In the early months of his second term, U.S. President Donald Trump has wasted no time asserting his combative “America First” vision of international politics – one that discards alliances, dismantles institutions, and replaces diplomacy with coercion. A good representation of this shift is the near-total dismantling of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). This federal agency has provided humanitarian aid and assistance in many developing countries for decades. And, no less important, it has been a cornerstone of U.S. influence and soft power since the Cold War. While previous administrations – Republican and Democratic alike – viewed foreign aid as a tool of strategic influence and humanitarian commitment, Trump sees it as a wasteful subsidy to ungrateful nations.
Trump’s America First approach is characterized by an open hostility toward traditional allies and institutions, in a much more pronounced way than during his first term. Just weeks into office, Trump withdrew the United States from the World Health Organization and (again) from the Paris Agreement, the most important agreement on fighting climate change. He has imposed ever-higher tariffs on allies and adversaries alike. His approach is not merely transactional – it is deliberately antagonistic, a bullying style of diplomacy that leverages the United States’ economic and military might while scorning the norms that once underpinned the postwar international order and that the U.S., on the front line, contributed to building.
Ironically, Trump’s approach to international relations is playing the game of his proclaimed main enemy: Xi Jinping’s China. For years, Beijing has been accused of using “sharp power” – a mix of economic coercion, diplomatic pressure, and information control – to undermine Western influence and reform the international order in a way that better suits Chinese interests. Under Trump, the United States seems to no longer resist the idea of a new global order. Instead, his administration is embracing China’s approach to international affairs.
As shown by the confrontation that took place in the Oval Office with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Trump’s worldview aligns more closely with Xi’s authoritarian pragmatism than with the liberal internationalism of his predecessors. Both leaders see global governance as a zero-sum game. Both are interested not in moral values but in practical gains. Both use state power unapologetically to secure strategic advantage. And both seek to bend smaller nations to their will – not through persuasion or partnership, but through leverage and intimidation.
Different Goals, Same Outcome
This convergence of strategic logic raises an unsettling question: Is the U.S., under Trump, unintentionally doing the ideological work of Beijing? By hollowing out institutions like USAID and undermining the legitimacy of alliances, Trump is weakening the very system that has for many years supported U.S. influence in the world and set the West apart from authoritarian challengers. He is, in effect, validating the Chinese argument that liberalism is in decline, that democracy is inefficient, and that power is the only real currency of global politics.
While Xi projects a vision of order rooted in sovereignty and development without democracy, Trump offers chaos wrapped in nationalism. And yet, both speak the same language of dominance. In rejecting the postwar consensus, Trump may be paving the way for a world that looks far more like Beijing’s vision than Washington’s – at least the Washington we have known so far.
Although Trump and Xi pursue distinct goals, their actions are converging toward the same result: reshaping the international order. Under Trump, the United States has steadily undermined multilateralism, withdrawing from or weakening key international institutions such as the United Nations, NATO, and the Paris Agreement, in favor of unilateral or bilateral approaches. This retreat creates space for Xi’s China, which has outwardly championed multilateral institutions while subtly reshaping its norms to better align with Chinese strategic interests.
Through selective adherence to rules – such as those of the World Trade Organization – and by establishing parallel structures like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) – strictly linked to Xi Jinping’s signature initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – China has gradually recalibrated global economic standards in its favor. The same is true also for the United Nations, where China’s approach includes placing its citizens in key leadership positions, increasing staffing, and boosting unearmarked financial contributions to multilateral institutions.
Soft Power Shift
While it is indeed the case that Trump is challenging multilateralism, it is equally important to recognize that he is eroding U.S. soft power on a global scale. This soft power has been fundamental to the United States’ dominance and the establishment of the U.S.-led world order. It has also served as a significant comparative advantage in the competition with a rising China for who will be the leading superpower of the century.
In his first term – as pointed out by Joseph Nye, the person who coined the term “soft power” – Trump had eroded U.S. soft power, which was already facing a longer-term decline. The Biden administration was, at least in part, able to recover this by putting a lot of emphasis on the need to protect democracy and alliances.
In the same period, a mixture of geopolitical and geoeconomic developments caused a significant setback in China’s image among Western developed economies. One important factor was China siding with Russia after Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine and thus bring war back to Europe. This pushed Europe to adopt a much more critical approach toward China. Other crucial components have been Beijing’s increasing techno-scientific influence, which has pushed Europe and, especially, the U.S. to adopt a “containment policy” toward China to maintain technological, economic, and military superiority. At the same time, China’s overcapacity has also put stress on European and U.S. markets and industries, causing additional tension with Beijing. All these elements have contributed dramatically to reducing China’s soft power, at least in the Western world, after many years in which Beijing had become increasingly interconnected with and embedded into Western economic, political, and cultural life.
But now, as Trump’s second term reveals itself to be much more aggressive than the first, U.S. soft power might experience an irreversible decline, leaving some space for a rebound of China’s soft power.
The abrupt dismantling of USAID has halted essential humanitarian projects, healthcare initiatives, vaccination campaigns, and educational programs, directly harming vulnerable populations worldwide. This vacuum provides Beijing with a significant opportunity to expand its influence through global health diplomacy, especially in the Global South and Africa. China has increasingly positioned itself as a reliable health partner, providing medical aid, vaccines, and healthcare infrastructure to developing countries. In Africa, China’s extensive provision of medical supplies, training of local health workers, and the deployment of medical teams have deepened Beijing’s diplomatic ties and bolstered its image as a pragmatic and dependable ally.
The same is true for Trump’s cuts to Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, which have been well received by The Global Times, a Chinese Communist Party-led tabloid, reflecting the geopolitical advantage Beijing gains as the United States retreats from its traditional soft power roles. These cuts significantly diminish the U.S. ability to counter China’s narratives, especially in regions where Beijing seeks to project influence without Western interference. China’s own international broadcasting and media platforms, such as CGTN and Xinhua, now face less competition in shaping global perceptions, particularly across the developing world and Africa, where U.S. media previously offered alternative viewpoints. The erosion of U.S. media outreach allows Beijing to more effectively promote its state-centric narratives, reinforcing the image of China as a reliable partner and diminishing the resonance of criticisms related to human rights abuses or authoritarian governance.
Thus, Trump’s disengagement unintentionally empowers Beijing, enabling it to expand further its influence within existing institutions while simultaneously promoting its alternative vision of multilateralism amid an increasingly vulnerable international system.
