The geostrategic value of the Eastern Mediterranean has historically attracted external powers trying to assert their influence, and China has been an increasingly important player in the region, though mostly in economic terms so far. All Eastern Mediterranean countries have a trade deficit with China and are no exception to what has set in as a global trend.
With regard to investment, Chinese companies hold significant stakes in Egyptian ports at both ends of the Suez Canal, and a huge industrial park sprawls in between. Unfortunately, the zone features some of the worst aspects of the Chinese way of doing business, including subsidized outputs and low environmental and labor standards. As a result, European glass fiber producers have lodged an anti-dumping complaint against Chinese manufacturers operating out of the Suez Canal economic zone.
But apart from the Suez Canal, China’s presence is expanding across the entire Egyptian economy. By March 2025, the worth of Chinese investment in Egypt had reportedly exceeded $7 billion, and there’s more coming. Chinese companies are involved in the construction of a central business district in Egypt’s new administrative capital, a 1.1GW wind farm in the Gulf of Suez, and a $5.1 billion plant that will export ammonia to European markets. The Chinese motor vehicle maker BAIC has announced its plans to set up an electric vehicle (EV) factory.
The stock of Chinese FDI in Turkiye amounted to $9 billion in 2023, from a terminal in the Ambarli sea port to road infrastructure, railways, telecommunications, online retail, and lending arrangements by Chinese state-owned policy banks. In 2019, the two countries signed a currency swap agreement to replenish the limited foreign exchange reserves of the Turkish Central Bank.
The EU-Turkiye customs union, in force since 1995, is a major incentive for Chinese companies to invest in the country and then target the European market. A 1$ billion BYD investment in an EV plant has been announced, while an agreement with Chery, a Chinese car maker, also seems to be in the pipeline.
Over the past three decades at least, there’s been close cooperation between Israel and China in trade and high-tech sectors. A Chinese state-owned company is involved in the management of a terminal in the Haifa Bay port, much to the chagrin of the United States. In addition, Chinese automakers clearly dominate the local EV and green energy market.
However, things have changed visibly in Israel since the Hamas attack in October 2023, and China’s refusal to criticize the same. There’s growing distrust of Chinese tech, as reflected in frequent discussions about security risks associated with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), the police, and other security agencies purchasing tens of thousands of Chinese-made cameras, drones, and electric vehicles.
China’s footprint in chronically unstable Lebanon is less prominent than Beijing would like to see, as Beirut needs to walk a fine line between long-term Western assistance and potentially risky Chinese loans. Chinese investment in Cyprus is exclusively concentrated in real estate, a huge casino, and hotels. In Greece, the other EU member in the region, the Chinese shipping giant COSCO has undertaken the management of the port of Piraeus, and has a 24 percent stake in the national high-voltage grid operator.
Alternative Trade Routes Via the Eastern Mediterranean
In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the railway track via Kazakhstan and Russia has seen a 40 percent drop in China-EU shipments. The crisis in the Red Sea, too, has sent a clear signal to China that the search for alternative routes is critical. Together, these factors have encouraged Beijing to rediscover the Middle Corridor as an opportunity. This route, bolstered by the existing Trans-Kazakhstan Railroad and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway into Turkiye, helps China circumvent Russia from the south.
Beijing’s renewed interest in the Middle Corridor could also explain the launch of the long-stalled China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project as part of the Central Asian route to the Caucasus and the Black Sea. In addition, a Chinese group has undertaken the construction of a large deep-sea port in Anaklia on Georgia’s Black Sea coast, which may actually be an indication of China’s reluctance to rely exclusively on Turkiye.
Regarding the India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor (IMEC) suggested at the New Delhi G-20 summit in 2023, China’s response has so far been cautious but not dismissive. Beijing tends to view global infrastructure projects as complementary rather than competitive. In addition, China has no motivation to be sucked into disputes over IMEC – rather, it would leave this to Egypt, Oman, and Turkiye who feel excluded from the proposed new route. For instance, Egypt views the IMEC as a potential rival to the Suez Canal, while Turkish President Erdogan has stated unequivocally that “there’s no corridor without Turkiye.” Beijing has kept conspicuously silent on this issue.
China’s Political Agenda in the Region
Egypt is by far the most China-friendly country in the Eastern Mediterranean, despite annual U.S. allocations of $1.3 billion through Washington’s foreign military financing program. Notably, the scope of steadily intensifying Sino-Egyptian ties extends to military cooperation as well. The recent joint air drills in Egypt with the code name “Eagles of Civilization 2025,” including the use of J-10Cs fighters, were seen by many as an opportunity for the Egyptian Air Force to evaluate China’s advanced equipment and consider potential procurement. Moreover, Egypt has confirmed it is now using the Chinese HQ-9B long-range surface-to-air missile system.
Turkiye’s overtures to the BRICS+ grouping and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) certainly are welcomed by Beijing, as well as by Moscow. However, China is on edge because of Turkiye’s interest in the Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic group, and is wary of Ankara’s self-image as a leader of the Turkic world, as illustrated at times by the slogan “from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China.”
Greece is turning increasingly cautious vis-à-vis China amid growing pressure from the U.S., mostly in relation to the port of Piraeus, and is confining itself to diplomatic pleasantries with Beijing. Similarly, despite a shiny façade of Sino-Cypriot relations, the recent rapprochement between Washington and Nicosia has not gone unnoticed in China.
A country where China’s image has definitely deteriorated is Israel. Beijing’s refusal to condemn Hamas and other Iranian-backed militant groups is interpreted in Israel as an obliquely pro-Hamas stance. In July 2024, the Beijing-hosted reconciliation agreement between 14 Palestinian factions, including Fatah and Hamas, received a frosty reception in Israeli media. In a September 2024 poll conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), only 16 percent of Israeli respondents viewed China a friendly country or an ally of Israel.
Bystander in a Turbulent Region
While China is increasingly muscular in its “near abroad,” at present, it is not in a position to project hard power farther from home and prepared to insert itself as a reliable interlocutor in the complex security patchwork of the Eastern Mediterranean. However, Beijing is not interested in a power vacuum either – it certainly needs regional stability for its Belt and Road agenda and commercial interests.
This is why China is a security consumer in the Eastern Mediterranean rather than a security provider. Its real interests lie in staying out of conflict and extracting whatever gains it can, leaving the responsibility for regional stability to other countries. This was clearly illustrated by Beijing’s do-nothing approach to the Red Sea crisis, where China attempted to secure safe passage for its own vessels and expected Western powers to ensure the safety of other maritime traffic.
China is only involved in two relatively safe peacekeeping operations in the region. In Lebanon, it is represented in the UNIFIL mission in the south of the country, undertaking tasks such as mine clearance, construction, maintenance, and medical assistance. In Cyprus, Beijing provides military and police personnel and civilian police to UNFICYP, the peacekeeping force on the island.
However, China has been careful enough not to get embroiled in the civil war in Libya, though it recognizes the government in Tripoli and, in parallel, has transactions with the authorities in Benghazi.
In Syria, Beijing supported the ousted Bashar al-Assad, taking its cues from Russia. It even invited Assad to China in September 2023, only to be caught off guard by the fall of the regime late last year.
As for the intractable Palestinian issue, Chinese President Xi Jinping has presented at least three peace plans, but of questionable feasibility. Rather than actually attempting to make progress, China’s peace proposals are mostly calibrated to win the hearts and minds of a broader Global South audience.
While China’s economic importance in the Eastern Mediterranean will continue to grow, driven by trade and infrastructure investments, its political and security role will remain limited in the short run. Most probably, while Beijing will continue to score easy diplomatic points each time an opportunity arises, it will continue to tread carefully in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, China’s selective engagements in crises raise questions about the sustainability of its hands-off approach in a region where political instability can directly impact its economic ambitions.
