Recent clashes in Sweida and Israel’s subsequent military intervention have once again brought Syria to the forefront of regional politics.
Since the fall of former President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime last December, one of the most pressing questions has been whether a new Syrian administration would be able to consolidate its base amid deep ideological and political divisions across the country.
To understand Syria’s current political transition, it is essential to examine how the Sweida-centred conflict and Israel’s involvement will affect the cohesion of the new administration’s support base.
The recent escalation in southern Syria began with clashes between Druze and Bedouin militias, prompting intervention by the Syrian army. Israel then launched air strikes in Damascus targeting critical military installations, including the army’s headquarters, with bombing also reported near the presidential complex.
After the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Sweida, clashes continued between Druze and Bedouin groups, deepening divisions and raising serious concerns about civilian safety in the region.
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The Syrian army and its key ally, Turkey, have gained extensive combat experience through years of conflict. Together, they played a crucial role in overthrowing the Assad regime and reducing the influence of Iran and Russia in the region.
Israel, which for nearly two years has been committing genocide in Gaza, is closely monitoring these developments and appears intent on using Druze leaders to further destabilise Syria. Its primary objective is to prevent the consolidation of the new Syrian administration, which it views as a threat, particularly given the regime’s close cooperation with Turkey.
Shifting tactics
In response to Israel’s air strikes on Damascus, and by demonstrating loyalty to the state, tribal groups have effectively become a new frontline for the administration of the interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The tribes have employed innovative strategies, such as using urban cover and burning tyres to obscure aerial surveillance, enabling them to advance to Sweida’s city centre by Friday.
Israel has not yet been able to carry out an effective intervention, as air strikes are not a practical method of targeting tribal groups situated in mountainous terrain.
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Syria’s new administration has been plagued by questions around how to achieve political consolidation by bridging the internal diversity of its supporters.
This challenge extends beyond the task of integrating groups such as the Kurds -the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)- and the Druze. The new Syrian administration includes a broad spectrum of ideological and political perspectives that must be effectively engaged, both militarily and politically.
Israel’s targeting of Damascus has concerned all supporters of the new Syrian administration, while facilitating greater cooperation at the local level, as demonstrated by the recent tribal operations. This dynamic is helping to ease the internal integration of the regime’s supporters.
Druze groups have also sought mediation through Damascus, with some leaders advocating for disarmament and integration within the new Syrian administration. In light of recent developments, these leaders appear to be gaining influence over Israel-aligned figures such as Hikmat al-Hajri. If the Druze successfully integrate, this would have significant implications for the disarmament process of Kurdish forces.
Israel’s targeting of Damascus has thus led many supporters of the new Syrian administration to prioritise responding to external threats. The integration of Druze groups into the central administration in Damascus would contribute to the country’s national unity, while reshaping the broader power dynamics across Syria.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.