China just delivered a warning shot from the Gobi Desert—combining mass ballistic missile firepower, precision radar tracking and a clear message of strategic intent.
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recently conducted an unprecedented missile defense test in the Gobi Desert, showcasing its advanced capabilities and strategic resolve amidst intensifying global tensions.
The exercise involved the simultaneous launch of 16 ballistic missiles toward a single target, testing a new dual-band (S/X) phased-array radar system designed to counteract saturation attacks, according to a PLA Unit 63623 study cited in the SCMP report.
This radar system, achieving 100% detection and tracking success, demonstrated its ability to differentiate between warheads and decoys while maintaining precise threat prioritization.
The technology mirrors, yet rivals, the US Navy’s USNS Howard O Lorenzen system, though China’s test marked the first live-fire demonstration of this kind.
Analysts note that this achievement marks a significant leap in China’s ability to counter sophisticated threats, such as hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and missiles equipped with countermeasures. The large-scale test, unparalleled outside of wartime scenarios, underscores China’s commitment to bolstering military readiness.
Ballistic missiles are among the most costly weapon systems, so the PLA’s willingness to undertake such an expensive endeavor reflects a strategic emphasis on deterrence, particularly in potential conflicts over Taiwan and the South China Sea.
China’s autonomous missile production further complements this shift, signaling its intent to sustain and expand its arsenal.
Examining the drivers of China’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability buildup, Jacob Mezey notes in a September 2024 article for the Atlantic Council that China’s BMD program was initially rooted in Cold War-era fears of US preemption.
Its development now, however, serves multiple purposes, namely: shielding leadership and nuclear forces from limited strikes, countering India’s expanding missile arsenal and supporting a potential launch-on-warning posture.
Mezey notes that BMD research also complements China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, providing dual-use technological benefits.
Underscoring the vulnerability of China’s land-based nuclear arsenal, Ryan Snyder mentions in a December 2024 article in the peer-reviewed Science & Global Security journal that US nuclear ballistic missiles pose a serious threat to China’s land-based nuclear arsenal due to their high accuracy and yield.
Snyder estimates that Chinese missile silos, likely hardened to no more than 1,500 psi, are vulnerable to airblast-induced ground motion from US nuclear surface bursts.
Using standard models for peak overpressure and lethal radius, he estimates that single-shot kill probabilities against such silos exceed 90%.
He notes that given the similar dimensions of China’s silos to Russian designs and no evidence of advanced shock isolation systems, their survivability against modern US nuclear counterforce capabilities remains in serious doubt.
Further, Hans Kristensen and other writers mention in a September 2024 article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that India has significantly expanded its land-based nuclear-capable missile force, featuring systems capable of striking deep into Chinese territory.
Kristensen and others note that the Agni-II and Agni-III, with ranges exceeding 2,000 and 3,200 kilometers, are believed to target China’s western, central and southern regions.
In addition, they claim that the Agni-IV, deployed since 2022, can reach over 3,500 kilometers, while the Agni-V, expected to be operational by 2025, extends its strike capability beyond 5,000 kilometers.
Additionally, they note that the upcoming Agni-VI, with a projected range exceeding 6,000 kilometers, will further expand coverage.
On China’s new BMD radar to support ASAT capabilities, Decker Eveleth mentions in a September 2024 China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) report that China operates several Large Phased Array Radar (LPAR) stations that provide dual-purpose capabilities: missile early warning and tracking of high-altitude space objects.
Eveleth says these LPARs can detect ballistic missiles and satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) from beyond visual range, making them essential assets for strategic defense and space situational awareness (SSA).
Such capabilities may be vital for targeting US satellite constellations, such as Starlink, which has proved its military value in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.
Howard Wang and other writers mention in a March 2024 RAND report that the PLA views Starlink and similar satellite constellations as significant threats that fundamentally challenge its core operational concepts.
Wang and others say that the PLA believes Starlink undermines its strategy of disabling adversary systems by neutralizing key nodes due to Starlink’s resilience, decentralization and rapid reconstitution capabilities.
They note that Starlink offers unprecedented real-time battlefield awareness, enhanced precision targeting and support for nuclear strikes.
They also note that some assessments even allege Starlink could intercept hypersonic missiles or function as kinetic kill vehicles, underscoring how the PLA perceives such constellations as destabilizing and integral to future US space warfare.
While firing many ballistic missiles makes for a strong show of force, it also highlights China’s industrial capacity to produce those weapons on a large scale.
Underscoring the importance of ballistic missiles to China’s military strategy, the US Department of Defense’s 2024 China Military Power Report mentions that the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) serves as the cornerstone of China’s nuclear and conventional missile strategy, organizing, training and equipping its growing land-based strike capabilities.
According to the report, the PLARF is tasked with strategic deterrence and regional counter-intervention, operating over 40 brigades across seven missile bases and three support bases.
It also says the PLARF fields a mix of nuclear and conventional missiles, including the DF-15, DF-16, DF-17, DF-26, and DF-41, as well as cruise missiles.
The report states that the PLARF’s dual command structure supports both theater- and central-level operations. It notes that ongoing modernization includes expanded intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) integration to bolster survivability and retaliatory strength.
Underpinning the PLARF’s firepower, Peter Wood and Alex Stone note in a May 2021 CASI report that China’s ballistic missile industry has expanded significantly in recent years, driven by increased investment, infrastructure growth and military-civil fusion initiatives.
Wood and Stone note that major facilities, such as China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation’s (CASC) Factory 211 and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation’s (CASIC) Fourth Design Department, have established new production zones, high-performance computing centers and joint industrial parks in collaboration with civilian firms.
They note that the sector benefits from vertically integrated research and development institutions, as well as a growing workforce.
However, they also note that China’s ballistic missile industry faces persistent challenges, including talent retention issues, lagging adoption of advanced manufacturing techniques and reliance on incremental modernization rather than frontier innovation.
According to them, these gaps reveal gaps between China’s domestic breakthroughs and global missile development and production best practices.
What was revealed in the Gobi was more than a missile test—it was a calibrated rehearsal for missile-era deterrence in a world where space, speed and mass firepower define the battlespace.
