The Hamas massacre on October 7, 2023, was made possible by “arrogant” groupthink led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which stifled critical voices, entrenched the mistaken “conception” that money could buy quiet from Hamas, and fed the state’s unpreparedness in nearly aspect on the day of the massacre and the days and weeks after it, the Civilian Committee of Inquiry found in its final report, published on Tuesday.
The committee’s 70-page report and 10-page “executive briefing” included a damning summary of the failures beginning at the very top of Israel’s government and reaching deep into Israel’s security establishment.
The committee was formed in July by families of those killed on October 7, representatives from the attacked kibbutzim, and civil society groups. It heard approximately 120 testimonies, including from former prime ministers, senior politicians, retired and serving security officials, survivors of the massacre, heads of volunteer organizations, and many others.
The committee was chaired by retired judge Varda Alsheikh, and included Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yehudit Grisaro; former police commissioner Shlomo Aharonishki; Maj.-Gen. (res.) Eyal Ben-Reuven; Rafi Ben Shitrit, former Beit She’an mayor father of soldier Alroy Ben Shitrit, who was killed on October 7; and Eyal Eshel, father of field intelligence lookout (“tatzpitanit”) Roni Eshel, who was also killed on October 7.
The committee examined a variety of issues surrounding the massacre, including the conduct of the government and security forces in the years, months, weeks, and days prior to the massacre; the functioning of the IDF and Israel Police on the day of the massacre itself; and the functioning of government in the days, weeks, and months following the massacre.
‘Arrogance is what led…to the fact that the IDF was not prepared’
The committee’s conclusions were widespread, but included the following:
“Arrogance is what led, according to various testimonies, to the fact that the IDF was not prepared for the massive invasion of Hamas terrorists into Israel, even though their plan was known. Arrogance and inherent blindness also led the political echelon to continue strengthening Hamas by transferring funds and avoiding taking offensive initiatives in the face of threats, all while idealizing the reality and trying to buy security quiet with money, ignoring the breaking of the rules by the enemy, and avoiding consultation with relevant parties such as the then-head of the Mossad.”
This arrogance, according to the committee, is what “led, among other things, to a deteriorated relationship between the political and military leadership, severely impacting decision-making in the Israeli government, which believed it could continue its course without interruption.”
“Arrogance and unwillingness to listen also led to the unpreparedness of various government ministries and public systems, delaying the response to besieged residents and later to evacuees from the south and north. These failures continued for weeks after October 7,” the committee wrote.
“From the testimonies, we did not identify significant processes meant to provide ‘protection’ against the development of a conception even now; rather, the opposite is true: it was found that even these days, after October 7, all those factors that do not generate deep strategic thinking about possible security developments are still in full force.”
“Repeated warnings from senior command officials (the Chief of Staff and Generals, the head of Shin Bet, and others) in the months leading up to the war were not addressed in-depth by the Prime Minister, and a reasonable response to the possibility of a mistake in the accepted conception—Hamas is deterred and does not want a high-intensity campaign—was not provided,” the committee wrote.
In addition to the arrogance, the committee also identified the “breakdown of order in decision-making processes” in the years preceding the massacre, including the “constant weakening of various oversight bodies, and the hollowing out of institutions to the point where they no longer perform their functions. Thus, even the discussions of the political-security cabinet are constantly leaked to the media, rendering it an unreliable body.
Once the war broke out, “for reasons less relevant to the war and more political, the strained relationship between the prime minister and the defense minister severely harmed the state’s security until the latter’s dismissal, as part of the transfer of decision-making processes from organized forums to the exclusivity of the prime minister. According to all testimonies, the relationship between the Prime Minister and the political echelon with the military and professional echelon has not been good or has not existed at all for a long time,” the committee found.
“In the last decade, an atmosphere has been created where professionals and ministers almost do not stand by their opinions, and the concept led by the Prime Minister and military leaders becomes the sole truth, with the National Security Council also functioning as a political body whose purpose is to serve the Prime Minister’s insights,” the committee wrote.
“The National Security Council has turned from an external body into one that no longer fulfills its purpose, instead effectively serving as another arm of the prime minister,” the committee wrote.
“In light of the testimonies and findings, it can be conclusively determined that the government in general, and the Prime Minister in particular, did not prepare or plan adequately not only for the disaster of October 7th, but also for other disaster scenarios,” the committee wrote.
The report then went on to analyze the failures that led to massacres at the Nova Festival near Re’im, and at the Nachal Oz base.
On a personal level, the committee found Netanyahu responsible for a series of failures.
“Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is responsible for undermining all decision-making focal points, including the National Security Cabinet and the National Security Council, in a way that prevented any serious discussion involving a variety of opinions on significant security issues. Netanyahu is largely responsible for the ‘money for quiet’ concept and for silencing other voices that criticized this concept. The committee members find that Netanyahu bears responsibility for ignoring the warnings he received about our enemies perceiving weakness and an opportunity to start a war. Additionally, he is significantly responsible for the division within the nation, a division that, although not the cause of the Hamas attack, had an impact on the resilience of Israeli society, as repeatedly warned. Furthermore, Netanyahu, as prime minister, is responsible for the transfer of powers between different ministries, which led to the inability to address various needs on the home front due to the chaos between the ministries,” the committee found.
The committee also laid responsibility at the feet of former prime ministers Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid; IDF chiefs of staff in the past decade; the defense minister, IDF Chief of Staff, and IDF Intelligence Branch leaders on October 7 and their predecessors; the IDF Southern Command and Gaza Division; a majority of the government’s ministers’ failed conduct in the days and weeks following the massacre; and the IDF and Israel Police’s lack of coordination surrounding the Nova Festival.
A National Committee of Inquiry is the most powerful probe in Israel’s legal system, and the only type of probe that operates completely independent of the political echelon. Its members are appointed by the Chief Justice, and it has the power to subpoena witnesses and make personal recommendations regarding individuals. The other types of probes are government-appointed and parliament-appointed inquiry committees. Recent reports indicated that the government intended to form a new type of committee to investigate the Hamas massacre, whose members will be appointed equally by the coalition and opposition.
The committee acted “to be the ears and eyes for all the citizens of the State of Israel,” Ofer Rosenbaum, chairman of the committee secretariat, stated at the press conference presenting the committee’s findings.
He added that “Nine million prosecutors are demanding answers” and “want to ensure that this terrible disaster never happens again.”
Maj.-Gen. Ben-Reuven noted that one of the committee’s prime recommendations was to adopt “a culture of accountability.”
Jerusalem Post Staff contributed to this report.
