The story so far:
Across the European Union, a significant and escalating conflict is unfolding between ascendant right-wing nationalist parties and the judicial systems of member states. Recent court rulings targeting prominent far-right figures have led to accusations of political persecution and calls for protest, forming part of a broader, deeply contentious struggle over judicial independence, the rule of law, and the very nature of democratic governance.
Which rulings have intensified the conflict?
The immediate triggers for the heightened conflict are several high-profile court decisions. In France, the political landscape was shaken when the Paris Criminal Court delivered a verdict on March 31 against Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Rally (RN) party, sentencing her for the embezzlement of EU funds. The sentence included a four-year prison term (two years suspended) and, crucially, a five-year ban from holding public office. This ruling, handed down just over two years before the anticipated 2027 French presidential elections in which Ms. Le Pen was a leading contender, effectively sidelines her unless overturned on appeal.
Similar confrontations are evident elsewhere. In Romania, the Constitutional Court upheld a decision barring Călin Georgescu, a far-right figure who unexpectedly topped the first round of the 2024 presidential election before it was annulled, from running in the rescheduled May 2025 contest. The court’s actions were rooted in the principle of “militant democracy”, citing Mr. Georgescu’s alleged antidemocratic behaviour, fraudulent campaign financing declarations, and suspected links to Russian-backed subversion efforts, which led to the annulment of the initial election results.
Meanwhile, in Germany, the domestic intelligence agency (BfV) has classified the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party as a suspected threat to democracy and the constitution, placing it under closer scrutiny. Although formal attempts to ban parties in Germany face high legal hurdles and have rarely succeeded since the 1950s, the BfV’s designation highlights deep concerns within the German establishment about the AfD’s compatibility with the country’s “free democratic basic order”.
What are the reactions?
The reactions from the targeted parties and their supporters have been swift and defiant. Ms. Le Pen and her supporters immediately decried the verdict, framing it as politically motivated. She labelled the proceedings a “political witch hunt” aimed at crippling her party and argued the Sapin II law, on the basis of which she was banned from running for office, was being improperly applied retrospectively. Vowing not to “give up”, Ms. Le Pen has appealed the decision, with a hearing scheduled for 2026.
Meanwhile, fellow nationalist leaders across the continent commented on the rulings. Following the Le Pen verdict, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán posted “Je Suis Marine” on the social media platform X, while Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, leader of the Lega party, also voiced support for Ms. Le Pen and criticised ‘Brussels’ and ‘leftwing radicals’.
The AfD in Germany has pursued legal challenges against the BfV’s surveillance and classification decisions, while also taking internal steps, such as dissolving its official youth wing (“Young Alternative”)—which the BfV had classified as extremist—in a move Politico described as potentially aiming to avert a ban and destigmatise the party.
The narrative consistently pushed by the European conservative-nationalists is that these legal actions are not genuine applications of law but rather politically motivated manoeuvres by an entrenched “establishment” or “elite” seeking to eliminate potent electoral rivals who have been gaining significant ground across Europe.
How does this impact wider European politics?
This resonates with a segment of the populace disillusioned with traditional politics. They argue that the judiciary — far from being impartial — has become a tool to suppress conservative-nationalist movements, questioning the selective application of laws like Sapin II and alleging that similar transgressions by mainstream figures are often overlooked.
This conflict feeds into a wider, ongoing debate within the EU concerning the meaning and application of the rule of law. Liberal and centrist forces, alongside EU institutions like the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), strongly maintain that adherence to the rule of law, including judicial independence and constitutional checks and balances, is fundamental to the Union’s values and legal order.
They view attacks on the judiciary, particularly measures aimed at curtailing its independence as seen in Poland, during the former ultra-conservative PiS-led government, and currently in Hungary under Mr. Orbán, as direct threats to democracy itself.
Conversely, many conservative-nationalist voices argue that the “rule of law” concept is being weaponised by Brussels and national elites to impose a specific political agenda, overriding national sovereignty and democratic mandates.
Are foreign actors involved?
Adding another layer of complexity are persistent concerns about foreign interference, particularly from Russia. Analysis from institutions like the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and reports from organisations like The Soufan Center suggest systematic Russian efforts to undermine democratic processes in the West through disinformation, financial support for extremist parties, and cyber operations.
The Romanian election annulment explicitly referenced suspicions of external manipulation favouring Mr. Georgescu, and historical financial links between parties like Ms. Le Pen’s RN and Russian entities fuel anxieties about Moscow’s influence.
While direct interference can be hard to isolate from domestic political dynamics, experts warn that Russia actively cultivates networks and exploits existing vulnerabilities within EU member states to promote anti-EU, anti-NATO sentiment and destabilise liberal democracies from within.
Prominent figures outside Europe have also weighed in. Following the Le Pen ruling, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance had stated that the conviction was imposed for a “very minor offense” and the resulting ban was “not democracy”.
Tech billionaire Elon Musk called the ruling “abuse” that would “backfire”, comparing it to legal actions against U.S. President Donald Trump and accusing “the radical left” of abusing the legal system globally to jail opponents.
Where does it leave the rule of law?
The escalating clash leaves the principle of the rule of law in a precarious position. When significant portions of the electorate perceive the judiciary not as an independent arbiter but as a political actor actively working against their chosen representatives, trust in fundamental democratic institutions erodes.
The rhetoric popularised by figures like Mr. Trump, calling to “drain the swamp”, finds fertile ground among Europeans, particularly younger generations who may lack lived memory of authoritarian regimes of communist Eastern Europe and right-wing military dictatorships in Iberia and Greece, where courts genuinely served as instruments of political oppression.
This erosion of trust poses a long-term challenge. As Marek Safjan, a former judge of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the CJEU, noted, while the European judiciary, particularly the CJEU, commands significant respect and has been key to integration, it is not immune to political pressures and the rise of populism.
If courts are increasingly seen as mere players in the political fray rather than guardians of constitutional principles, the essential checks and balances underpinning European democracies risk being fatally weakened, opening the door to further democratic backsliding and instability.
Published – April 22, 2025 10:37 pm IST
