Last month, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s visit to China underscored the strengthening economic ties between both countries. The leaders of Brazil and China have met multiple times, with Lula first visiting China in April 2023 and President Xi Jinping then reciprocating visiting Brazil the following year. Nonetheless, the 2025 meeting occurred at a time of heightened tensions between the United States and China, marked by an intensifying trade war. In a clear move to deepen its influence in Latin America, Beijing has recently pledged an additional $35 billion toward 100 new infrastructure projects across the region.
Brazil’s increasingly close economic ties with China are centered on two pillars: exports to China and major infrastructure developments by Chinese companies in Brazil.
In 2024, Brazil exported $94.4 billion worth of goods to China, a slight decrease from the estimated $105 billion exported in 2023. Brazil enjoys a substantial trade surplus with China; in 2023, China only exported $57.5 billion worth of goods to Brazil, a little more than half of Brazil’s exports to China.
Brazilian exports to China center on critical minerals, crude oil, and soybeans. In 2024, exports of these products to China was worth an estimated $73.55 billion, nearly 80 percent of Brazil’s total exports to China. Notably, many of these critical resources are also produced by Chinese entities operating in Brazil. For example, in December 2024, China’s Nonferrous Trade Corporation Limited acquired the Pitinga Mine from Brazilian company Mineracao Taboca for $340 million. Pitinga houses Brazil’s largest deposit of tin (420,000 tons), as well as stocks of niobium (504,000 tons) and tantalum (53,000 tons). Additionally, in 2025, China’s Baiyin Nonferrous Group acquired the Serrote copper and gold mine for $420 million. Serrote began operation in 2021, and in 2024 it produced 18,300 tons of copper and 8,200 ounces of gold. Overall, even including mines not owned by China, about 70 percent of Brazil’s iron exports go to China. As of 2023, Brazil is the second highest exporter of iron to China estimating in $20 billion in value.
Beijing also holds strong investments in Brazil’s crude oil. Beginning in 2009, China International United Petroleum & Chemicals and Brazil’s Petrobas made a supply chain deal, guaranteeing 200,000 barrels a day for $10 billion funded by the China Development Bank. Since 2009, China steadily began to expand and it now accounts for over 40 percent of Brazil’s oil exports, importing an estimated $20 billion in 2023. From 2007-2020, 30 percent ($66 billion) of all Chinese investment in Brazil has gone into the oil and gas sector. Investments increased due to Petrobras and China Petrochemical Corporation forming partnerships in offshore drilling, the most notorious being the Well Gura-1 site worth $338.5 billion in international crude oil prices.
However, of all critical resources, agriculture largest sector for Brazilian exports to China, making up almost 40 percent of bilateral trade in 2023. In that same year, China sourced 70 percent of its imported soybeans from Brazil, valuing $38.9 billion. China is the world’s largest importer of soybeans, taking in 60 percent of global exports. The United States and Brazil together account of 80 percent of the globe’s soybean exports, and historically both were major suppliers to China. Yet, due to the trade war and tariffs initiative in President Donald Trump’s first term, China began to shift away from U.S. suppliers and toward Brazil. In 2016, the U.S. accounted for 40 percent of China’s total soybean imports; by 2024 that figure had plummeted to 18 percent. In January and February 2025, China accounted for 79 percent of Brazil’s soybean exports, and it is looking to import even more – in April 2025, Zhejiang Province reported that Brazilian imports of soybeans grew by 48 percent compared to the previous April.
Similar to mining, China holds enormous agricultural projects in Brazil. Starting in 2008, Chongqing Grain Group acquired 200,000 hectares of land in Brazil’s Bahia region for 2.47 billion. This includes a 2,000 square kilometer plantation area, 1.5 million ton-capacity warehouses, and a soybean processing facility. The facility will harvest 10 million tons of soybeans per year and produce 2 million tons of soybean oil annually. In 2010, Pallas International Consultant Group acquired 200,000-250,000 hectares of land for an unknown amount with the intention of building a grain production facility and bioenergy sector.
As China builds up its investment in Brazilian resources, Beijing has pushed to build better infrastructure to transport the extracted goods. The Port of Santos in Brazil is one of the largest ports in Brazil, handling exports of grain, sugar, meat, and minerals originating from Sao Paulo, Minas Gerias, Goias, Mato Grosso, and Mato Grosso do Sul. By container ship, from the Port of Santos to China it takes about 40 days of maritime travel. But that calculation does not include the time needed to bring resources from their point of origin to a container ship. The total transit time could be 50 days, depending where a resource is produced in Brazil.
However, China has been looking to improve the efficiency of resource exports from Brazil. China is looking to build a transcontinental railway that would connect Brazil to the Peruvian megaport at Chancay, which is owned by China’s COSCO. In 2014, a government-to-government agreement was signed for a basic feasibility study for the railway. Under the agreement, Beijing funded the basic feasibility analysis and assigned China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group (CREEC) to conduct the study, while agencies from the host countries’ transportation ministries supported and reviewed the work. However, neither Brazil nor Peru approved the final report due to a clash between Chinese and Brazilian technical specifications, substandard quality in the Chinese-led study, and Peru’s withdrawal over cost and environmental concerns.
Yet the project is not dead. In May 2025, Peru’s Economy Minister Raul Perez Reyes, along with Peru’s transport and communications minister, deputy finance minister, and deputy transport minister, met with representative from China. On China’s side, the delegation included the director of the National Railway Administration and China’s ambassador to Peru, Song Yang. Then in April 2025, China sent a delegation to Brazil with 11 delegates, including individuals from China State Railway group and the Chinese Transport Ministry. Both these meetings had the goal of reviving the transcontinental railway.
Chancay’s connection to Brazil is important for China. It only takes about 20 days to get to China from Chancay – already shaving off half the transit time from the Port of Santos in Brazil. In addition, Chancay can handle Ultra-Large Container Ships of 18,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) meaning it can handle more cargo, for less time in shipment. A transcontinental railway would let China use this route for imports from Brazil as well, saving time and money and likely growing Brazil-China trade ties as a result.
Overall, the growing ties between Brazil and China has brought Brazil’s economic independence into question. As of 2023, China bought 30 percent of Brazil’s exports, more than any other country. The United States is a distant second to China, accounting for 10 percent of Brazil’s exports. Moreover, Brazil’s exports to China will increase further with the recently signed 37 agreements from November 2024. But critics in Brazil note that trade is imbalance, as Brazil exports commodities – 90 percent of its exports to China are composed of iron ore, soybeans, crude oil, corn, and meat – while importing higher-value manufactured goods.
On the other hand, Brazil’s citizens have grown increasingly negative toward both their own governance and China. As of April 2025, Lula’s approval rating has dropped to 24 percent, an all-time low. The previous record was 28 percent in 2005. The primary reason for this new low is the rising cost of food products, driven by the impacts of climate change. Food is Brazil’s top export, valued at an estimated $80 billion in 2023. A significant portion of this, roughly half, was exported to China; as mentioned earlier, China owns many of the agricultural commodities involved. Lula is losing support because his deals with China have increased animosity among the Brazilian people. According to CEBRI, in 2023, 50 percent of Brazilians see China’s emergence as a global power “a serious threat” and 75 percent of Brazilians distrust China.
The upcoming 2026 elections in Brazil will be as unpredictable as ever with Lula’s approval ratings sinking and his predecessor, Jair Bolsonaro, barred from elections until 2030. But what is essential is for the people of Brazil to vote for leaders that will acknowledge foreign influence and protect the nation’s economic future.
