The first island chain broadly refers to the chain of islands encompassing Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia – allies or friends of the United States. Conceptually these islands and nations form the first line of defense against China in the U.S. strategic posture in Asia-Pacific – in which South Korea, though not an island country, also plays an important role. From China’s perspective, the first island chain is a line of strategic containment near to its shore. China must break out of this island chain so that its blue water navy can have unfettered access to the Pacific and beyond.
In that context, China is keenly interested in the strength of those governments and the popular support of their China policies – especially when such policies are against Beijing’s interests.
As a consequence, China has reasons to view recent political disarray in those countries as being to its advantage, especially if domestic turmoil limits the ability of these U.S. allies to bolster their defense postures.
South Korea
South Korea is the most obvious example of political chaos. President Yoon Suk-yeol announced martial law in the evening of December 3, then lifted it six hours later after a National Assembly vote. Yoon apologized to the public and survived the first attempt at impeachment in the National Assembly, but even his allies’ defense against impeachment hinges on the claim that Yoon no longer exercises any presidential authority. Meanwhile, he faces investigations for insurrection and treason as a second impeachment vote looms.
The shocking chain of events has revealed the deep division and disarray in the Korean political system, driven by intense partisanship with vicious cycles of retribution. The political turmoil may persist for a while as the minority-ruling conservative People Power Party has refused to support impeachment, which requires a two-third majority in the National Assembly, paralyzing the government and triggering public protests.
The political crisis will strengthen the headwinds facing an already moribund economy which has grown by 0.1 percent in the third quarter after shrinking by 0.2 percent in the second. The Korean stock market is one of the worst performing this year. Adding to the economic gloom is a sense of social malaise caused, by among other things, a rapidly aging and declining population with a record low fertility rate of 0.76 (well below the replacement rate of 2.1), rising unemployment, and extreme isolation among young people as well as elevated housing costs and a widening gender gap.
As a consequence, South Korea is ill equipped to deal with a worsening external environment such as an emboldened and aggressive North Korea, which has sent troops to fight for Russia in Ukraine, probably in exchange for assistance to its nuclear weapons and space programs. South Korea also faces uncertainty from its security ally, the United States, due to the return to power of the unpredictable Donald Trump. He has a history of demanding more contributions to the costs of stationing U.S. troops in South Korea. Trump’s threatened tariffs would also slow world trade and the global economy, hurting export-dependent South Korea.
Japan
While South Korea is the most obvious example of political turmoil, it’s not alone. Japan, too, is in a period of political uncertainty not seen in over a decade.
Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru is heading a minority government, with the government coalition of his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito having lost their majority in the October 2024 general elections following a slush fund scandal. For now, Japanese politics has turned inward, with the public and politicians focusing on the reform of political funding by corporations and groups.
Meanwhile, Ishiba has to seek accommodation with opposition parties on a case-by-case basis, including more fiscal spending on their favored programs. The budget wrangling would make it difficult for the government to deal with Trump’s demands for more defense spending, including significantly higher contributions to the costs of stationing U.S. troops in Japan. Furthermore, with its merchandise trade surplus with the United States amounting to an estimated $70 billion in 2024, Japan is vulnerable to U.S. tariffs probably beyond the 10 percent threatened on all goods entering the U.S. This would further darken Japan’s economic prospects, whose GDP has been estimated to grow by an anemic 0.3 percent this year.
Taiwan
During his first six months in office, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te has seen his public approval rating declining from a high of 58 percent in May to a low of 42.8 percent in November. Being stymied by the opposition-controlled Legislative Yuan, the government has been seen as inactive, failing to address the people’s concerns such as high inflation, housing shortages, and social welfare problems. In particular, there has been a backlash to President Lai’s reliance on the Constitutional Court to reject an opposition-led reform to increase legislative oversight of the government.
Moreover, Lai has been perceived as deviating slightly, not in substance but in style, from his predecessor in making statements needlessly provocative to Beijing. Since Lai took office, China has intensified its military and economic coercion against Taiwan, including two major military drills practicing maneuvers for a blockade.
Taiwan thus is in a weakened position to deal with growing external problems. China has become more aggressive in its coercion measures, even as U.S. assistance seems less certain. Trump has said that Taiwan should pay for U.S. protection and accused Taiwan of having “stolen” the semiconductor industry from the United States, threatening to put tariffs on Taiwanese chips. As the Legislative Yuan has blocked passing the 2025 budget, it would be a challenging task for Lai to raise defense spending to meet U.S. demands.
The Philippines
At the southern end of the first island chain, the political division in the Philippines has worsened into a bitter family feud between the Marcos and the Dutertes. Vice President Sara Duterte resigned her Education Ministry portfolio in protest over parliamentary investigations of her alleged misuse of public funds and of her father’s role in extrajudiciary killings of suspected drug traffickers. She then openly criticized President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. – including making veiled death threats.
The two camps have intensified their public campaigns to consolidate their support bases for the May 2025 mid-term parliamentary elections as well as positioning for the 2028 presidential election.
The political infighting has interfered with normal government business, in particular delaying the passage of the 2025 budget. Meanwhile Marcos’ popular support has begun to be eroded due to high inflation, especially for foodstuffs.
This has put the Philippines government in a weakened position to deal with more challenging external situations. China has become more aggressive in asserting its claims in disputed areas within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The upcoming Trump administration means U.S. demands for more defense spending and payments for U.S. protection against a backdrop of a more isolationist turn in American politics.
This has raised questions about the solidity and reliability of U.S. commitments to come to the Philippines’ defense against China’s encroachment. It has strengthened the arguments of the Dutertes: that Marcos has been wrong in being antagonistic against China, aligning too much with the United States.
Views From Beijing
Intent on following Sun Tzu’s military precept of “winning without fighting,” China has conducted increasingly coercive gray zone tactics (below the threshold of waging war), using military drills as well as its Coast Guard and Maritime Militia to assert control of disputed areas in the South and East China Seas. Beijing also combines economic statecraft with diplomatic and disinformation campaigns to weaken opposition to China’s positions among the nations along the first island chain.
In this context, Beijing should be pleased with the political disarray and weakness in the governments of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines – which have been largely self-inflicted. Assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the protagonists in the current geopolitical rivalry, one cannot help but recall Bill Clinton’s famous dictum “It’s the economy, stupid!” and paraphrase it: “It’s the domestic politics, stupid!”
