A new name, fresh appointments and a minor reshuffle at the top — it’s all part of the Myanmar junta’s bid to prepare the nation and sell the outside world on its controversial general election plan for December.
The generals in Naypyitaw are counting on the election to confer the legitimacy they’ve lacked since seizing power in a February 2021 coup that ousted an elected government.
Critics have dismissed the planned vote as a junta ploy, branding it a “generals’ election” rather than a genuine general election — a label that may prove more accurate than not.
Since the coup, the military has faced armed resistance across large parts of the country. While the anti-junta forces—both political and ethnic—may not control as much territory as they claim, it is clear that the upcoming elections can hardly be described as “nationwide” and will likely be dismissed by many as a sham.
But that may not concern the generals in Naypyitaw, and the stark reality is military rule in Myanmar is here to stay — in one form or another — as it has been since the men in green first seized power in a 1962 coup.
The country experienced a decade of relative openness, starting in 2011, with the introduction of limited freedoms; however, the generals never truly relinquished power. They remained in the background, protected by a pro-military constitution and ready to intervene when threatened, as they decisively did in the 2021 coup that overthrew a democratically elected government.
Regardless of how Myanmar’s democratic forces and their international supporters view the upcoming election, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member, is almost certain to endorse the result as a positive step after more than four years of intensified civil conflict.
China is expected to accept the election outcome without reservation, while India, Bangladesh and perhaps Japan will likely consider even a flawed election preferable to no election at all. Australia, with its long history of trying to engage Myanmar’s military regimes, may also feel that engaging whoever holds power in Naypyitaw is better than isolating them.
The State Administration Council (SAC), established after the 2021 coup, has been formally dissolved and replaced by a new governing body called the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC).
This mirrors a previous rebranding in 1997, when the then-junta known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) adopted the more palatable State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) moniker.
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the architect of the 2021 coup and instigator of the now near nationwide war, will remain interim president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
His close associate, General Nyo Saw—who joined the SAC in 2023—has been appointed prime minister and minister of national planning, reflecting his background as a military economist.
He also serves as chairman of one of the military’s main holding companies, the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), and holds key roles in another military-controlled conglomerate, the Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited, as well as in MEC-founded Innwa Bank.
But who is Min Aung Hlaing really? Unless something unexpected occurs—a common uncertainty in Myanmar’s military politics—he is likely to shed his military uniform after the election and transition from interim president to official head of state. But anyone in the international or regional community hoping that change in garbs signals new reforms will likely be disappointed.
Numerous human rights organizations have documented how Min Aung Hlaing and his coup associates have imprisoned thousands of dissenters, many of whom were tortured to death in detention. He has also ordered thousands of airstrikes on resistance-held areas with little regard for civilian casualties, including in zones recently devastated by earthquakes.
The International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued a global arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing, citing “reasonable grounds to believe” that he bears criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity, including the deportation and persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslim minority.
Min Aung Hlaing’s rise to power is closely linked to Senior General Than Shwe, chairman of the former SLORC and SPDC juntas. Than Shwe, who took power in 1992, stepped down in 2011, paving the way for a more constitutional form of government.
Under Than Shwe and his predecessor General Saw Maung’s autocratic rule, Myanmar became pariah state due to the military’s appalling human rights record, which included the killing of thousands of pro-democracy protesters in 1988 and subsequent brutal crackdowns. As Western countries imposed sanctions and boycotts, China emerged as Myanmar’s sole international ally.
Over time, however, Than Shwe grew wary of Myanmar’s overdependence on Beijing and sought to secure his legacy through a tightly controlled political reform program aimed at appeasing Western calls for a more democratic order.
A constitution drafted under military oversight was adopted following a fraudulent 2008 referendum, and a tightly managed 2010 election ensured victory for the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).
To avoid the humiliating fates of predecessor autocrats Ne Win and Saw Maung, who both died in obscurity, Than Shwe handpicked not one but three trusted generals as his successors: Thein Sein as president, Min Aung Hlaing as military chief and Shwe Mann as parliamentary speaker. Min Aung Hlaing was chosen because he was not seen as particularly strong and posed no threat to the old strongman.
However, surprising initiatives followed once Thein Sein assumed the presidency. Political prisoners were released, the press was liberalized and the long-persecuted National League for Democracy (NLD) was allowed to re-enter the political arena. These moves transformed Myanmar’s international image and earned Western recognition and praise.
Though hailed as a democratic opening, these initiatives were part of a carefully calculated strategy for the military to retain power. Still, society began to change in ways the military had not anticipated, including a surge in civil society organizations and a free, outspoken press.
In 2015 and 2020, voters overwhelmingly supported the NLD, and Shwe Mann aligned himself with pro-democracy forces, leading to his expulsion from the USDP. Following the NLD’s second landslide victory and its promises to amend the 2008 constitution to curtail military power, Min Aung Hlaing staged a coup, arresting NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and toppling her government.
Min Aung Hlaing was born on July 3, 1956, in Minbu, Magway region. He entered the Defense Services Academy in 1974 on his third attempt, graduating in 1977 with an unremarkable record and reputedly not particularly liked by his elite military academy classmates.
However, through loyalty to Than Shwe, he steadily climbed the military ranks, eventually leading the Bureau of Special Operations-2 in 2009. In this role, he oversaw brutal operations in Kokang, northeastern Shan state, which caused mass displacement of civilians into China.
At the same time, resistance forces—both Burman-dominated political groups and ethnic armed organizations—emerged strongly following the 2021 coup, managing to wrest control over large swaths of territory in the north, northeast and west.
As the SAC’s forces suffered humiliating defeats, military insiders reportedly criticized Min Aung Hlaing for being too weak and indecisive on the battlefield. There was speculation that his deputy, Vice Senior General Soe Win—more experienced and hardline—might replace him as commander-in-chief.
That, however, may no longer be the case. The Myanmar military now appears to be gaining the upper hand in the country’s many ongoing civil conflicts. While the Arakan Army, a local resistance group in western Rakhine state, seems to be holding its ground, other anti-junta forces have been forced to retreat from several areas they captured after the coup.
If Min Aung Hlaing transitions to a “civilian” role after the election, who will assume the commander-in-chief position—a post even more powerful in Myanmar’s overall power structure?
Soe Win is a strong candidate, but military insiders also mention General Kyaw Swar Lin, the current chief of general staff. However, Kyaw Swar Lin lacks combat experience and may hold his position primarily due to his loyalty to Min Aung Hlaing.
The intrigues within Myanmar’s military make its internal politics as opaque as Kremlinology once was in the Soviet Union, and as they remain in China and other authoritarian states today. What is clear, however, is that the military will not relinquish power to any civilian—or even quasi-civilian—entity.
The generals have clearly learned from what they now view as the mistakes of allowing too much openness from 2011–2021, and there will be no repeat of that semi-democratic experiment that inevitably strengthened popular opposition to military rule.
Yet, despite this reality, Myanmar’s immediate neighbors—and possibly other countries—are likely to accept a post-election regime back into their circles of associates and partners. This is the bitter truth that democracy advocates and armed resistance groups in Myanmar must begin to come to terms with as Min Aung Hlaing trades in his khakis for civilian wares.
