On July 2, Prime Minister Narendra Modi embarked on what is being described as the longest foreign trip of his tenure – an eight-day, five-nation journey covering Ghana, Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina, Brazil, and Namibia. Framed as Global South outreach, the trip spans three continents and underscores India’s desire to deepen diplomatic and economic ties with countries often overlooked in traditional diplomatic circuits.. Yet, while the initiative is ambitious, it invites questions about its timing, depth, and long-term substance.
The Global South is a loosely defined group of countries – mostly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America – connected more by shared postcolonial trajectories and economic aspirations than by formal institutional alignment. India has long positioned itself as a champion of this group, especially since the Voice of the Global South Summit it hosted in 2023. However, transitioning from aspirational leadership to delivering tangible outcomes remains a formidable challenge.
India’s itinerary this time is notable for including countries that rarely feature in the upper echelons of its diplomatic map. In Ghana, a stable West African democracy and a key member of ECOWAS, Modi will propose a vaccine manufacturing hub and digital cooperation initiatives. While this builds on India’s COVID-era reputation, execution remains a challenge in a region also courted by China and the EU.
Trinidad and Tobago presents a different case: over 40 percent of its population is of Indian origin, descendants of indentured laborers from the colonial era. While cultural diplomacy will be on display through Modi’s address to Parliament in Port of Spain, critics argue that diaspora-focused gestures often lack strategic follow-through in areas such as investment or technology collaboration.
In Argentina, India sees a rare opportunity to deepen bilateral ties with a lithium-rich country critical to the global EV battery supply chain. This is the first full bilateral visit by an Indian prime minister in nearly 60 years. Trade, mining, fintech, and defense cooperation are expected to dominate the agenda. However, political volatility under President Javier Milei raises questions about the sustainability of such partnerships.
The most high-profile leg of the trip is Brazil, where Modi will attend the 2025 BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro. BRICS, now expanded to include six new members, is undergoing a transformation. India supports reforms aimed at promoting local currency trade and amplifying the Global South’s voice in global institutions like the U.N. and WTO. However, internal power dynamics, particularly China’s growing assertiveness within BRICS, may limit India’s maneuverability. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s decision to skip the summit – instead, China will be represented by Premier Li Qiang –will only deepen speculation about intra-group friction.
Namibia, the final stop, is symbolic of India’s efforts to scale up its digital and wildlife diplomacy. The launch of India’s UPI digital payment system and renewed discussions on conservation – India reintroduced cheetahs from Namibia in 2022 – illustrate how India is blending fintech with environmental soft power. But in a region where the African Continental Free Trade Area (AFCFTA) is gaining traction and global actors are ramping up digital investments, India’s late entry presents both challenges and opportunities.
While the tour signals ambition, it also reveals tensions between rhetoric and reality. India’s development cooperation, though well-intentioned, remains modest in scale compared to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Despite frequent announcements, India’s follow-through on infrastructure, trade facilitation, and capacity-building initiatives has often lagged. The emphasis on cultural ties and diaspora engagement is important, but critics warn against an overreliance on soft symbolism in the absence of long-term economic programs.
Moreover, India’s claims to represent the Global South are sometimes undermined by its own domestic contradictions, including democratic backsliding, centralized policymaking, and limitations on press freedom. These issues are increasingly noticed by civil society groups in Africa and Latin America, which view development cooperation as a two-way relationship grounded not only in technology but also values.
To its credit, India is reaching out to countries long neglected by the traditional structures of global diplomacy. This trip could lay the groundwork for stronger partnerships on critical minerals, digital public goods, vaccine production, and even climate governance. But the litmus test will be institutional depth – whether India can sustain these efforts through trade agreements, research collaborations, and public-private partnerships.
The visit also feeds into broader speculation about what some are calling “Modi Doctrine 3.0” – a new iteration of India’s foreign policy that emphasizes Global South solidarity, technology-led diplomacy, and reforming global governance. Whether this doctrine can deliver beyond summits and soundbites remains an open question.
