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“We were at war with a dictator; now we are fighting against a dictator supported by a traitor.” Thus, in a brilliant speech, did Claude Malhuret, hitherto a little-known French senator, define the challenge of our age. He was right. We now know that the US and so the world have been transformed for the worse. But this should no longer be all that surprising. The doubt rather is over how Europe can and will respond.
In the 1970s, I had the good fortune to live and work in Washington DC. This was the era of Watergate. I watched the congressional hearings on the ill-doing of President Richard Nixon with admiration. It swiftly became evident that members of Congress of both parties took their obligation to protect the constitution both seriously and literally. Nixon was about to be impeached and convicted. Warned of this, he duly resigned.
Contrast this with the second impeachment of Donald Trump in February 2021 on the far greater crime of inciting an insurrection aimed at overturning the results of the 2020 presidential election. It is impossible for anybody sane to doubt his guilt. But only seven Republican senators voted for conviction. It was not enough. In letting him off, Congress killed the constitution. What has happened since that moment was predictable and predicted.
Since the 1970s the US has suffered a moral collapse from which it is unlikely to recover. We see this daily in what this administration is being allowed to do to US commitments, to allies, to the weak, to the press and to the law. My colleague John Burn-Murdoch has also shown that Maga attitudes are close to those of today’s Russians: power will not be yielded easily.
This is a truly historic catastrophe. But if the US is no longer a proponent and defender of liberal democracy, the only force potentially strong enough to fill the gap is Europe. If Europeans are to succeed with this heavy task, they must begin by securing their home. Their ability to do so will depend in turn on resources, time, will and cohesion.
Undoubtedly, Europe can substantially increase its spending on defence. While there has been a rise in the share of GDP spent on defence over the past decade in the 10 most populous EU countries, plus the UK and US, Poland is the only one that spends more than the US, relative to GDP. Fortunately, ratios of fiscal deficits and net debt to GDP of the EU27 are far lower than those of the US. Moreover, the purchasing power of the GDP of EU and UK together is bigger than that of the US and dwarfs Russia’s. In sum, economically, Europe has the resources, especially with the UK, even though it will need the reforms recommended by Mario Draghi last year if it is to catch up technologically. (See charts.)
Yet this economic potential cannot be turned into strategic independence from the US overnight. As the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies shows, European weaponry is too dependent on US products and technology for that to be possible. It will need a second and scarcer ingredient — time. This creates a vulnerability shown, most recently, by the feared impact of the cessation of US military support for Ukraine. Europe will struggle to supply what will be missing.
The third ingredient is will. Europeans have to want to defend the vaunted “European values” of personal freedom and liberal democracy. To do so will be economically costly and even dangerous. In Europe, too, rightwing elements with views similar to those of Maga Republicans exist, even if these are not as dominant on the conservative side of politics as in the US. But some countries — Hungary, Slovakia and maybe soon Austria — will have pro-Putin governments. Marine Le Pen in France has more than merely flirted with being pro-Putin in the past. Also frightening is the rise of the far right and far left of Germany. In short, Europe has “fifth columns” almost everywhere.
At the same time, some important European leaders and countries, Germany above all, are showing some will. In particular, Friedrich Merz, expected to be the next German chancellor, and his potential coalition partners agreed to amend the “debt brake” and spend hundreds of billions of euros on infrastructure and defence. Merz also said that Germany would do “whatever it takes” to fend off “threats to freedom and peace” in Europe. Yet will he deliver? The answer to that question is unclear.
Last but not least is the essential ingredient of cohesion. Unlike the US, China or Russia, Europe is not a state. Indeed, contrary to the hysteria of the British Brexiters, it is far from being a state. Its ability to act strategically is fundamentally hampered by the twin facts that it lacks a shared politics and shared finances. It is better seen as a club that needs a high degree of unanimity if it is to act effectively and legitimately in matters of foreign policy and defence. Europeans were free riders on the US because that was the natural thing for each of them to do. Unfortunately, much the same still applies if the US abandons them. Many members will be inclined to leave the burden to a few big powers. But even co-ordinating the policies and militaries of Germany, France and the UK will be hard, because this is to be done by a committee of rough equals — it lacks a leader.
In brief, we have an irresistible force and an immovable object: Trump’s unreliability is the force; and the difficulties in getting Europe to mobilise its will are the immovable object. Moreover, overcoming the latter has to be done quickly. Until it is done, Europe will still rely heavily for its security on an unreliable US.
If Europe does not mobilise quickly in its own defence, liberal democracy might founder altogether. Today feels a bit like the 1930s. This time, alas, the US looks to be on the wrong side.
martin.wolf@ft.com
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