By the time a student-led protest movement erupted into a full-scale revolution in Bangladesh in July 2024, the country’s economy was already in free fall.
Years of rampant corruption, mismanagement and dwindling opportunities for young people – not to mention the brutal repression of its then-autocratic government – had left the country’s financial institutions on their knees.
The banking system teetered on the brink of collapse under the weight of massive bad loans and capital flight. Meanwhile, foreign reserves dwindled due to a worsening trade deficit and declining remittances from Bangladeshi migrant workers abroad.
The immediate aftermath of the toppling of autocratic leader Sheikh Hasina after 36 days of protest suggested that the country’s new leaders faced an unenviable task righting the economy. Law and order disintegrated, as large segments of the police and other law enforcement agencies — loyalists of the overthrown government — disappeared into hiding.
Meanwhile, several actions of India, Bangladesh’s powerful neighbor and major trading partner, further destabilized an already volatile situation. The government in New Delhi, which had been close to the Hasina government, began exerting economic, political and diplomatic pressure on Bangladesh after providing refuge to numerous leaders and activists from the deposed administration, including Hasina herself.
Despite this gloomy picture, however, things look brighter a year on. As an expert on international economics and Bangladeshi politics, I believe Bangladesh has achieved a remarkable degree of economic and political stability under Muhammad Yunus’s caretaker government.
Yet massive domestic and international challenges persist and will need careful handling in the months and years to come.
Charting economic and political stability
At the urging of the student leaders leading last year’s protest movement, Yunus became the de facto leader of Bangladesh’s interim government on August 8, 2024.
The 2006 Nobel laureate, renowned for his pioneering work in microloan and social business, formed a transitional administration comprising technocrats, civil society leaders and student representatives.
Its stated goals were restoring order, organizing free and fair elections, implementing democratic reforms and bringing accountability to those responsible for the killings of political activists during Hasina’s reign.
On the financial front, the country’s central bank – under the new leadership of a former IMF economist appointed by Yunus – has successfully steadied the banking sector through a series of painful but essential reforms, including changes to monetary policy and a restructuring that saw replacements of the boards of 11 troubled banks.
Rising export earnings and increased remittances have helped stabilize foreign reserves, which climbed from US$20.39 billion as of July 31, 2024, to over $31 billion at the end of June 2025.
This recovery is particularly striking given that the country managed to rebuild its reserves while concurrently settling outstanding import arrears and servicing the substantial foreign debt burden inherited from the previous government.
The Yunus government has also brought greater stability to the domestic economy by reducing inflation from 12% in July 2024 to 9% in May 2025 and achieving a GDP growth rate of 3.9% in 2024-25 through better macroeconomic management.
In recent months, the interim government has also been able to curb the influence of powerful and politically connected business cartels that for years have largely controlled the prices of essential goods and services. In part this is due to legal action against corrupt business leaders and enhanced oversight by food inspectors.
Even during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan, typically a period of sharp price increases, most consumers experienced no sudden surge in the cost of essentials such as rice, fish and poultry. Prices also remained stable during the Eid al-Adha, the second largest Muslim religious festival, marking a notable departure from previous years when festival periods brought dramatic price spikes.
The Yunus government has also scored some key diplomatic successes. Shortly after a March 2025 visit by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, Bangladesh secured a landmark agreement with Myanmar under which the latter agreed to repatriate some 180,000 Rohingya refugees who have been living in Bangladesh since fleeing a government crackdown in their homeland in 2017.
Bangladesh has also seen marked improvements in several bilateral relationships, including with China, its main trading partner. Given ongoing India-China tensions, the India-backed Hasina regime had refrained from deepening its relationship with China to its full potential.
Her departure has freed Bangladesh to pursue trade with Beijing more aggressively. During Yunus’ official visit to China in March 2025, Bangladesh secured a pledge for a $2.1 billion loan from Beijing.
That agreement mirrors a number of other loan agreements Dhaka has struck with international creditors in 2025, including with the IMF, the Asian Development Bank, the Japanese government and a $850 million loan from the World Bank for boosting job training, enhancing social protections and increasing trade capacity.
All told, those deals represent billions in critical funds for budget support and infrastructure.
And the country continues to pursue other avenue of investments. In April it hosted a summit that drew over 400 participants representing global fund managers, multinational corporations and oil-rich Middle Eastern nations and secured investment pledges of $260 million.
Alongside promise, the remaining perils
Despite the progress, there remains a slew of internal and external challenges that threaten the country’s short- and long-term economic prospects.
For one, the law-and-order situation remains fragile. Meanwhile, political parties including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the country’s largest party, are resisting the interim government’s reform agenda and demanding immediate elections.
Recognizing that any gains not secured through a functioning democratic and legal system are likely to be short-lived, the Yunus government has announced a road map for general elections by no later than April 2026.
Another major challenge has been trying to recover $234 billion of assets laundered by bureaucrats, politicians and business tycoons associated with the fallen regime. The total exceeds the country’s total foreign debt.
But the interim government has yet to secure meaningful cooperation from key countries, including the US, United Kingdom, UAE, Canada and Singapore, where much of this money is believed to be invested in real estate and financial markets.
External pressures compound these domestic challenges. India Prime Minister Narendra Modi has adopted an increasingly aggressive stance toward Bangladesh, canceling airport transit facilities for Bangladeshi exporters, banning imports of Bangladeshi products through land borders and suspending visa issuance for Bangladeshi travelers.
The Indian government has also intensified deportations of alleged “illegal Bangladeshi migrants,” many of whom are reportedly Muslim Indian citizens.
And then there’s the US under Trump.
Washington’s move to cancel the vast majority of US foreign aid is already impacting various sectors in Bangladesh, particularly healthcare. More significantly, the imposition of 35% additional tariffs on Bangladeshi imports threatens catastrophic damage to the economy, especially the crucial textile and garment sector, given that the US is Bangladesh’s primary export market.
Although Bangladesh is currently holding bilateral trade negotiations with the US to avert steep tariffs, the volatile trade policies of the Trump administration may create serious long-term planning difficulties for Bangladeshi businesses.
While overcoming these challenges would be a formidable challenge under any circumstances, the Yunus government’s ultimate success depends on three interconnected objectives:
- conducting free, fair and inclusive elections followed by peaceful power transfer;
- implementing the recommendations of various reform commissions to strengthen economic and political foundations; and
- delivering justice for victims of the previous government’s persecution.
Achieving all three satisfactorily will be extraordinarily difficult. A year in, Yunus has shown a remarkable ability to weather difficult circumstances. But what happens next will most likely be determined by both domestic and international factors out of his control.
Mohammad Elahee is a professor of international business, Quinnipiac University.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
