An internal IDF probe released on Friday concluded that a navigational error caused Hamas terrorists to target the Urim outpost during the October 7 attack, although the base was not marked as an initial target in its invasion plans.
The probe found that this mistake redirected a cell of Hamas terrorists to the base, where eight IDF soldiers and commanders were killed.
The findings describe a series of failures in preparedness, communication, and defense measures that contributed to the base’s vulnerability. The report outlined the sequence of events that allowed the infiltration and documented the military’s response throughout the assault.
According to the investigation, Urim outpost’s defenses were not suited to repel a large-scale infiltration. At 7:31 a.m., the base received an initial alert, but communication remained limited to telephone calls between officers. No general alarm was issued through the base’s internal alert systems.
Due to the lack of a general warning, IDF soldiers continued arriving at the base without knowledge of the attack underway. One incident noted in the report involved the deputy district commander, who was fatally shot by IDF forces after being misidentified as a terrorist.
The report also noted that only seven of the base’s 12 security posts were manned at the time of the attack, and that no security guards were on duty inside the base. It added that guard units had not been trained to respond to full-scale incursions, and previous drills had focused solely on small, localized security incidents.
“Defense protocols addressed the possibility of infiltration but not the occurrence of an actual breach,” the investigation stated. “It did not account for an attack of such magnitude,” and “drills were conducted only for small, isolated ‘incident response’ situations.”
The timeline provided in the report begins at 6:29 a.m. with the launch of a large-scale rocket barrage on southern Israel. Simultaneously, a cell of Hamas terrorists on motorcycles advanced toward the Urim outpost. Soldiers at the Home Front Command’s guard post entered shelters following “Red Alert” sirens.
Hamas terrorists spent roughly three hours on the base
At 7:21 a.m., the terrorist cell arrived at the base’s eastern gate and placed an explosive device. The device detonated five minutes later, breaching the gate and enabling entry. Surveillance teams reported the breach, and the regional command post (MATZPAM) was secured.
By 7:29 a.m., an alert squad and two female soldiers moving toward the command post came under fire. Two soldiers were killed, two were wounded, and others retreated to the dormitories. Around this time, terrorists reached the weapons bunker, shot a soldier stationed there, and took control of the facility.
At 7:49 a.m., the cell leader divided the group and approached the female dormitories. A soldier used a loudspeaker to deter their approach. The group then returned to the bunker.
At 8:02 a.m., a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) was fired at the MATZPAM, striking a conference room and injuring a reserve officer. Three minutes later, the attackers entered the MATZPAM foyer and attempted to breach two reinforced steel doors. At 8:14 a.m., the first door was breached, followed by the second a minute later. Inside, the attackers shot and killed a systems NCO. A grenade was thrown inside the command post, but it failed to detonate.
At approximately the same time, a force from Battalion 414 breached the perimeter and deployed in squads across the base. At 8:19 a.m., the terrorists disabled the base’s security cameras and entered the inner command center. Following an exchange of fire with soldiers, the attackers threw a grenade that killed three and wounded two personnel. The assault inside the command center lasted until around 8:29 a.m.
Reinforcements arriving at the base began regaining control of key areas. Battalion 414 troops killed the remaining terrorists in the weapons bunker. At 8:37 a.m., the deputy district commander entered the base and was mistakenly shot by IDF personnel. From 8:50 a.m. to 9:10 a.m., additional clashes occurred near the logistics building. A commander was wounded during this stage, and one female soldier later died of her injuries.
Later in the morning, IDF and Yamam counterterrorism units arrived. By 10:40 a.m., the last two terrorists were killed, and the base was declared secure. Evacuation and recovery operations continued until approximately 12:30 p.m.
The investigation presented a number of recommendations aimed at addressing the failures identified. These include updating base defense protocols to account for full-scale infiltrations, defining responsibilities for all personnel, increasing the presence and readiness of armed troops on base, and holding integrated training exercises with neighboring units to prepare for complex and simultaneous attacks.
The IDF also called for improved communication between the Home Front Command’s Southern District, the Gaza Division, and the Southern Brigade.
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