EPASvitlana says her daughter loved her school in Poland.
“Even when we moved to another area, she didn’t want to change schools,” says the 31-year-old Ukrainian mother. “She liked it so much. There was no bullying.”
Now she says the atmosphere at the school – and in Poland overall – has changed.
“Two weeks ago, she came home and said “One boy said to me today, ‘Go back to Ukraine’.” Svitlana was astonished.
She is one of dozens of Ukrainians living in Poland who have told the BBC that anti-Ukrainian sentiment has risen considerably in recent months.
Many described experiencing abuse on public transport, bullying in schools and xenophobic material online.
A polarising presidential election campaign has added to the tension, with the first round of voting taking place on Sunday.
The day after Svitlana’s daughter was told to go back to Ukraine, the abuse became even worse.
“Girls from the class above started complaining about her speaking Ukrainian. Then they pretended to fall to the ground shouting ‘Missile! Get down!’ and laughing,” Svitlana says. “She came home crying.”
A Russian missile had slammed into Svitlana’s hometown in Ukraine days before, killing scores of civilians, including children. Her daughter was traumatised.
Svitlana – not her real name did not want to be identified as she fears reprisals. She showed us screenshots of messages with school staff where she complains about her daughter’s treatment.
She said she had noticed attitudes changing towards Ukrainians in other places, too: “At work, many people have been saying Ukrainians come here and behave badly. And my Ukrainian friends say they want to go home because Polish people don’t accept us. It’s frightening to live here now.”
According to government statistics, at least 2.5 million Ukrainians live in Poland, comprising almost 7% of the total population of Poland.
When the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, there was an outpouring of compassion from Poles. “It was amazing. Every day people were calling, asking, ‘How can we help?'” says activist Natalia Panchenko, head of the Warsaw-based ‘Stand with Ukraine’ Foundation.
“Some of them organised humanitarian convoys or brought refugees here. They gave their houses, food, everything they have – and their hearts, too.”
Three years later, Natalia says she believes the majority of Poles still support Ukraine. But some don’t – and her organisation has noticed an upsurge of anti-Ukrainian online abuse that began several months ago.
“Then it started to come to real life,” she says. “Recently, we have more and more of these kinds of situations… xenophobic [abuse] of people working in shops or hotels just because they speak with a Ukrainian accent.”
Natalia says that many Ukrainian refugees are traumatised. “These groups of women and children are in Poland because of the war, very often their relatives are on the front line, in captivity or dead… and this is the group of people being targeted.”
Research suggests that Poland’s public opinion of Ukrainians is indeed worsening. According to a March 2025 poll by the respected CBOS Centre, just 50% of Poles are in favour of accepting Ukrainian refugees, a fall of seven percentage points in four months. Two years ago, the figure was 81%.
Around a million Ukrainians are officially registered as having arrived after the start of the full-scale invasion. Poland spends 4.2% of its GDP on Ukrainian refugees.
EPAUkraine has become a hot-button political issue in Poland’s crucial presidential election campaign.
Far-right populist Slawomir Mentzen, currently polling third, is virulently anti-Ukrainian and supports an “agreement” with Russia’s Vladimir Putin.
In second place is conservative Karol Nawrocki, who opposes EU and Nato membership for Ukraine and financial assistance for refugees, but supports the war effort.
The most pro-Ukraine candidate is front-runner Rafal Trzaskowski from Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s coalition, although even he has promised a reduction in social welfare for Ukrainians.
Trzaskowski has refrained from espousing his pro-Ukrainian credentials in order to attract the centrist vote in the elections, says political analyst Marcin Zaborowski.
“He’s responding to the change in public attitudes. The initial enthusiasm for supporting war victims is disappearing, negative sentiments are taking over and it’s not an entirely comfortable issue for him.”
Another far-right candidate, Grzegorz Braun, is under investigation by police for tearing down a Ukrainian flag from a city hall building during an election rally in April. Braun, who is polling at just 3%, regularly fulminates against what he calls the “Ukrainisation of Poland”.
Last week, the Polish government warned of an “unprecedented attempt” by Russia to interfere in the Polish elections by spreading “false information among Polish citizens online”. Moscow denies all allegations of election interference.
Michal Marek, who runs an NGO that monitors disinformation and propaganda in Poland, offers some examples of the anti-Ukraine material being circulated on social media.
“The main narratives are that Ukrainians are stealing money from the Polish budget, that Ukrainians do not respect us, that they want to rob and kill us and are responsible for the war,” he says.
“This information starts in Russian-speaking Telegram channels, and, after that, we see the same photos and the same text just translated by Google Translate. And they are pushing [the material] into the Polish infosphere.”
Mr Marek links such disinformation directly with the increase in anti-Ukraine sentiment in Poland, and says an increasing number of Poles are becoming influenced by propaganda.
“But we will only see the effect after the election – what percentage of Poles want to vote for openly pro-Russian candidates.”
