The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Romina Bandura – senior fellow with the Project on Prosperity and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) – is the 443rd in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”
Examine China’s rising influence in the multilateral system.
In the past two decades, China has been very capable at exerting its influence in existing multilateral institutions (the U.N., U.N. agencies and development banks such as the World Bank). It has also set up its own commercial initiatives (the BRI and the Digital Silk Road) and new organizations (the AIIB, the NDB) that serve its geopolitical purposes and authoritarian values.
As we outlined in several CSIS publications, Chinese actions include competing and winning in leadership positions, significantly increasing funding to established organizations, increasing its personnel footprint, winning procurement contracts, and aligning developing country votes to serve China’s commercial interests.
Analyze how China strategically places personnel and resources to expand its strategic positioning in international organizations.
People are the most important asset of these institutions, along with the funding they provide. China can exert influence by placing nationals in leadership and senior staff positions.
All these institutions were founded on key liberal values and principles – peace and security, respecting each country’s sovereignty, human rights and the rule of law, among others. If these leadership positions are held by nationals from authoritarian regimes, they will likely try to change the original “DNA” of these organizations to serve those authoritarian values.
What is the correlation between Chinese leadership decision-making and achieving China’s objectives in international organizations?
Leaders of these institutions are responsible for setting the direction and agenda and have significant decision-making power, particularly over institutional priorities and staff composition. Similarly, senior staff are responsible for implementing the decisions of leaders.
For example, in 2021, Chinese nationals led four of the 15 major U.N. specialized agencies that work on strategic sectors such as food, transport, and communications. Additionally, China tried to gain leadership of a fifth agency, the World Intellectual Property Organization, but that effort was blocked.
Beyond leadership positions, China also understands the value of nurturing a pipeline of nationals within the U.N. system. The number of Chinese nationals employed by the United nations nearly doubled from 2009 to 2022, reaching 1,564 personnel in 2022. China also feeds its pipeline by sponsoring nationals through the U.N. junior professional officers (JPOs) program.
Compare and contrast China’s personnel representation with that of the United States in multilateral organizations.
As CSIS has argued in several reports, the U.S. ability to compete in leadership races and place qualified representatives in top positions of these institutions has diminished. The presence of qualified Americans in staff positions has also declined vis-a-vis the amount of funding it provides. For example, in 2022 (latest figures of the U.N. system-wide) Americans represented 4.5 percent of total U.N. staff (system wide) while the U.S. provides more than 30 percent of the revenue. American representation (as a share of total staff) has declined while China’s has increased.
Unfortunately, the IFIs/MDBs (World Bank and regional development banks) do not publish personnel data by nationality, so it is harder to do an analysis for these institutions.
We are not implying that Americans working in these institutions should be advocating for U.S. national interests. All employees, regardless of their nationality, should be hired for their merits and pursue the institution’s mission. However, there is an opportunity to increase U.S. representation, particularly at the mid and junior level, which could yield the following benefits:
- Upholding universal liberal values: Regardless of their political affiliation, U.S. employees can sustain founding values and advocate for institutional transparency, accountability, neutrality, and integrity in these organizations.
- Building a future leadership pipeline: U.S. personnel that possess technical skills and acquire experience in these organizations may become candidates for future leadership positions and senior roles.
- Having mentors and champions within: Americans working within the system have critical knowledge on processes, including how to get hired, navigate promotions and transitions, which can help other Americans trying to enter the system.
Assess the potential impact of U.S. leadership under the incoming Trump administration on great power competition in the multilateral system.
The United States under the Trump presidency will be tracking leadership positions in these institutions more carefully. Two examples are the past WIPO and ITU elections.
In terms of personnel, we have suggested a series of recommendations that the United States could adopt to strengthen its representation: 1) A centralized U.S. government effort to monitor upcoming leadership elections; 2) More collaboration with allies and like-minded partners to put forward the best candidates; and 3) Supporting Americans in mid- and entry-level positions.
Beyond personnel, the U.S. will probably be looking more closely at procurement decisions, discussions under the United Nations Human Rights Council, and voting patterns in these institutions.
In the past, the United States withheld funding or withdrew from institutions when it disagrees with their decisions. It would not be in the U.S. long-term interest to follow such a strategy because that leaves a vacuum for malign actors to fill. Instead, the Trump administration should advocate for reforms, greater transparency and accountability from these institutions, including in procurement actions and hiring, as well as improved development impact.
The selection of leaders for these institutions is either done through an “election” process or a direct “appointment” process. At the U.N. system, for U.N. departments, funds, and programs, the secretary general is responsible for appointing heads of organizations, in consultation with member states. In the case of U.N. specialized agencies, these organizations have elections, mostly with a majority-rule, one-country-one-vote system. In the case of the IFIs, leadership is selected through executive board-only elections.
The type of selection process in these institutions shapes the candidates’ approach to the different leadership races. In appointment races, a select group of typically high-level representatives make the final decisions, usually with the future vision of the overall organization in mind. Thus, it may be important for candidates to clearly demonstrate a commitment to the organization itself. Furthermore, it may be important to champion policies that receive broad consensus among organization member states. On the other hand, in a majority-rule election, candidates may find greater success in targeting specific member state subgroups through a series of targeted policy promises. It may also be more critical for candidates to devote resources in these races to consult with and pitch to individual member states. While these two strategies represent opposite ends of the spectrum, in practice, there is a mix of both.
