On January 6, U.S. National Security Adviser (NSA) Jake Sullivan, accompanied by a delegation of senior U.S. officials, met India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar, and Sullivan’s counterpart, Ajit Doval. During the visit, two sides reviewed progress in key sectors, including the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET).
The trip, Sullivan’s last before the Biden administration gives way to Trump 2.0, concluded with an announcement of key U.S. policy changes that will further bilateral ties. Washington’s planned “updates” to U.S. missile export control policies under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), is expected to boost U.S. commercial space cooperation with India. More importantly, Sullivan announced U.S. efforts to finalize necessary steps to delist Indian nuclear entities from the restricted lists, which will promote civil nuclear cooperation and clean energy supply chains. With the Biden administration’s term set to culminate next week, removing long-drawn barriers vis-à-vis nuclear collaboration will likely happen by January 19.
Jaishankar complimented Sullivan for his “personal contribution” to forging a stronger India-U.S. partnership. Sullivan’s trip materialized a week after Jaishankar’s six-day visit to the United States. During his visit, Jaishankar met senior officials including his counterpart Antony Blinken and Sullivan. He reviewed the progress in bilateral partnership over the last four years while expressing optimism in ties going forward. Jaishankar also met Michael Waltz, President-elect Donald Trump’s nominee for national security adviser, marking first high-level contact with the incoming Trump administration.
Even as Sullivan billed the next decade as propelling the India-U.S. partnership toward an “endless frontier,” both visits were integral to ongoing efforts to facilitate a smooth transition under Trump 2.0, while signifying the structural, deep, and ever-expanding nature of ties.
Multipronged Significance of the Visits
The high-level visits proved to be significant vis-a-vis India’s civil nuclear program (potentially), the future of the bilateral relationship, and the backdrop of recent tensions.
Currently, the major impediment to bilateral civil nuclear cooperation lies in the Code of Federal Regulations (Part 810) of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which gives U.S. nuclear vendors the ability to export equipment to countries under strict safeguards, but bars them from jointly manufacturing any nuclear equipment or performing nuclear design work in designated countries, including India. The planned delisting of Indian nuclear entities is especially noteworthy given that the India-U.S. civilian nuclear agreement has not been operationalized in more than a decade and a half. Moreover, owing to stringent liability provisions in Delhi’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act 2010, the last two decades have seen no nation other than Russia willing to partner with India to establish nuclear power plants.
Sullivan’s announcement could pave the way for joint production of nuclear components for atomic power projects planned in India by deploying U.S. atomic reactors. This also comes when India is hoping to pitch itself as a credible and cost-effective destination to manufacture nuclear reactors, especially small modular reactors (SMRs), with capacity between 30MWe and 300 MWe. While India has expertise in manufacturing SMRs, its reactor technology (based on heavy water and natural uranium), is increasingly out of sync with light water reactors (LWR), the most dominant reactor type globally. With the United States among the leaders in LWR technology, India’s collaboration with the U.S. private sector, scientists, and technologists could be fruitful given India’s technology constraints.
Sullivan’s visit reflected Washington’s commitment to deepen and expedite bilateral cooperation in other key sectors as well, including advanced technologies – especially evident since the inception of iCET. The high-level visit also ended with announced cooperation on co-production of U.S. sonobuoys for the Indian Navy, a first-of-a-kind defense industrial collaboration under iCET on niche undersea technology. As per Make in India principles, American Ultra Maritime will partner with Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) to jointly manufacture sonobuoys as per U.S. Navy standards, with production split across the U.S. and India. In addition to bolstering undersea indigenization, the joint venture would further military interoperability between the two navies since the sonobuoys are interchangeable and interoperable with the Indian Navy’s current U.S.-based equipment, including P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, MH-60R helicopters, and MQ-9B drones.
The visits of Sullivan and Jaishankar also proved the determination of the two sides to prevent unanticipated crises from derailing ties. The visits were opportune and perhaps seemed essential due to multiple episodes of friction in the last three months. First, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted Vikash Yadav, an ex-Research and Analysis Wing officer, for an attempted assassination plot against Sikh separatist leader and U.S. national Gurpatwant Singh Pannun. This was followed by BJP accusations that the U.S. State Department and “deep state” elements were trying to destabilize India, with India’s ruling party branding them as an “evil force.”
Thereafter another DOJ indictment on Gautam Adani and the subsequent withdrawal of Adani Group’s financing request from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation aggravated the escalatory dynamic.
In hindsight, both the visits were symbolic of the matured and structural nature of the relationship, which has previously withstood multiple headwinds.
Thinking Ahead
While bilateral ties experience a peculiar set of issues with every U.S. administration, some scholars argue the impact of discord on trade matters under Trump 2.0 is likely to be relatively substantive for India, which Trump previously dubbed the “tariff king.” However strong strategic alignment between the two partners might temper Trump’s inclinations for imposing tariffs, although threats to impose duties and dialogue on trade issues might continue.
While Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy might entail certain positives for India, including the latter’s ties with Russia, it could also manifest in different approaches to cooperation in sectors like defense. Washington’s potential demands for India to increased defense imports, rather than India’s preferred projects involving technology transfer, could affect the benefits India desires from its ties with the United States. Meanwhile, New Delhi, which is currently in the middle of rapprochement with Beijing, would naturally be circumspect before jumping on a Trump-led anti-China bandwagon. Thus, India is likely to rely on prevalent institutional enablers and bureaucracy for bolstering defense and technology partnership, as it did during Trump’s first term.
While shared concerns about overreliance on imports from China could further private sector investment from both sides in sunrise sectors, sustaining India-U.S. cooperation in key sectors including high-technologies would be contingent on sustained multistakeholder efforts, including via iCET and the India-U.S. Defense Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X). This would also depend on regulatory adjustments from the two countries, especially in sectors like defense, manufacturing, and nuclear. Even as both collaborate in building resilient supply chains, cooperation on establishing a global governance framework including for AI and global commons besides collaborating for regional security is likely to be a key focus area going forward.
