Recently published data shows that the balance of migration to and from Israel has become negative in recent years. In 2023, the number of Israeli émigrés outstripped the number of returning Israelis by 27,500. And the negative balance more than doubled in 2024: About 59,000 more left than returned. As an illustration, imagine that two-thirds of the population of Ra’anana left Israel last year.
Alongside these figures, it is important to note the continued aliyah of Jews to Israel, but here, too, a downturn is evident. In 2023, Israel welcomed some 47,000 immigrants, but only 32,800 in the past year.
Why is Israel less attractive, and is, as many fear, a significant wave of emigration ahead?
At the present moment, it is clear that the economic and security situation is a key driver of out-migration. But in the long term, these difficulties do not pose a significant threat to Israel’s growth.
In the past, Israel has overcome economic (hundreds of percent inflation) and security (the Yom Kippur War) challenges that sparked waves of emigration, but they were halted and the country returned to impressive growth.
Yet it seems the current wave may be different – more severe and lasting, and therefore more dangerous than its predecessors. This is because we are experiencing a different kind of crisis now, one we have never seen before: an undermining of the social order.
First, society: Israel is in the process of replacing its elites. This is the way of the world, but it is most excruciating for the groups that are being pushed out of national leadership. One can understand the fear, disappointment, and frustration of those who feel that although “they” built this country, with talent and sacrifice, the steering wheel is slipping from their grip as a result of demographic and social processes.
Second, ideology: A struggle is underway between identity groups, each of which seeks to achieve different national goals from the others. The fault lines between these groups touch on a range of fundamental issues: religion, nationality, culture, and ethos. The multiple fronts and intensity of the struggle have ignited a firestorm of controversy in the public sphere, fueled, with abject shortsightedness, by a political leadership that thrives on it.
The tug-of-war is becoming increasingly hysterical and undermines Israeli unity to the point of fraying the bonds of mutual responsibility. It foments alienation from Israel – the place and the idea – and is driving tens of thousands to leave the country.
Zionism and democracy
Third, democracy: The Zionist movement has been committed to democratic principles since its founding. This is the Israeli DNA. However, the judicial reform/revolution that tore us apart in 2023, and is rearing its head once again, has subverted confidence in Israel’s commitment to democratic precepts.
Those who voted for the current coalition are disappointed that, even though they won the last elections, they have been unable to advance the reform. For them, the majority-rule democratic system has failed in the face of opposition from the elites, who thwart the “will of the people.”
And on the other side, opposition voters have discovered with great alarm that a slim majority in the Knesset is plotting to “steal” the country, through a takeover that would upend the “natural order.”
Hundreds of thousands took to the streets calling for “democracy” because they felt it was in real danger. And so, for the first time in the history of the Zionist project, there are many – from the Right, the Center, and the Left – who are no longer sure that the democratic system is a stable, fundamental fact of our national life.
IT APPEARS that the right way to strengthen Israel’s allure, for all its citizens and for world Jewry, is through the restabilization of Israeli democracy.
The threat to the social order lies in the fact that we do not have consensus-based “rules of the game” by which we conduct the dispute over the character of the state and manage the ideological struggle between different identity groups.
We do not have a constitution, and therefore any casual Knesset majority may attempt – as is currently the case – to change the rules of the game unilaterally. This possibility exacerbates the potential harm of the Israeli dispute, because it tempts election victors, at any given moment, to exploit it to decide the struggle in favor of one of the identity groups.
The absence of stable, codified rules of the game shakes the confidence of many Israelis in a shared future. If this situation continues, the wave of Israeli abandonment may intensify.
The analysis clarifies the importance of establishing a “thin constitution,” intended to propose a limited constitutional instrument that does not decide the ideological disputes between identity groups but establishes rules of conduct among government authorities based on broad, pan-Israeli consensus.
A thin constitution would deploy a safety net for all of us, because in Israel – “a state of all its minorities” – there is no immutable hegemonic majority. If we are all potential minorities, we should all want the rules of the game to be accepted through, and only through, broad consensus. A “thin constitution” is the recipe that will enable Israel to return to what it should be: the most attractive place for the individual and the collective.
The writer is president of the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) and professor (emeritus) of law at Bar-Ilan University.
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