Australia’s nuclear submarine ambitions under the AUKUS security pact are sinking to a weak US production base, uncertainties from a second Trump administration and a reluctance to share nuclear tech.
This October, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) released a report stating that instead of Australia acquiring nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) under the AUKUS Pillar 1 framework, US SSNs could perform Australian and US SSN missions in the region.
Such an arrangement would be similar to existing ones between the US and some of its NATO and other allies on significant naval assets such as aircraft carriers, large surface combatants, SSNs, amphibious warfare ships and non-naval capabilities such as nuclear weapons, space-based capabilities and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
The CRS report discusses several alternative arrangements for planned SSNs for Australia. These include forward rotations of US and UK SSNs to Australia, operating three to five US SSNs out of Australia, or Australia reinvesting funds initially intended for SSNs to other assets such as B-21 bombers and other long-range strike aircraft.
The report discusses other variations of such alternatives, namely that Australian investment in indigenous and US submarine construction capacity would continue while US SSNs perform Australian SSN missions until Australia builds its SSNs.
Another variation the report mentions is that US SSNs would perform Australian SSN missions indefinitely while Australia could continue investing in other military capabilities supporting a US-Australia division of labor.
The CRS report warns that should Australia’s SSN plans under AUKUS reach a cost-death spiral, it could reduce Australia’s funding for other military capabilities, negatively impacting Australia’s deterrent capabilities versus China.
The CRS report may represent a significant change of heart for AUKUS regarding SSNs for Australia, contrasting with the project’s earlier fanfare hype.
One of these reasons may be a weak US submarine construction base. A 2023 US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report mentions that the US faces significant challenges in its submarine production base, directly impacting the AUKUS’s submarine-sharing goals.
The CBO report mentions that US submarine production struggles with cost overruns, construction delays and missed deadlines. It notes that this is compounded by a 50% projected increase in submarine construction workload over the next decade, as the US Navy aims to produce five types of submarines simultaneously, including Virginia-class, SSN(X) and Columbia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN).
The report says the high cost of implementing the US Navy’s 2024 shipbuilding plan, driven by surging submarine expenses, exacerbates these issues. It projects submarine construction will outpace historical funding levels, requiring systemic industrial reforms and jeopardizing the AUKUS timeline for Australia to have SSNs by the 2030s.
Uncertainty over a second US Trump administration’s stance on AUKUS has compounded doubts about Australia’s SSN acquisition ambition.
In a November 2024 article for The Conversation, David Andrews mentions that Donald Trump’s return to the White House has raised significant concerns about the future of the AUKUS agreement. Andrews notes that the Australian government has expressed apprehension that Trump may seek to renegotiate or terminate the agreement.
He mentions that this concern stems from Trump’s history of demanding greater financial contributions from allies, as seen in South Korea, Japan, and NATO, with AUKUS possibly being subjected to similar demands. Andrews says the AUKUS agreement allows any party to withdraw with 12 months’ notice, making its longevity dependent on political will.
In line with that, Australian Greens spokesperson for defense David Shoebridge pointed out in August 2024 that AUKUS places the US and UK above accountability. Shoebridge says the agreement has multiple exit clauses that allow the US and UK to back out without compensation to Australia and place responsibility on Australia should anything go wrong with the formers’ SSN technology.
ABC News reported in July 2024 that the head of the AUKUS submarine program, Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead, has refused to confirm whether Australia will receive a refund if the US fails to deliver nuclear-powered submarines as part of the AUKUS agreement.
During an Australian Senate estimates hearing, ABC News says that Senator Shoebridge questioned the A$4.7 billion (US$3 billion) payment to the US, seeking clarity on whether a refund clause exists. According to the report, Mead reiterated the US commitment to providing two Virginia-class submarines in the early 2030s but avoided addressing the hypothetical scenario of non-delivery.
While Andrews notes bipartisan support for AUKUS in the US Congress, Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy approach and potential demands for increased Australian contributions raise questions about the agreement’s stability.
Australia’s reluctance to cooperate with the US and UK on nuclear power may also be a stumbling block for its SSN ambitions, hindering the establishment of the nuclear infrastructure necessary to operate SSNs.
ABC News reported in November 2024 that Australia has declined to join a UK and US-led pact to accelerate civilian nuclear energy development, citing the technology’s inapplicability to the country.
According to the report, Acting Prime Minister Richard Marles stated that pursuing nuclear energy would be Australia’s most expensive electricity option, as the country lacks a civilian nuclear industry. It notes that the UK and US had initially expected Australia to join the pact, but the Australian government ultimately decided against it, focusing instead on transitioning to renewable energy sources.
While AUKUS’ SSN ambitions are lofty, its rationale may be vague, impractical and militarily unsound according to some analysts. In a March 2024 Lowy Institute article, Sam Roggeveen cites AUKUS critics who point out that the AUKUS SSN project lacks a clear strategic rationale, with neither the Morrison nor Albanese governments providing a detailed explanation of what the SSNs are meant to achieve.
Roggeveen points out that the debate has primarily been framed around vague notions of “deterrence” without engaging in a substantive discussion on how best to achieve it.
He mentions skepticism about the sincerity of the Australian Labor Party’s support for AUKUS, suggesting it was driven more by political calculation than genuine conviction. He also emphasizes the project’s financial burden, which could lead to cost overruns and program delays, potentially straining other defense budgets.
Roggeveen also notes concerns about the potential impact of a second US Trump administration on AUKUS, including fears that Trump might not support it. Notably, he questions whether the AUKUS SSN project is a good idea, suggesting that Australia should leverage its geographic distance from China rather than attempting to project military power into China’s near seas.
