Taiwan’s first indigenous armed sea drone marks a significant step toward building asymmetric warfare capabilities amid the growing threat of kinetic Chinese action.
This month, multiple media outlets reported that Taiwan’s state-backed shipbuilder CSBC Corporation unveiled its first domestically developed military-grade uncrewed surface vehicle (USV), the Endeavor Manta, at Kaohsiung’s Singda Harbor.
This marks a significant step in Taipei’s efforts to develop asymmetric warfare capabilities amid mounting tensions with China.
Designed to operate in the Taiwan Strait, the trimaran-hulled vessel measures 8.6 meters in length and 3.7 meters in width and is constructed from fiber-reinforced plastic to ensure high maneuverability and seaworthiness. It boasts a top speed of 35 knots and can carry over one metric ton of payload, including light torpedoes and explosives.
Drawing inspiration from Ukraine’s use of USVs against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, CSBC began developing the Manta in early 2024. The vessel features multiple remote communication modes—4G, radio frequency and satellite—and boasts advanced capabilities, including AI-assisted targeting, autonomous navigation, collision avoidance and swarm control.
It is programmed to return to base or self-destruct if compromised. Aside from foreign-sourced satellite and motor components, all systems are locally produced.
The Mantra’s rollout underscores Taiwan’s emphasis on indigenous defense innovation and signals a shift toward cost-effective, unmanned platforms amid growing Chinese military assertiveness.
Delving deeper into the possible tactical roles of Taiwan’s Manta USV, Scott Savitz mentions in a January 2023 RAND commentary that USVs can be more dangerous to surface ships than aerial weapons, as they strike at the waterline and carry explosive payloads that are much heavier than those of the latter type.
Savitz says swarms of low-profile USVs, difficult to detect and counter, could overwhelm the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) fleet. He notes that they could also complement naval minefields, forcing an enemy fleet to adopt slower and more vulnerable formations. Additionally, he says USVs could deliver incendiary materials or loitering munitions for further damage.
Further, Eric Rosenbach and other writers mention in a February 2025 Belfer Center report that USVs are envisioned to perform long-duration missions with minimal logistical support, including intelligence gathering, mine laying and electronic warfare in environments too hazardous for manned platforms.
Rosenbach and others say these systems would operate autonomously in denied electromagnetic environments, where PLA electronic warfare would hinder remote control.
Karl Flynn mentions in a November 2021 Proceedings article that USVs could be used for resupply purposes. USVs enable redundancy and simultaneous resupply of distributed forces, which is particularly useful in environments such as Taiwan’s frontline islands, including Kinmen and Matsu.
However, as with the Ukraine war, Taiwan’s USVs may not be the war-winning wonder weapon some may tout them to be. For instance, USVs lack the range, endurance, durability, firepower and versatility of manned warships; however, their unmanned nature and lower cost somewhat offset these disadvantages.
Additionally, their lack of crew means there is no way to repair them if they encounter technical issues in a maritime environment. Sea spray and salinity could affect sensitive electronics and machinery. While Taiwan’s Manta has a self-destruct mechanism, the possibility of a defective unit being captured and analyzed, with its cryptographic keys being compromised, remains.
At the operational level, Stacie Pettyjohn and other writers mention in a June 2024 report for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) that a defense of Taiwan presumes it could not match China ship for ship to repel an invasion, but must instead rely on a “porcupine strategy” built on numerous smaller, easily concealed weapons, such as USVs, to increase the costs of such aggression.
Pettyjohn and others say that suicide USVs carrying large explosive payloads are capable of damaging large warships and can be led to their targets by aerial drones or other USVs collecting intelligence.
They also suggest that Taiwan could deploy USVs to provide early warning about an invading fleet’s progress and identify vulnerable troop transports. In addition, they say USVs can lay minefields that could channel an invasion fleet into “kill zones,” where it is vulnerable to air- and shore-based missile strikes.
However, Taiwan’s drone industry is a work in progress. In a December 2024 article for The Strategist, Jane Rickards notes that Taiwan is aware of China’s significant lead in drone production, yet still hopes to catch up.
Rickards quotes Su Tzu-Yun of Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), who says that Taiwanese drone makers tend to excel in hardware but are relatively weak in design and system integration.
Further, she quotes Richard Weir, vice president for global strategy and government relations for IMSAR, a US manufacturer of sophisticated radars, who states that Taiwanese drone makers tend not to identify missions, weapons and sensors for the drones before they’re designed.
Additionally, Harun Ayanoglu mentions in a January 2025 article for the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) that Taiwan faces challenges in scaling up its drone industry.
Ayanoglu notes that, unlike Turkey and Israel, Taiwan cannot export its drones to active combat zones due to political constraints, depriving its manufacturers of operational feedback and revenue.
At the strategic level, Taiwan’s drone efforts do not change the fact that US military intervention would be critical for the self-governing island’s survival in the event of a Chinese invasion. US policy over Taiwan hinges on “strategic ambiguity,” but such may only mask indecisiveness over the issue.
Jennifer Kavanagh and Stephen Wertheim mention in a February 2025 Foreign Policy article that direct US military intervention could result in catastrophic human and economic costs, including potential nuclear escalation.
The writers note that the US faces pressure to defend Taiwan to maintain its credibility, but such a move risks provoking China and escalating tensions. They also point out that Taiwan’s defense strategy is inadequate, relying on vulnerable big-ticket items such as frigates and fighter jets rather than asymmetric capabilities.
They say the US aims to help Taiwan defend itself without becoming overly involved in a larger conflict, relying on strategic ambiguity and support from regional allies to navigate these complexities.
However, Michael Schiffer argues in a Financial Times (FT) article this month that US strategic ambiguity over Taiwan has lost effectiveness as China escalates its coercive campaign through military intimidation, diplomatic isolation and economic entanglement.
Schiffer contends that China no longer fears uncertain US retaliation, while Taipei grows increasingly anxious over inconsistent signals, especially amid the volatility of Trump’s foreign policy. He argues that the US’s focus on military deterrence is inadequate against China’s integrated strategy.
To restore deterrence and regional stability, he says the US must adopt strategic clarity, detailing the consequences of Chinese aggression while reinforcing diplomatic, economic and informational support for Taiwan without breaching the “One China” framework.
