Did the Lao Government Just Attempt an Extrajudicial Killing on European Soil? – The Diplomat

On June 14, an attempt was made on the life of the prominent Laotian activist Joseph Akaravong. Known for his pointed criticisms of members of Laos’ political elite, Joseph’s Facebook account has over 600,000 followers – a monumental figure for a country with a population of less than 8 million.

The attack took place in Pau, France, where Joseph has been living since being granted political asylum in 2022. An unknown assailant approached him on the street and inflicted multiple stab wounds to his throat and torso.

Given Joseph’s profile and the nature of the attack – no attempt at robbery was made – it is suspected that this was a failed extrajudicial killing.

Acts of severe state violence against “regime dissidents” by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) are nothing new. Arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and assassination attempts have all been common mechanisms of the LPRP’s repressive authoritarianism over the past decade.

Yet this recent attack, which took place on European soil, represents both a business-as-usual human rights abuse by the Lao single-party state, and a step into entirely unchartered territory.

To offer some context to Joseph’s attempted murder, a list of the more well-known cases of LPRP violence toward critics bears repeating.

Beginning with other assassinations and assassination attempts, in April 2023, popular youth activist “Jack” Anousa Luangsuphom was shot twice in a Vientiane coffee shop following his ongoing online criticisms of the Lao government. Jack survived, but just one month later, another activist, Bounsuan Kitiyano, was fatally shot in Thailand’s Ubon Ratchathani province.

Such public assassination attempts represent a new and emboldened use of state violence by the LPRP, with enforced disappearance traditionally being its preferred method of terror.

In 2012, for example, the international award-winning community development worker Sombath Somphone was abducted in front of a police checkpoint in Vientiane, sparking global outrage. Sombath’s disappearance followed the lesser-known 2007 disappearance of Somphone Kantisouk and was itself followed by the disappearance of numerous Thai political activists while in Laos: Itthipol Sukpaen in 2016, Wuthipong Kachathamakul in 2017, and Surachai Danwattananusorn, Kraidej Luelert, and Chatchan Buphawan in 2018. The mutilated bodies of Luelert and Buphawan were later discovered on the shores of the Mekong in Northeast Thailand, their faces disfigured and their stomachs filled with concrete. Then, one year later, in 2019, two Laotian political activists, Od Sayavong and Phetphouthon Philachane, disappeared in Thailand following a meeting with the then-U.N. special rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, who subsequently issued a scathing statement on rights abuses in Laos.

This track record of violence is not exhaustive, and does not include unlawful arrests, such as the prominent cases of Somphone Pimmasone, Lodkham Thammavong, and Soukane Chaithad (2016), “Muay” Houayheuang Xayabouly (2019) or Savang Phaleuth (2023). Yet as this history makes clear, the recent attempt on Joseph Akaravong’s life, if it was indeed an act of state violence, was in itself nothing unusual for the LPRP.

What is remarkable about Joseph’s attack, however, is where it took place – in a regional French city known for its natural beauty.

The disappearance and execution of Thai activists in Laos, and of Laotian and Cambodian activists and political figures in Thailand, indicate that authoritarian transnational collusion has become prevalent in mainland Southeast Asia. Indeed, the rise of transnational attacks on dissidents has been well recognized by scholars and rights organizations alike.

But to extend extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings from beyond the wider Mekong region into Europe represents an astonishing geographic expansion of the single-party state’s reach.

If this was a targeted assassination attempt – and it is highly likely that it was – it is worth asking what has emboldened the LPRP to take this unprecedented step, that would have arguably seemed unimaginable only a week ago.

There are multiple possible explanations.

First, and most simply, it may be the result of the significant online profile that Joseph has built, and the impact that he has been able to have on public political discourse in Laos. Joseph is an outspoken critic, and many believe that his corruption allegations against former Lao Prime Minister Phankham Viphavanh played a role in the latter’s early resignation in late 2022. Perhaps Joseph had become so damaging to the interests of members of Laos’ political elite that extraordinary action was deemed necessary, regardless of his location.

A second, related explanation could be that the LPRP is becoming increasingly insecure about any form of public criticism. As shown in the World Bank’s most recent economic monitor report on Laos, the country’s economy is in a precarious position, with foreign debt, inflation, and the cost of living all at alarmingly high levels, and employment opportunities limited. Faced with limited prospects, many young people are leaving Laos to find work abroad, and public dissatisfaction with the government is high.

When Joseph was attacked, he was with another Laotian political activist. Perhaps there is fear within the LPRP of a rising collective opposition to replace the former “Free Lao” network of which Od Sayavong,  Phetphouthon Philachane, and Bounsuan Kitiyano were all members. While enforced disappearances and assassinations of Laotian dissidents have been common for over a decade, they have also become more frequent since 2023.

A third explanation might be that the LPRP felt that this was the right timing for such an attack. Globally, there has been a steady deterioration of democratic institutions and a decline of political freedoms, within established liberal democracies and less democratic countries alike. The U.N. has arguably never been more toothless in the upholding of human rights than it is today, and the “rules-based international order” never more in question. With global news media captivated by rising authoritarianism and protest in the United States, Israel’s genocide in Palestine, Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, and now the expanding conflict between Israel and Iran, the LPRP may have felt that this comparatively less consequential act of state repression would go unnoticed.

Or perhaps it is simply that the LPRP has calculated that such a gross breach of French sovereignty could be carried out without any real consequence. The single-party state has been killing those who speak out against it for a long time, and despite stern words of condemnation, the international community has failed to take any substantive punitive actions. There has been no reduction or halting of development financing or foreign investment, no sanctions or tariffs, and no attempts at investigating and prosecuting the perpetrators of these crimes.

Suspected extrajudicial killings (and attempted killings) of Indian activists in Canada, Russian journalists and activists in Germany, the Czech Republic, and Georgia, and Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey may all have served to further embolden the LPRP to undertake this dramatic escalation of inter-state repression, yet even in the context of these global events Laos’ geopolitical weakness in comparison to France makes the attack on Joseph a globally significant event.

One last possible explanation (though there are surely many others) is that this attempt on Joseph’s life was connected in some way to his criticisms of China’s growing presence in Laos, including growing Chinese investment and the growing numbers of Chinese nationals living in the country. In making this suggestion, it is important to stress that China’s presence in Laos takes a multitude of forms and has an equally diverse array of effects. The people of Laos have benefited from, and faced hardships due to, increasing engagement with China.

Noting this, it is also the case that Chinese criminal networks have significantly expanded their operations in Laos over recent years, the most notable example being those linked to scam centers, gambling operations, and human trafficking within the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone. It is possible that this attack was undertaken by criminal actors, who may or may not have affiliations with the LPRP criminal state.

Whatever the case, France must thoroughly investigate this case. Four suspects have been arrested, and if it can be proven that the LPRP was indeed responsible, France must adopt real punitive measures against Laos, or at least against members of the government, for this shocking breach of sovereignty. This must include but go beyond demanding prompt and effective accountability and an end to the human rights violations that have long been shrouded in the culture of impunity in Laos. Now is not a good time to suggest cuts to aid funding or further tariffs (Donald Trump’s government has already imposed a 48 percent tariff on the country), but sanctions on senior political leadership by France and other European countries would be well justified.