It is difficult to overstate the importance of Egypt’s ongoing House of Representatives elections.
The voting results will not only decide the composition of the next parliament but will also determine whether, and for how long, the rule of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi will be extended.
The vote comes amid an economic crisis and growing public frustration, raising the stakes for a president desperate to secure his long-term political survival.
El-Sisi came to power following a 2013 military coup, quickly consolidating power and establishing an ultra-authoritarian political framework.
In 2019, he pushed for a referendum on constitutional amendments that would grant him more power and effectively extend his rule, which was supposed to end in 2022.
The regime did not take any chances with the result: it blocked thousands of websites that criticised the amendments; arrested individuals who campaigned for a “no” vote; and engaged in a combination of voter intimidation, bribery, and smear campaigning.
Given that context, it is unsurprising that el-Sisi and his supporters won a landslide “yes” vote, effectively guaranteeing that he would rule Egypt until 2030.
Now, with only a little more than four years left until 2030, el-Sisi reportedly seeks yet another extension.
He appears poised to use the next House of Representatives to approve a constitutional amendment that would lengthen his tenure beyond 2030 — and perhaps indefinitely.
The House of Representatives
The House is far and away the more important of Egypt’s two parliamentary chambers; the other, the Senate, mostly plays an advisory role.
The Senate elections, held last summer amid very low voter turnout, were carefully managed to ensure complete regime domination.
The focus has now shifted to the far more consequential parliamentary elections.
The 596-seat House is responsible for lawmaking and is tasked with approving proposals to amend the constitution, among other responsibilities.
Despite the important role they play, however, members of the House are not elected in a truly democratic fashion.
The House is essentially structured to align with the president. Twenty-eight individuals are appointed directly by him, with the remaining 568 seats carefully engineered to ensure the status quo.
These 568 seats are divided into individual seats, contested by candidates running on their own, and list-based seats, allocated through party lists.
In practice, almost all of the individual seats are accessible only to candidates with substantial financial resources or strong connections to state-aligned networks, as documented by investigative reporting.
The remaining list-based seats are selected through an absolute closed-list system rather than through a proportional representation arrangement.
The absolute closed-list system is a winner-takes-all method, whereby voters choose only one party list from a notional collection of lists.
Any list that attains 50 percent of the vote in a given district wins 100 percent of the seats in that district.
Importantly, only approved party lists are allowed to compete.
No suspense and a predetermined result
The results of all elections and referendums in el-Sisi-era Egypt have been more or less predetermined.
Since 2014, the regime has consistently eliminated potential presidential candidates preemptively, intimidated and arrested opposition campaigners, engaged in manipulation of voting processes, and used media crackdowns to ensure electoral dominance.
The ongoing parliamentary elections have followed the expected pattern. With competition already tightly controlled through the individual-seat and list-seat systems, the National Elections Authority further narrowed the field by eliminating all but one list — el-Sisi’s National List for Egypt — from contention. It has been alleged that between 30 million and 70 million Egyptian pounds ($629504-$1.4m) were required for candidates to access the preferred el-Sisi list.
During the first round of voting, held on November 10 and 11, widespread irregularities were alleged and some clearly documented, including vote buying, illegal campaigning, and various other forms of voter manipulation.
Embarrassing videos showing inducements being offered were circulated online, and el-Sisi ultimately had to cancel and reschedule a small number of individual seat elections for some districts.
The second round of voting was carried out on November 25-26, with violations appearing to continue unabated despite the National Election Authority’s claims of having implemented preventive measures.
Throughout both rounds of voting, el-Sisi’s media apparatus faithfully repeated the official government line.
Media highlighted what they portrayed as regime successes — organisation, law and order, and high voter turnout — even as videos emerged on social media showing chaos and clear evidence of low turnout.
Results will be announced next month, but there is no suspense — observers widely expect el-Sisi’s coalition to dominate the House, just as it dominates the Senate.
Unsurprisingly, early results suggest el-Sisi’s coalition is performing well.
Buying time
El-Sisi has essentially rewritten the authoritarian playbook for modern Egypt.
His programme of widespread state violence, mass arrests, opposition party and media bans, and draconian legislation far surpasses the repression of his dictatorial predecessors.
His system of repression is perhaps the main reason why el-Sisi finds the idea of surrendering power, even in a pseudo-democratic handover, completely untenable — letting go of power could place him at risk of accountability.
The risk is real, in part because he has also created rivals from within the power structure.
El-Sisi will stand victorious at the conclusion of the ongoing House elections, and he will almost certainly be granted his wish: at least one additional six-year term as president.
If nothing else, this will buy el-Sisi time.
But the elections will also likely add to growing frustrations over Egypt’s one-man-show political system and the economy, which has long been in shambles.
The mix of economic mismanagement, corruption, and repression is a dangerous and familiar one.
It is reminiscent of the last years of Hosni Mubarak’s tenure in Egypt.
He, too, thought he was firmly in control.
Indeed, it could be just a matter of time before there is another popular uprising, or before the military empire decides to sacrifice el-Sisi the same way it sacrificed Mubarak in 2011.
It is paradoxical, but leaders often lose control even as the grip of their iron fist tightens.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.
