In early December, China and Vietnam convened their first-ever “3+3 strategic dialogue“—a mechanism unprecedented in both nations’ diplomacy.
Built on the three pillars of defense, diplomacy and public security, the dialogue was held at the vice-ministerial level just before the 16th meeting of the China-Vietnam Steering Committee for Bilateral Cooperation.
This new dialogue underscores the respective anxieties of the two neighbors, which are deeply entangled in territorial and resource disputes in the contested Spratly and Paracel Island chains in an increasingly fluid global geostrategic landscape.
Vietnam is known to be concerned that Trump’s tariff war might shift focus from China to itself amid speculation it often serves as a transshipment site for what are really Chinese-made goods. At the same time, Hanoi is wary of China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea.
For its part, China is seeking to prevent South China Sea disputes from spiraling out of its control and is aiming to preemptively neutralize potential US exploitation of the situation.
Contrary to perceptions that the new 3+3 dialogue signifies Vietnam’s alignment with China, seasoned observers see the mechanism as a pragmatic response to overlapping interests rather than a hierarchical shift in Vietnam’s foreign policy.
Vietnam expert Carl Thayer, for one, has aptly described it as a “natural outcome” rather than a sign of Vietnam shifting into China’s orbit.
While the new 3+3 dialogue clearly aims to stabilize bilateral ties, the reality on the ground indicates that the South China Sea disputes will remain a major point of bilateral contention unlikely to be resolved or significantly mitigated by the mechanism.
For example, on October 2, Vietnam protested a Chinese attack on Vietnamese fishermen near the Paracel Islands on September 29, which reportedly left them seriously injured. In a strong allegation, Vietnam’s foreign ministry accused Chinese law enforcers of looting Vietnamese catches and equipment.
China denied the allegations, claiming the fishermen illegally entered Chinese waters and that its operations were “professional and restrained” and caused no injuries.
Significantly, this heated diplomatic exchange occurred just months after To Lam, Vietnam’s newly installed Communist Party general secretary, visited China amid considerable fanfare in August.
The South China Sea is a bubbling geopolitical cauldron. Recent headlines have been dominated by China and the Philippines, which have clashed over Manila’s resupply missions to the contested Second Thomas Shoal and other disputed features.
Chinese attacks on Southeast Asian fishermen represent a subdued form of coercion, with limited escalation potential as they involve civilian, not military, actors.
China’s actions against Vietnamese fishing vessels reflect an attempt to pressure Vietnam into maintaining a neutral foreign policy by balancing external security coercion with inter-party linkages to the Communist Party of Vietnam. This strategy aims to drive a wedge between the US and Vietnam, yet it does not directly impact the broader disputes.
The attacks are neither isolated nor new. Since 2009, China has routinely looted, rammed, sunk, and fired flares at Vietnamese fishing vessels, often to signal displeasure with Vietnam’s deepening ties with the US.
For instance, after the historic visit of Nguyen Phu Trong to the White House—the first by a Communist Party of Vietnam general secretary, China sank a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracel Islands. Similarly, the October attack followed General Secretary To Lam’s meeting with US President Biden on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York.
Among other things, these incidents also underscore China’s unease over Vietnam’s engagement with the US. The new 3+3 mechanism may thus indicate a reconciliatory approach on Vietnam’s part to placate and reassure China that its US relations will not come to Beijing’s detriment.
Vietnam’s measured diplomatic response has allowed it to quietly foritify its South China Sea position. An Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) report revealed that Vietnam’s land reclamation in the Spratly Islands expanded by 2,360 acres as of May 2024—a dramatic increase compared to its total expansion of 329 acres three years prior.
Despite the naval power disparity, Vietnam’s actions have not sparked significant Chinese retaliation. That’s likely because they are viewed independently of the US-China rivalry, unlike the Philippines’ recent actions around contested features.
Indeed, Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy”—a neutral, multi-dimensional foreign policy—allows it to deftly balance relations with China and other global powers, including the US.
Hanoi’s “Three No’s” policy, expanded to “Four No’s” in 2019, underscores its commitment to non-alignment and peaceful dispute resolution. Rooted in Cold War lessons, Vietnam continues to diversify its relations, adhering strictly to its multi-directional foreign policy.
Looking ahead, China’s rising assertiveness in the South China Sea may lead to more confrontations with Vietnamese fishing vessels. However, such incidents are unlikely to result in a significant shift or escalation in Vietnam’s stance on the disputes or its broader relationship with China.
Vietnam’s strategic choices will hinge on the extent of Chinese coercion but are expected to remain anchored in its neutral and pragmatic policy framework.
The newly launched 3+3 dialogue mechanism, thus, will likely only help with capping the two sides’ South China Sea disputes while their respective positions on who owns and controls what in the maritime area will remain unchanged.
Dr Rahul Mishra is an associate professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, and a senior research Fellow at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance, Thammasat University, Thailand. He can be reached at rahul.seas@gmail.com. Follow him on X at @rahulmishr_
Harshit Prajapati is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. He can be reached at harshi55_isn@jnu.ac.in Follow him on X at @harshitp_47
