Is the US Army’s Dark Eagle hypersonic missile a crucial breakthrough in an emerging new era of warfare, or an overpriced weapon still struggling to justify its role?
This month, The War Zone reported that the US Department of Defense (DOD) remains uncertain about the lethality and survivability of the US Army’s Dark Eagle hypersonic missile due to limited test data, according to the DOD’s latest annual report.
The missile, part of the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) system, is designed to equip the US Army and US Navy, including Zumwalt-class destroyers and Block V Virginia-class submarines.
Despite a successful test launch in December 2024 from Cape Canaveral, prior testing issues—such as multiple launch cancellations and hardware failures—have delayed the missile’s deployment at a time when China and Russia have proven hypersonic weapons in their respective arsenals.
The Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) states that tests have not provided sufficient data to determine the missile’s operational effectiveness or whether it requires multiple strikes to destroy targets, a key concern given the system’s high cost and limited arsenal.
Additionally, survivability against kinetic, electronic and cyber threats remains untested. The US Navy has independently tested the missile’s warhead, but the results are still under analysis.
With the system expected to be fielded by Fiscal year 2027, there is little time for modifications if performance shortfalls arise. The US is prioritizing hypersonic weapons to counter China and Russia, yet gaps in testing mean Dark Eagle’s battlefield viability remains unproven.
The US Army’s Dark Eagle hypersonic weapon is a truck-launched missile system designed to counter enemy anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Co-developed with the US Navy, it uses the Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) and a two-stage booster. It reaches speeds above Mach 5 and has a reported range of 2,776 kilometers.
The first Dark Eagle battery, assigned to the 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, faced multiple testing failures, delaying initial fielding to Fiscal Year 2025.
However, questions about unresolved cost, technical issues and reliability persist, casting doubt on whether it will truly shift the balance in the US-China missile race.
Delving deeper into why the US is trailing in hypersonic weapons development, a July 2024 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report identifies key gaps in US hypersonic weapon testing that have delayed fielding, including inadequate infrastructure, high costs and limited historical data.
Testing requires specialized facilities like wind tunnels and long-range test sites, while flight tests are constrained by the large distances required and the need for extensive sensor coverage. A lack of experience complicates cost estimation and test planning, with unsuccessful tests causing significant delays.
As a result, the DOD relies on expert opinions over historical data for cost projections, while digital engineering tools remain underutilized.
While a January 2025 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report mentions that the DOD’s FY2025 hypersonic research budget surged to US$6.9 billion, reflecting growing urgency, it states that a lack of established programs raises concerns about mission requirements and long-term funding, with delays threatening to widen the capability gap in future missile warfare.
Why is the US lagging in hypersonic development while China fields operational systems and Russia deploys them in Ukraine? The answer may be more straightforward than expected—hypersonic weapons are not invincible. Traditional cruise and ballistic missiles offer comparable speed, range and effectiveness, potentially making hypersonics an expensive redundancy.
Shawn Rostker mentions in a RealClear Defense article this month that hypersonic weapons, touted for their speed and precision, may be overhyped due to significant technical and strategic shortcomings.
Such challenges include immense thermal stress in flight, communications blackout at hypersonic speeds, highly visible launch signatures, aerodynamic drag while maneuvering, immature scramjet technology and fragile electronic components.
He argues that US defenses, including Aegis and Patriot PAC-3, can intercept hypersonic weapons traveling at Mach 10 or below during their terminal descent. However, this assumption hinges on ideal engagement conditions.
In a January 2022 article for Air & Space Forces Magazine, Abraham Mahshie discusses the capabilities of current missile defenses against hypersonic threats. While the Aegis Baseline 9C capability, including the SPY-1 radar and SM-6 interceptor, can defend against some hypersonic threats, these systems primarily rely on terminal phase interception, which is less effective.
Additionally, Mahshie says the curvature of the Earth limits radar detection range, providing only brief response windows. He notes that ground-based radars can detect these threats but are often too late for effective interception, necessitating faster, more agile interceptors and enhanced tracking capabilities.
Further, Rostker mentions that while China and Russia allegedly operate hypersonics within the Mach 10-12 range, they would experience enough drag in flight to slow them down enough for Aegis or Patriot to intercept them. He notes that while hypersonic weapons will be part of future US military strategy, they may be overhyped for propaganda and marketing.
In line with Rostker’s reasoning, a January 2023 US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report suggests hypersonic weapons’ value may be exaggerated due to their extreme costs, technical challenges and limited operational advantages over existing alternatives.
The report says developing and fielding hypersonic missiles is approximately one-third more expensive than deploying ballistic missiles with maneuverable warheads, which offer comparable speed, range, and accuracy.
Moreover, it mentions that hypersonic missiles do not offer significantly greater survivability against missile defenses unless adversaries develop highly effective long-range interceptors, which they currently lack.
The CBO highlights ballistic missiles with maneuverable warheads and subsonic cruise missiles as viable alternatives, providing comparable capabilities at lower costs and with fewer technical challenges.
With soaring costs, unresolved technical hurdles and credible alternatives, Dark Eagle risks becoming another DOD white elephant. Meanwhile, China and Russia continue advancing their hypersonic arsenals—potentially leaving the US to question whether it’s competing in the right arms race.
