contingent on Iran abandoning its support for regional proxies.
Facing the loss of its sole Arab ally and much of its sphere of influence, Tehran might seek to capitalize on the opening initiated by China, striving to foster more amicable relations with Arab nations.
This could reduce regional tensions by lowering the Arab states’ threat perception of Iran. However, this would necessitate a significant shift in Iranian foreign policy. Iran’s preference for destabilizing the region through its proxies while accelerating its uranium enrichment program are currently incompatible with deepening rapprochement with Arab states.
Whatever the future holds, the West – particularly the United States – faces a critical question. Should the preferred outcome of rapprochement materialize, it would consolidate Chinese economic and diplomatic influence in the region. It would also position China as a leading global power, capable of engaging with all parties.
This stands in stark contrast to the U.S. position, which has often been marked by military interventions and a more pronounced alignment with specific regional powers, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. Facing Trump’s explicit objective of fighting China economically, Beijing would not miss the opportunity to bolster its global leaderships.
Looking forward – particularly in the Middle East – this necessitates that Washington presents an offer to all involved parties, including Iran, that is more compelling than that of China.
In essence, the forthcoming Trump administration could achieve stabilization in the Middle East and diminish Chinese influence. But it will need to adopt a revised approach toward Iran and work closely with its European allies to revive the 2015 nuclear deal under the new geopolitical circumstances in the region.
The fall of Bashar al-Assad signifies the end of a five decades-long alliance between the Syrian al-Assad regime and the Iranian mullahs. It could easily plunge Iran, and the rest of the world, into an unprecedented state of uncertainty in the region. This would be a situation fraught with both opportunities and dangers.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
