America’s secretary of Defense is its first line of defense. Pete Hegseth admits he couldn’t always walk a line. So how will he hold the line when facing astute counterparts around the world?
Russian Minister of Defense Andrei Belousov, the former minister of Economic Development, has experience aligning his nation’s budget with military needs. He launched an unmanned aviation industry that built 18,000 drones. China’s minister of National Defense, Admiral Dong Jun, served as commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy and as deputy chief of staff of China’s North Sea Fleet. He knows how to interweave various military services to function as a team.
That’s called “jointness,” about which Hegseth knows little. He touted his Army background in the National Guard as a qualification to be secretary of Defense, but just as different cultures, goals and methods divide allies in a coalition, they also divide military branches.
Training and loyalties begin and end with one’s unit. Joint military action is critical for today’s complex missions, right down to compatible communication software. Hegseth lacks the military experience necessary to prepare joint readiness for 10 years out or for tomorrow.
Readiness requires decisions about force structure and capability — how many divisions, navy vessels, fighter aircraft, bombers and missiles. How many troops, how well trained, how recently, and their familiarity with new equipment. Development and manufacture of new weapons takes five to 10 years and stays in our arsenal up to 40 years.
Former President Jimmy Carter’s secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, had a Ph.D. in physics and previously served as U.S. director of Defense Research and Engineering. Brown led development of stealth aircraft, precision-guided bombs and the Polaris missile. He understood why the Soviets wanted to limit the range of those missiles to 600 km past border defenses, because it would the limit would tie America’s hands. At the time of SALT II negotiations to limit the range, 53 percent of Americans lived within 600 km (372 miles) of our coastal borders; Moscow lies 700 km from a border.
The range limit of a treaty affects not only strike capability, but also how the U.S. researches, designs and builds weapons. By avoiding Russia’s suggested limits, America is able to load multiple missiles on one aircraft with an extended striking range. How can Pete Hegseth, who lacks scientific training, guide future weapon treaties to our advantage?
On the other hand, both Andrei Belousov and Dong Jun, men in their mid-sixties, bring decades of experience developing innovative weapons of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance. For the last dozen years, Dong has taught in China’s National University of Defense Technology. China’s new powerful microwave weapon can impede the electronics in our weapon systems. Like secretaries of Defense before him, Hegseth will need to sit down with China to discuss limiting new weapons’ use. He’ll need substantial scientific tutorials to ace that task.
The four original Cabinet positions — the secretaries of State, Treasury and Defense and the Attorney General — have always dealt directly with the president. Former Secretary Brown spoke directly to Carter several times a week. What experience will underpin Hegseth’s advice to President Trump under threats posed by China, Russia, Iran and North Korea?
Given Trump’s view toward NATO, how will he manage the president’s isolationism? NATO has been the bulwark for democratic political systems, an economic resource and the source of significant military contribution. In the western Pacific, Japan and South Korea can help us counter China’s vow to thwart Taiwan’s independence. Does Hegseth have what it takes to manage conflicting points of view when our national alliances and security are at stake?
Even before he grapples with world problems, Hegseth will face tumult within the Pentagon. Our Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines compete with one another for money to research and develop new weapons, and for advanced training. Congress directs funds to each of the armed services by name. At the outset, the secretary of Defense must defend his budget choices — including budget cuts — not only to four military commanders but also to individual members of Congress lobbying for funds to benefit their states.
It’s a grueling process. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs can be an important budget adviser, mediator and ally in Congress, but Hegseth said he intends to “fire” the head of the Joint Chiefs, whom he deems too “woke.” By cutting troops or bases in certain states, Hegseth may find himself besieged by angry Republicans who voted to confirm him. That’s before his inbox fills with a tyranny of headlines that usurp his focus from strategic long-range projects.
It’s not enough to be smart; it takes wisdom to manage 2.25 million personnel and about the same number of civilian employees — a force far larger than the world’s largest private corporation. The secretary worries over short-term needs of troops in battle while formulating long-term programs to ensure American interests in all parts of the world. He must stay informed about any important international or domestic happenings and deal with them best he can.
As a television anchor, Hegseth had only to parrot news stories. A secretary of Defense defuses inaccurate news, advises the president, protects America’s ability to sustain its defense, and keeps important long-range projects on track. To this important job, which benefits from multi-faceted management skills and seasoned wisdom, Republicans confirmed a brash, ambitious, historically unwise neophyte.
Joyce Winslow served as a spokesperson for Medicare in the Bush-Cheney administration, and wrote a book with former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, titled “Star Spangled Security: Applying Lessons Learned Over Six Decades Safeguarding America.”
