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The writer is a member of the executive board of Bertelsmann Stiftung. Jake Benford and Anton Spisak also contributed to this article
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s dinner with EU leaders on Monday was more than a symbolic act — for it came as preparations for the first EU-UK summit are under way, and while the EU is gearing up for co-operation on defence matters.
Facing Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and hybrid interference in European countries, as well as a US administration that is likely to reduce its contribution to European security, closer EU-UK co-operation is now essential to defending the western alliance. But several months after Starmer and the new political leadership in the EU committed to a “reset” of relations, progress has been largely rhetorical.
It is high time the UK and the EU became more practical about deeper relations. The inaugural EU-UK political summit this May is an opportunity to launch three concrete initiatives.
First, both sides should sign a security and defence partnership. Involving the UK closely in EU defence arrangements would help increase European contributions to Nato and will be beneficial to all partners in the alliance — subject to agreement on clear rules for participation, such as financial contributions and data-sharing protocols, as well as joint defence research and development projects.
An EU-UK defence and security agreement should also cover support for Ukraine, especially if US policy changes. It could also cover joint enforcement strategies on sanctions to address problems caused by divergence between different regimes, as well as joint preparations for Ukraine’s eventual reconstruction.
The agreement should also commit both sides to closer foreign policy co-ordination, where the UK remains unique among the EU’s external partners in lacking structured forms of co-operation. This has prevented both sides from responding to a number of security challenges in a more co-ordinated manner.
Second, the UK and the EU should establish a dialogue on economic security and resilience at ministerial level to improve co-ordination on shared geoeconomic threats. Currently, these topics are approached in the G7 at the working level, but with US protectionism and an American president who may seek to prise European countries apart, as well as sustained economic pressure from China, the risks of economic fragmentation have increased.
The UK and the EU share an interest in defending an open global economy and a rules-based trading system. For the EU, which is developing an “economic security” doctrine, co-ordinating policy responses to tariffs, sanctions, export controls, FDI screening and strategic industrial policies with like-minded partners such as the UK would leverage the economic weight of both sides. The dialogue could also facilitate co-operation on energy and climate-related issues, such as carbon border adjustment mechanisms.
To form a backdrop to these practical steps, the EU and the UK should agree on a joint political declaration which articulates common objectives given the collective challenges Europe is facing in terms of security, economic competitiveness and democratic resilience. There should also be a shared political road map to guide substantive policy discussions on selected issues. The current relationship is based on a 2019 declaration and the Brexit trade and co-operation agreement, but neither document recognises the profound global shifts that have taken place since.
A UK-EU relationship that matches current challenges can only be achieved if leaders on both sides set bitterness and pride aside. For the UK, this requires reprioritising Europe as the central pillar of its strategic outlook and acknowledging that its own long-term security and prosperity are inextricably linked to that of the EU. While this is not about moving backwards, the UK must accept that deeper, more substantial relations come hand in hand with new responsibilities.
For its part, the EU needs to recognise the UK as a strategic partner, rather than an ordinary third country. It is clearly in the EU’s interest to accommodate a major European country, economic and Nato partner, nuclear power and UN security council member, whose co-operation remains essential to achieving broader geopolitical objectives.
If the EU-UK summit fails to deliver concrete progress, inertia will only push the two sides further apart — not by design, but by neglect. In an increasingly unstable world, where reliable alliances are more valuable than ever, such drift would represent not only a missed opportunity but a profound strategic failure.
