When media outlets in the United States reported that Vice President Kamala Harris was leading former U.S. President Donald Trump in some of the final national polls before the presidential election, South Koreans had cause to expect continuity in South Korea-U.S. relations. Under thebromance between U.S. President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, the two countries have worked side by side to address not only the security threats posed by North Korea but also international issues such as climate change and democracy.
As a result, Trump’s landslide victory in the November 5 polls took many in South Korea by surprise. South Koreans have expressed concerns over his business-style leadership, which had apparently affected the so-called “ironclad” relationship between the two countries. Experts and former government officials who experienced his top-down approach on sensitive issues during Trump’s first term warned the Yoon government to brace for possible impact.
Trump has repeatedly called South Korea a rich country, and during his first term negotiations stalled on the Special Measures Agreement, which is a cost-sharing deal between the South and the U.S. for the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, due to his exorbitant demands. Now that he has been reelected, his administration may seek to reopen the SMA issue, even though the two countriesfinalized a five-year deal last month as a way of hedging against Trump’s return.
Considering his previous attempt toforce a hefty increase in South Korea’s payments when he was in office, his administration could send an updated bill demanding that Seoul to pay “$10 billion” a year (a figure he latched onto during his presidential campaign). Currently, South Korea pays $1.1 billion per year, with annual increased pegged to inflation.
Trump’s businessman mentality was a negative for South Korea when he prioritized money more than sustaining a well-settled alliance with like-minded partners. However, in another area such a style unexpectedly worked: opening negotiations with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
Ultimately, Trump’s attempts at dialogue with Kim failed to entice the North Korean leader to dismantle his nuclear arsenal. But what should be noted is that he was the first sitting U.S. president who sat down with a North Korean leader to discuss denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. No U.S. presidents before Trump directly negotiated with Kim’s father and grandfather, who ruled the country from 1948 to 2011, thus wasting a golden opportunity to halt the North’s attempt to be a nuclear country.
It was reported that Trump’s aides in the White House recommended that he too shouldn’t talk with Kim unless the North Korean leader preemptively took a step to give up his nuclear weapons. However, Trump saw a chance to win global recognition – andmaybe even the Nobel Peace Prize – if he could make the North Korean leader give up his nuclear weapons through summit meetings.
On the campaign trail, Trump highlighted that he had good relationships with autocratic leaders such as Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin when he was in office. He pledged that he would end the Ukraine War “within 24 hours” after he returns to the White House. If he succeeds at that effort, there might be a room to consider renewing the stalled nuclear talks with Kim.
That could be the worst-case scenario for the Yoon government, as Pyongyang has clearly ruled out the possibility of holding any talks with Yoon.
Kim Yo Jong, the powerful sister of Kim Jong Un and the main voice on inter-Korean relations,humiliated Yoon through her belligerent statements against him only three months after Yoon took office. She also clearly noted that Pyongyang will not negotiate with the Yoon government as it does not like Yoon himself.
Kimmay not want to sit down with Trump again. Since their 2019 summit in Hanoi fell apart, North Korea has amended its constitution to expand its nuclear arsenal, and Kim has clearly stated that his nuclear weapons are no longer negotiable. He would not return to the negotiating table unless Trump makes concessions first. And North Korea’s need for such concessions is lower than it was during Trump’s first term. North Korea appeared to have received financial assistance from Russia in return for its supplies of soldiers and ammunition.
Simply speaking, North Korea is not desperate for the United States to lift the devastating economic sanctions at this moment, as it has Russia as a strong back-up. With Moscow resuscitating the North’s devastated economy, Pyongyang will not make friendly gestures toward Trump even after he returns to the White House.
The scenario on the Korean Peninsula could become even more complex during the second Trump administration. For the next two months before Trump takes office, Seoul should prepare itself by devise concrete plans for both strengthening self-defense capabilities and recalibrating its policy on North Korea to renew the stalled inter-Korean dialogue.
Trump and his advisers have repeatedly stated that they view China as the top security threat to the United States. Should a conflict break out in the Taiwan Strait, the United States would want to mobilize its troops stationed in South Korea to support Taiwan. There is nothing South Korea can do to prevent such a move, but it would snowball concerns among South Koreans over the country’s defense capabilities against North Korea. Thus, it is important that Seoul should strengthen its own defense capabilities enough to deter North Korea’s aggression and preemptive strikes against the South’s soil even without the U.S. military support.
Given Pyongyang’s antagonism toward Yoon personally, there would not be room for the South Korean president to engage even if Trump holds another meeting with Kim. However, Yoon at least should let the international community know that he is willing to sit down with Kim to make a peaceful Korean Peninsula with no nuclear weapons. A starting point for this would be an updated stance for peace on the Korean Peninsula, which should include a different approach on North Korea.