The Philippines will once again receive Japan’s Official Security Assistance, marking the third consecutive year of such support. In 2024, Tokyo pledged coastal radar systems and patrol boats to the Philippines and speed boats to Indonesia under the government-to-government scheme.
Yet as Tokyo’s Indo-Pacific ambitions grow, a critical question emerges: Can OSA expand beyond Southeast Asia’s maritime states without getting caught too deeply in the crossfire of US-China rivalry?
The answer arguably lies in Pakistan, a Chinese ally that paradoxically offers Japan the best chance to rebrand OSA not so much as a tool to encircle Beijing, but as a pragmatic regional security initiative.
Introduced in then-Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s National Security Strategy 2022, OSA marks Japan’s shift from post-war pacifism to forging strategic security partnerships.
Unlike its socioeconomic development-focused Official Development Assistance (ODA), OSA provides equipment and supplies as well as infrastructure development assistance to armed forces and related organizations of “like-minded” states to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific.
With a modest expected budget of 8 billion yen (US$55 million) in 2025, OSA cannot significantly challenge or counter China’s military might but does strengthen Japan’s strategic ties. Rather, it helps Tokyo expand defense support without provoking Beijing, signals clear military intent and lays the groundwork for future defense sales.
Polarized reaction to Japan’s OSA in ASEAN reveals its limits. While some countries—such as the Philippines, now hotly engaged in maritime disputes with Beijing—have hailed OSA as a deterrent, others, like Vietnam, remain cautious, opting to hedge rather than risk antagonizing China.
Beijing has seized on this divide, framing Japan’s OSA as a US-aligned “containment” scheme. Chinese experts maintain that Japan is intentionally provoking conflict by using Southeast Asian proxies with tacit US approval.
For Japan, this characterization is unsustainable. If its OSA is perceived solely as a club for America’s allies, it risks alienating the very nations Japan seeks to cultivate—those wary of being drawn into US versus China great power rivalry.
Given these challenges within Southeast Asia, Japan might look to expand its partnerships further afield. At first glance, India appears a natural choice to expand into the Indian Ocean and beyond.
But India’s Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, membership and Himalayan border disputes with China make it a poor fit. Granting OSA to India would validate Beijing’s “anti-China alliance” narrative and potentially deter fence-sitters from accepting its OSA. Pakistan, by contrast, offers strategic value without geopolitical baggage.
Formally, Japan has already extended OSA beyond Southeast Asia. Mongolia, a landlocked state, has received Japan’s air-defense simulators to reduce reliance on Russia and China.
Djibouti, home to Japan’s lone overseas naval base, has received anti-piracy gear to safeguard Gulf of Aden shipping. Bangladesh, a Bay of Bengal linchpin, secured coastal radars to monitor Chinese submarines.
Yet these grants are arguably exceptions rather than evidence of a broader strategy. Mongolia’s OSA is symbolic; Djibouti’s protects Japanese assets; Bangladesh’s mirrors Southeast Asian aid. None redefines OSA’s identity or expands its reach.
Pakistan, however, offers a proactive opportunity to bridge regions and recalibrate perceptions. OSA to Islamabad could potentially dampen China’s oppositional rhetoric, transforming the assistance from a Quad-adjacent tool into a neutral platform for regional security.
Despite its “ironclad” ties with Beijing, Islamabad seeks strategic diversification amid intensifying US-China rivalry. Engaging Pakistan through non-lethal OSA projects would allow Japan to position OSA as a regional security initiative rather than an overt counterweight to Beijing. If a key Chinese partner finds value in OSA, it becomes harder for Beijing to portray the program as a direct challenge.
Japan aims to incrementally raise the OSA program’s budget and add “new partners, and eventually work with eight or nine countries next fiscal year.” Aligned perfectly with OSA’s three core pillars, Pakistan presents an ideal partner for addressing critical security and humanitarian needs.
First, pertaining to security under the rule of law, Pakistan qualifies for OSA support in counterterrorism and anti-piracy efforts, particularly in securing the Arabian Sea and other critical maritime routes.
Second, its vulnerability to natural disasters positions it well for humanitarian assistance, including for disaster response and medical care, areas where Japan has historically provided aid.
Third, Pakistan’s extensive participation in UN peacekeeping missions aligns with OSA’s international peace cooperation pillar, offering opportunities for capacity-building in peacekeeping and related logistics.
Japan’s OSA outreach to Mongolia—likely aimed at reducing Ulaanbaatar’s reliance on Russia and China—set a precedent. Like Mongolia, Pakistan is strategically overdependent: 82% of its arms imports between 2019 and 2023 came from China.
Yet Japan already has a foothold, with Pakistan benefiting from its Official Development Assistance (ODA) totaling 364 billion yen ($2.4 billion) up to 2021. Dual-use OSA projects could build on this foundation without alarming Beijing, an appealing prospect as Japan seeks to boost its defense exports.
While OSA’s limited scale precludes transformative strategic gains, its institutional benefits – enhanced technical cooperation, trust-building with Japan and diversification of strategic partnerships – offer a pragmatic, counterbalancing opportunity for Pakistan.
It could also potentially offset India’s edge from Japan’s Quad cooperation. Military cooperation with an Asian power known for its soft power could also help to restore Pakistan’s strategic importance after the US’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.
China’s sensitivity to such an arrangement is inevitable but arguably manageable. Pakistan can mitigate risks to its China relations by framing OSA as a supplementary, transparency-driven initiative focused on technical and humanitarian areas such as disaster relief, anti-terrorism and anti-piracy capacity building.
Prioritizing Japan-funded projects with dual civilian-military utility would allow incremental gains while balancing relations with Beijing. Japan’s broader military budget growth signals a sustained commitment to OSA, offering Pakistan a low-cost avenue to deepen trust with Tokyo and signal its role as a stabilizing actor in the Indo-Pacific’s security architecture.
For Japan, Pakistan is more than just a potential security partner—it’s a litmus test. Success here would prove OSA can transcend great-power rivalry, offering developing nations a third way to address security needs without picking sides.
For Islamabad, it’s a chance to redefine its role in Asia’s emerging order: not as a theater for US-China competition but rather as a sovereign actor bridging divides. In an era of increasingly polarized alliances, that’s a vision worth investing in.
Najam Ul Hassan Naqvi is researcher at the Consortium of Asia-Pacific Studies,
National Defense University, Islamabad.
