The geopolitical landscape is shifting beneath our feet as the United States recalibrates its global strategy. This strategic pivot carries profound implications not just for conventional U.S. military force posture throughout the globe, but for an often-overlooked dimension of allied security assistance: space. As Washington urges European and Middle Eastern partners and allies to shoulder greater security responsibilities, the implications for space-based capabilities demand our urgent attention.
America’s reorientation creates a delicate balancing act in the Middle East, particularly among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. These countries find themselves caught in a strategic transition as the U.S. reviews its theater missile defense postures worldwide. The Trump administration appears poised to push GCC countries toward integrating their disparate missile defense systems — all American-supplied — to create a more cohesive shield against missile threats from Iran and its regional proxies. Yet this much-needed integration will require sophisticated space support at precisely the moment when U.S. Space Force resources are increasingly focused on countering Chinese capabilities in the Indo-Pacific.
This situation creates both a challenge and an opportunity. The U.S. might need to provide Middle Eastern partners with ballistic missile early warning satellites and supporting command and control systems. Such a transfer would mark a significant shift in America’s approach to space security cooperation, encouraging regional actors to develop independent capabilities rather than relying exclusively on U.S.-operated systems. Challenging as this might be, it should be made clear that such satellites need not be the most cutting-edge systems that the U.S. possesses; legacy, reliable and proven systems could serve regional needs more than adequately, supplied through American industry with the Space Force providing the necessary training and operational support.
For such a vision to materialize, however, a fundamental overhaul of U.S. satellite export policies becomes necessary. This represents not merely a technical challenge but a philosophical one, requiring Washington to reconsider longstanding restrictions on sharing space technologies with even its closest allies. If the U.S. expects its friends and partners to take on more responsibility for their security affairs without direct American military involvement then it must ensure that they are adequately equipped. This means adjusting policy to allow U.S. companies to sell sophisticated satellite capabilities to facilitate and enhance security assistance. Additionally, the Space Force must develop expertise in conducting foreign military sales of national security space systems to global partners and allies — a process it has yet to master fully.Â
Beyond missile defense, the broader security environment in the Middle East is driving regional powers to seek sophisticated space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, along with hardened satellite communications. The concentrated geography and volatile geopolitics of the region make space assets particularly valuable for states seeking strategic advantage. These countries understand that dominance in orbit increasingly translates to dominance on the ground.
Currently, America’s regional partners have largely turned to Western commercial space systems, with France emerging as a primary supplier. However, a growing roster of countries — including Israel, Italy, India, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Turkey — are aggressively marketing their space technologies throughout the Middle East. While this competition is not inherently contrary to American interests, it poses significant challenges for U.S. satellite manufacturers, who are often more expensive than their foreign commercial competitors and are subject to restrictive export controls like the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
The constraints of ITAR present a particular dilemma for early warning satellites, where the U.S. stands as the sole Western provider. If Washington hesitates to equip regional partners with these systems while simultaneously expecting them to assume greater security responsibilities, it will create a potentially dangerous vacuum. Geopolitics, like nature, abhors a vacuum, and such voids are quickly filled — potentially by adversaries like China or Russia who would be eager to establish strategic footholds in the region and the critically important space domain.
The consequences of inaction extend beyond mere market share. By failing to meet legitimate national security space requirements of Middle Eastern partners, the U.S. risks undermining the very security architecture it has spent decades building. More worryingly, it could inadvertently accelerate the proliferation of advanced space technologies through alternative channels, potentially strengthening the orbital capabilities of strategic competitors and altering the strategic orientation of traditional friends and partners.
A more forward-thinking approach would recognize space as an essential component of the evolving security relationship between the U.S. and Middle Eastern partners. Rather than viewing space cooperation through the narrow lens of technology transfer risks, policymakers should consider the strategic benefits of enabling partners to develop robust, interoperable space capabilities that complement American systems while reducing dependency on direct U.S. support.
The pivot to the Indo-Pacific need not mean abandonment of Middle Eastern space security needs. Instead, it offers an opportunity to reimagine how the U.S. supports regional stability through a more distributed approach to space capabilities — one that empowers partners while preserving America’s leadership in space. But this vision requires both policy innovation and courage that will secure America’s pole position in space while properly equipping partners and keeping them on side.
Dr. John B. Sheldon is Senior Partner at AzurX in the UAE, and a former member of faculty at the School of Advanced Air & Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
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