For the first time since 1955, Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has lost control over both houses of parliament, known as the National Diet. In the July 20 election for the House of Councillors, the upper house, the LDP and its coalition partner won just 47 seats, three short of the number needed to maintain a majority. This followed a defeat in the lower house, the House of Representatives, in October 2024, where the LDP also lost its majority.
Most notably, in the July upper house election, the far-right, anti-immigrant Sanseito won 14 seats, increasing their total seats from one to 15. The centrist Democratic Party for the People also dramatically expanded its presence; the party now holds 22 seats in the House of Councillors, more than double its previous tally. Both are populist parties that successfully capitalized on domestic dissatisfaction with the cost of living.
Despite the major loss for his party, Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru vowed to stay in his position – at least for the time being. But regardless of his own political fortunes, Japan’s immediate neighbors largely expect Tokyo’s foreign policy to stay the course in the short term.
Surprisingly, Russia emerged as an issue in the election, with some Japanese news outlets accusing Moscow of interfering in the election. Sanseito came under fire after Saya, a candidate for a Tokyo constituency, was interviewed by Sputnik, a Russian state media outlet the Kremlin uses to propagate disinformation overseas. Sanseito claimed Saya (a political newcomer who uses only one name) spoke without proper authorization, though previously the party’s leader, Kamiya Sohei, had suggested himself that sanctions against Russia should be relaxed. During the 2025 campaign, the Ishiba administration blamed foreign bots on social media for spreading disinformation about the foreign population in Japan, amplifying the message of far-right parties such as Sanseito.
Although Russian media saw little sign of immediate change in Japan-U.S. relations or Japan’s partnership with NATO after the election, some commentators expressed hope for a “diversification” in Japanese foreign policy. The state-owned RIA Novosti celebrated the election of Suzuki Muneo, an independent candidate with strong ties to Russia. A former LDP politician, Suzuki was a figure in Japan’s Russia policy until his resignation and conviction on corruption charges, after which he played the role of unofficial adviser on Russia, including to the late Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.
Commentators in China saw the LDP loss ushering in a period of turbulence and uncertainty. China’s relations with Japan have stabilized in recent months, though some of the anti-immigrant rhetoric in the upper house election took aim at Chinese citizens buying up property in Tokyo. Chinese nationals are the largest group of immigrants – 870,000 were living in Japan as of late 2024, with their numbers expected to grow to 1 million by 2025, but still making up less than 1 percent of the population.
Some Chinese commentators argued that the rise of the right wing would bode ill for China. They predicted Japan’s government will likely implement more provocative policies such as ramping up naval patrols in disputed waters, increasing defense cooperation with Taiwan, and restricting Chinese imports – ostensibly for supply chain security. In China, Japan scholar Meng Xiaoxu noted that Ishiba failed to attend the 2025 NATO summit held just prior to the election, but he predicted that the Japanese government’s ties to NATO would further strengthen in the future and noted that the Japan-U.S. alliance remained a top priority.
For South Korea’s new government, the emphasis has been on continuity. South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun spoke by phone with Japanese Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi and agreed to continue to prioritize the stable development of bilateral relations, especially their cooperation on North Korea and trilateral diplomacy with the United States. According to Cho, “Korea-Japan cooperation is the centerpiece of our government’s practical diplomacy along with the Korea-U.S. alliance.”
North Korea has not publicly issued a statement regarding Japan’s recent election. The latest press statements from North Korea’s authoritative news outlet, Korean Central News Agency, condemned Japan’s next-generation fighters and its recently released Defense White Paper 2025. However, the KCNA also encouraged ethnic Koreans in Japan to “devote themselves to carrying out their patriotic duties” and ensure the continued development of ethnic Koreans in Japan. The ethnic Koreans who support North Korea through the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan – referred to as Chongryon – are connected to the financial and international reach of North Korea. North Korea’s close ties to the Chongryon makes it possible, though unlikely, that Pyongyang will publicly condemn Sanseito’s anti-immigrant rhetoric.
South Korea also has remained relatively quiet about the success of Sanseito. South Korean media has focused on the LDP’s election loss and the rise of Sanseito, rather than the implications for Zainichi Koreans – ethnic Koreans residing in Japan. Koreans in Japan who identify with South Korea belong to the Korean Residents Union in Japan, known as the Mindan. Unlike North Korea, which uses the Chongryon for global outreach, South Korea is not as reliant on the Mindan. Because of that, it is unlikely that the Lee Jae-myung administration will comment on Japan’s domestic affairs. Given that South Korea’s foreign minister just described the Seoul-Tokyo relationship as a “key axis” of the administration’s pragmatic diplomacy strategy, there is less of a chance that South Korea will involve itself in Sanseito’s anti-immigration controversies.
Instead, local Japanese and ethnic Korean groups have highlighted the impacts on the Zainichi community. When Kamiya, Sanseito’s leader, used a slur against ethnic Koreans in a campaign speech, the Korea NGO Center, an Osaka-based nonprofit, protested his language, demanding that he apologize. In a letter, the organization stated that Sanseito has capitalized on social anxiety to push for ethnic discrimination and the exclusion of foreigners.
Additionally, in a post-election interview, Mindan President Kim Yi-joong stated he “never imagined” that a political party like Sanseito would emerge and surpass the minimum 11 seats required in the upper chamber to submit bills. Kim said he worried about potential bills that would revoke the right to vote for first-generation naturalized Japanese citizens – those who were born as foreigners but acquired citizenship later in life, the status of many Zainichi Koreans. As Sanseito members propose legislation, it will be important to watch the groups and actors who become increasingly involved.
Now that Ishiba has reached a tariff deal with the Trump administration in the United States, it remains to be seen if or when the Japanese prime minister will resign from office and who might replace him. Although Japan’s neighbors emphasize the continuity they expect to see in Japanese foreign policy, they are watching the unfolding political drama in Japan with a mixture of hope and concern.
