In his recent speech in Singapore, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth pledged to defend the region against Chinese aggression and encroachment.
This should have reassured the audience presumed to be concerned about China’s assertiveness. Yet, possibly, the room listening to him wasn’t quite ready to believe what they were hearing.
The past few months have been full of surprises for Asia.
Technically, Japan is still at war with Russia, just as South Korea is with North Korea. And yet, both Russia and North Korea are fighting in Ukraine— a country that has been left hanging by the US because Washington is (was?) seeking to turn Russia (and maybe also North Korea?) against China.
This situation is spreading anxiety in Asia. China may suddenly look more straightforward, reliable and easier to talk to. Plus, Chinese jet fighters look more formidable than French fighters because the French aircraft (adopted by the Indian Air Force) performed poorly compared to the Chinese ones (adopted by Pakistan) in the recent bilateral clash.
Furthermore, everyone in the region— starting with the US’s closest allies— is scrambling to understand what kind of trade deal they can make with America. It is all creating huge uncertainty in the region. So far, no one feels they have a clear picture, and no one has a deal.
Then, America doesn’t address these issues, but comes and lambasts China.
Maybe Japanese, or Thai or South Korean, could say: “Sure, China is my biggest concern in the long term. But geography doesn’t change, and what if America doesn’t have my back in one or two years? It dropped me about Russia and North Korea, it bugs me about my trade surplus, but it wants me to push harder on China. Sure, I’ll do it, but I’ll need to hedge my bets— at the very least.”
These contradictory statements and actions are causing massive unease in Asia.
Many (maybe all) American regional allies are getting cold feet about the US. Their feet are getting even colder because, despite many warnings, America doesn’t seem to realize the gravity of the situation and that Asia can’t be separated from what is happening in Europe. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Korean and Vietnam Wars had a massive impact on Europe.
To cap it all, the Chinese—and thus true believers in conspiracy theories—could see this erratic US behavior as evidence that the US administration is caught in a loop of irrationality or is penetrated by Russia.
Moscow could likely fuel those suspicions. And still, the pragmatic Chinese would be puzzled: if the Russians are so good at plotting in Washington, why didn’t they get a peace deal in Ukraine already?
Thus, short of certainty, Beijing would not sensibly talk to Washington without a clear picture of what was happening. It would realistically wait to see the developments with the US and the world.
This also impacts Europe, now closely following Asian developments, and Russia. Moscow has fewer incentives to seek peace in Ukraine when the whole American fabric seems to be unraveling.
America can decide to be cavalier about all of this, and the problems will certainly fester and rot transpacific and transatlantic trust, weakening US clout in the regions and the world. Or it can decide to address these concerns, which need profound rethinking.
This article first appeared on Appia Institute and is republished with kind permission. Read the original here.