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Roula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.
The writer is an Israeli pollster and journalist
In recent months, two decades-old conflicts — between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Azerbaijan and Armenia — have taken tentative but significant steps towards peace. The breakthroughs have restored hope that conflicts can end through diplomacy, not only by butchery. By contrast, and despite vastly greater global attention, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is further from peace than ever. Resolving it will require fresh ideas from outside.
There is a different example of time-tested diplomacy that has saved lives. Thirty years ago, the leaders of Bosnia, Yugoslavia and Croatia signed the accords negotiated under US auspices in Dayton, Ohio, and ended the war in Bosnia — one of the bloodiest ethnonationalist wars of the last century. For three decades, Bosnia has avoided a resurgence of ethnic violence, proving that despite cynicism, agreements can halt bloodshed. But the applicable lessons from the Dayton accords for Israelis and Palestinians go much further.
Bosnia might seem like a troubled comparison. The country is beset by difficulties related to the original conflict, and to the Dayton framework. The agreement split Bosnia into two constituent entities, one under the control of Bosnian Serbs, which some saw as a reward for violence, while the other entity is the “federation” of Croats in Bosnia and Bosniak Muslims. Dayton’s constitution requires representation of the three main groups, Bosniak Muslims, Croats and Bosnian Serbs, in the country’s complex shared governing institutions. This has led to venal governance and embittered citizens.
Many criticise the system for discriminating against other minorities, and for being prone to ethnic exploitation. The Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik continues to traffic in ultranationalist secessionist policies, and has recently been convicted for violating the terms of the agreement. Serbia and Croatia are a negative influence and Bosnia’s EU path has been beleaguered and slow. The aim is not to copy Bosnia’s fate, but to extract essential principles from the Dayton framework that can help Israelis and Palestinians find a path out of hell.
One such lesson is obvious. The architect of Dayton, the late US diplomat Richard Holbrooke called his book To End a War, not To Reach a Temporary, Partial Ceasefire. Critics later developed the idea that Dayton was intended to be temporary, but the first line of the accord reads: “Recognizing the need for a comprehensive settlement to bring an end to the tragic conflict in the region.”
Yet in the Israeli-Palestinian case, it has become normal for over a decade to invest almost all diplomatic efforts in temporary ceasefires, without ending the conflict. If the Gaza war ends with a ceasefire alone, the chance of resurgence is 100 per cent. The only way to end the war in Gaza is permanently, and the only way to do that is through comprehensive final status talks.
Second, outside intervention is critical. In Bosnia, it took Nato military strikes against Serbs before the Dayton negotiations could advance. That won’t happen in the Middle East but the two sides won’t settle matters themselves, and external powers must seek to impose an agreement. The intensive international role in implementing Dayton in Bosnia, and later Kosovo, was essential to making the deal work.
Third, Bosnia’s peace agreement is grounded in a constitutional arrangement between warring ethnonational groups. Israeli-Palestinian peace would not need to have the same arrangement — Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a single country, while Israel and Palestine will almost definitely be two. But like in Bosnia, the warring groups could define a measure of separation and co-operation on issues such as economic policy, security and freedom of movement. If these measures sound fantastical in the Middle East, they were implemented in Bosnia, where the physical crimes were no less barbaric.
One final lesson is to drop this presumption that “trust” is a condition for peace. My own polling leaves no doubt about the depth of mutual Israeli-Palestinian distrust. But how much did Bosnian Muslims or Croats trust Bosnian Serbs in 1995, after the siege of Sarajevo, systematic rape and genocidal killings? The ethnic groups in Bosnia are still lukewarm about one another. In 2023, a USAID-funded survey found that an average of just 43 per cent of all three ethnic groups trusted the other two groups. But they’re not killing each other. Seeking to build “trust” or “confidence” between Israelis and Palestinians without ending the war, occupation and conflict is a phantom goal and a waste of time. The only trust-building measure is to impose a full end to the conflict — now.
