The critical minerals sector has attracted significant global attention, including from New Delhi and Astana. On November 4, India and Kazakhstan partnered to produce titanium slag, a critical mineral. Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL) and Kazakhstan’s Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium and Magnesium Plant (UKTMP) have signed anagreement to establish an Indo-Kazakh joint venture company (JVC), IREUK Titanium Limited, which is set to process low-grade Ilmenite reserves in Odisha into high-grade titanium feedstock. UKTMP, besides providing the technology and capital investment, would also offtake agreed quantities of titanium.
This initiative aims to develop the titanium value chain within India. According to the official press release, the arrangement “shall be instrumental in bringing valuable forex for [India] and aid UKTMP JSC in raw material security.” Synergizing the strengths of both sides, the joint venture is expected to enhance the brand equity of both companies while serving as a hub for India and Kazakhstan in the titanium value chain, aligning with the broader strategic objectives of both sides in securing critical mineral supply chains.
The new India-Kazakhstan titanium deal reflects three important aspects. First, the agreement represents a positive yet incremental development in India’s long-term goal of developing a critical minerals supply chain and away to compensate for previous lapses. India’s attempts to auction off mining rights for critical minerals have received lackluster responses in the past. Given the costly extraction process, Indian investors have been reluctant to invest due to the outdated official resource classification rules, which lack the necessary information on the economic viability of mining a block. The Ministry of Mines (MOM), havingfailed to receive a minimum of three required domestic bidders on multiple occasions, has had to scrap the auctioned mineral blocks. In the third tranche of auctions, for example, MOMannulled three out of the total seven auctioned blocks – including the one containing titanium.
Consequently, the deal with Kazakhstan will form a key element of India’s approach toleveraging foreign technology and capital for developing a critical minerals supply chain. This agreement is crucial, giventitanium’s application across key sectors and gaps in India’s supply chain. Owing to thelack ofextraction, processing, and recycling technologies within India, the country remains excessively dependent on imports. In processing specifically, India hasconsiderable processing capabilities for only one designated critical mineral, copper. For all others, it is reliant on external providers to source refined minerals.
Second, the deal is also a reflection of fundamental politico-economic changes that Kazakhstan and the Central Asian region are witnessing. With over 5 percent growth from the last decade, theregion has made significant strides in upskilling its labor force and improving manufacturing capabilities while attempting sustainable economic growth.
Unlike earlier, when Indian energy companies such asONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) bought stakes to explore and exploit Kazakhstan’s oil field, today’s reality is different. UKTMP, which sells 100 percent of its titanium products to developed countries, is a testament to the tremendous technological progress that Kazakhstan has realized.Achieving over 4 percent growth since 2017, excluding the pandemic year, Astana hasadopted a market-driven innovation ecosystem, which has meant regional leadership in science, technology, and innovation and competitiveness in a rapidly evolving global technological landscape. The country’s economic growth trajectory appears bright, with itscentral bank forecasting an average growth rate of 4.5 percent over a 5-year horizon.
Third, the deal could mean increased focus in South Block onadvancing India’s ties with Kazakhstan and potentially the Central Asian region –a global mineral powerhouse. Besides oil and uranium, Astana possesses tremendous reserves of critical minerals and rare earth elements, includingcadmium and rhenium, considered critical by India.
Kazakhstan’s importance to India goes beyond possession of mineral resources, with Astana being New Delhi’slargest trading partner in Central Asia. Recent talks between the two sides have emphasized greater business-to-business linkages and leveraging complementarities, particularly in the electronics and engineering goods sector. The bilateral trade, totaling$1 billion in 2023, has immense scope for growth in a range of sectors, including power, renewable energy, pharmaceuticals, and agriculture.
The potential of India’s ties to Central Asia remains unfulfilled. Despite its attempts to pursue deeper strategic engagement,New Delhi’s links with the region are limited. India’s traditional policy objective of realizing physical connectivity through projects including the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and Chabahar port hasremained elusive for two decades.
There seems to be a sense gripping New Delhi that its previous assumptions about the region – that Central Asian countries are main beneficiaries from bilateral engagement – no longer remain valid. Today, it’s a new Central Asia, with its economies witnessing strong growth rates andtransitioning from inward orientation to liberalization, along with market diversification. There is also a greater regional push toward diversifying international partners. Amidrenewed major power competition involving the United States, China, and the European Union, India’s revived regional interest, underscored by the recent deal in the titanium sector, is emblematic of Central Asia’s increased strategic utility.
While India, understandably, cannot provide large-scale infrastructural investments on the same scale as China, New Delhi is likely to capitalize on thefresh engagement opportunities in the region stemming from the Russia-Ukraine war. With complementarities for regional engagement in sectors like mining, green energy, medical tourism and education, and digital technologies, India’s attempts to become a viable alternate partner for Central Asian countries are likely to continue. This is evidenced by a recent10-year agreement with Iran for operationalizing the Chabahar port andnegotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA) with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
Regarding critical minerals specifically, notwithstanding its partnerships with countries such as the United States, Australia, and France, India is likely to explore further engagement with Kazakhstan and possibly other Central Asian states. Since securing critical minerals supply chain across the spectrum from exploration to recycling remains a long-term and complex goal, the more, the merrier appears to be the mantra going forward.
Therefore, despite multifaceted impediments to substantive engagement, India’s perceptual shift and its interest in becoming a key regional actor would drive New Delhi to pursue deeper economic engagement with Central Asia.
