China’s ambitious plan to construct the world’s largest hydropower dam on the Brahmaputra River marks a significant and crucial turning point in South Asia’s geopolitical landscape.
This project is more than just a Chinese technological marvel; it heralds a profound shift in regional power dynamics, particularly in the realm of transboundary water politics.
While Pakistan views the dam as a strategic advantage that aligns with its broader geopolitical goals, India perceives it as a looming threat to its water security, border stability and regional influence. When China recently announced the dam plan, India responded that it would “protect its interests.”
The Brahmaputra River, known as the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet, originates near Mount Kailash and traverses China, India and Bangladesh before merging with the Ganges in the Bay of Bengal.
The river’s unique topography, particularly at the “Great Bend” in Tibet, offers immense potential for hydropower generation.
Recognizing this, China has embarked on constructing a massive dam capable of generating an unprecedented 60 gigawatts of electricity, three times the capacity of the renowned Three Gorges Dam.
Beijing justifies this endeavor as a crucial step toward its 2030 carbon neutrality goals. However, the strategic implications of controlling the Brahmaputra’s upper reaches cannot be overlooked.
By harnessing the river’s flow at its source, China secures unparalleled leverage over downstream nations, particularly India and Bangladesh. Additionally, the dam’s proximity to India’s northeastern border, a region fraught with territorial disputes, adds a layer of geopolitical complexity.
For Pakistan, China’s Brahmaputra dam project is a welcome development that bolsters its longstanding strategic partnership with Beijing while simultaneously countering India’s regional dominance.
As a lower riparian state, Pakistan has long grappled with water management challenges, especially concerning shared rivers with India. Despite the Indus Waters Treaty providing a framework for water sharing, tensions persist.
China’s control over the Brahmaputra introduces a new dynamic that could diminish India’s leverage in future water-related negotiations.
With China firmly positioned as a key player in South Asia’s water politics, Pakistan gains a strategic ally capable of influencing regional hydro-diplomacy.
Given the complex history of water disputes between India and Pakistan, Beijing’s growing role could serve to recalibrate power dynamics in Islamabad’s favor.
This shift aligns with Pakistan’s broader objectives of securing its water resources and challenging India’s supremacy in the region.
For India, the implications of China’s dam project are profound. The Brahmaputra is a crucial lifeline for India’s northeastern states, supporting agriculture, drinking water supplies and hydropower generation.
Any alteration to its natural flow could disrupt these essential functions, posing severe risks to millions of Indian people who depend on the river.
Reduced water flow and sediment deposits could negatively impact agriculture, fisheries and local ecosystems, exacerbating socio-economic vulnerabilities in the region.
The dam’s location near Arunachal Pradesh, an area claimed by both India and China, further complicates matters. Given the recent military standoffs along the Sino-Indian border, Beijing’s control over a major water source could be perceived as a strategic pressure point.
Any manipulation of water flow, whether intentional or due to mismanagement, could escalate tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.
Environmental concerns also loom large. The Himalayas are one of the most seismically active regions in the world, making large-scale infrastructure projects highly risky.
A potential dam failure or mismanagement during extreme weather events could lead to catastrophic flooding in downstream areas, posing serious humanitarian and economic consequences for India.
Adding to India’s apprehension is China’s history of unilateral decision-making on transboundary rivers. Unlike the water-sharing treaty India has with Pakistan, Beijing has refrained from entering legally binding agreements with downstream nations.
The lack of transparency in China’s hydropower projects has fueled mistrust, leaving India with limited diplomatic avenues to address its concerns.
China’s Brahmaputra dam project signifies a broader trend of increasing competition over water resources in South Asia. Water is fast emerging as a critical geopolitical asset, and Beijing’s ability to regulate the Brahmaputra’s flow places India and Bangladesh in a precarious position.
For Bangladesh, which relies heavily on the Brahmaputra for agriculture and drinking water, the project raises fears of water scarcity and accelerated riverbank erosion.
Disruptions in river flow could impact millions of livelihoods, pushing Dhaka to seek greater engagement with both India and China to mitigate potential risks. However, the power imbalance between these nations complicates the possibility of meaningful negotiations.
The dam also aligns with China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which seeks to expand Beijing’s economic and strategic influence across Asia. By developing critical infrastructure in key locations, China aims to deepen regional dependencies on its economic and technological prowess.
The Brahmaputra dam is yet another step in this strategy, offering China both hydroelectric capabilities and geopolitical leverage over its South Asian neighbors.
India has responded to China’s dam project with plans to construct its own hydropower infrastructure on the Brahmaputra. The proposed Siang dam in Arunachal Pradesh is intended to counterbalance China’s influence and ensure India’s water security.
However, given the region’s geological sensitivity, executing such a project presents significant technical and environmental challenges.
Beyond infrastructure, India has sought diplomatic avenues to address its concerns. Indian officials have urged China to engage in greater transparency and consultation on water-sharing matters.
However, Beijing’s preference for unilateral decision-making limits the effectiveness of these efforts. In response, India may need to strengthen regional partnerships, particularly with Bangladesh, to present a united front against China’s growing hydro-hegemony.
New Delhi is also exploring technological solutions such as advanced satellite monitoring of water flows and predictive modeling to anticipate and mitigate any adverse impacts from China’s dam.
Additionally, India’s emphasis on diversifying its energy sources, including a push for domestic hydropower projects, aims to reduce dependency on transboundary river flows.
Still, China’s decision to build the world’s largest hydropower dam on the Brahmaputra River represents a watershed moment in South Asian geopolitics.
As the dam project progresses, India faces the challenge of formulating a comprehensive strategy to protect its water interests while navigating its complex relationship with China. Diplomatic engagement, regional partnerships and domestic countermeasures will be key in shaping India’s response.
Ultimately, China’s increasing control over South Asia’s water resources has altered the balance of power, tipping the scales in favor of Beijing and Islamabad.
As competition over water intensifies, the possibility of escalating tensions in the region grows. The era of hydro-diplomacy in South Asia is evolving rapidly, and the stakes have never been higher.
Sara Sheikh is an Islamabad-based political analyst
