In a moment of diplomatic clarity that quickly gained traction across Chinese and international media, Chinese Premier Li Qiang recently remarked: “China and Japan are neighbors who cannot be moved. Since we cannot move, we should be good neighbors.”
This deceptively simple statement carries a deep sense of geopolitical realism. It reflects Beijing’s awareness that proximity is not merely a geographical fact—it is a strategic condition that requires sober diplomacy, especially amid rising regional volatility and heated rivalry with the US.
Few bilateral relationships in the Indo-Pacific are as fraught and intertwined as those between China and Japan. Rooted in centuries of interaction, marred by the horrors of 20th-century warfare and shaped by decades of economic symbiosis, the China-Japan relationship has historically and recently swung between wary competition and cautious cooperation.
In invoking the idea of immutable geography, Premier Li also hinted at a basic truth: China wants stability with Japan, not out of sentimentality but strategic necessity.
Geography’s inescapable reality
“Cannot be moved” is a blunt admission of reality. From Shanghai to Fukuoka, the distance is less than 800 kilometers.
Between them lies the East China Sea—an arena of resource disputes, overlapping air defense zones, and naval brinkmanship, but also a vital artery of commerce and energy transit.
Despite maritime tensions, this shared body of water anchors both countries in an unavoidable relationship.
Li’s appeal to geography recalls the thinking of the late Japanese diplomat Yukio Okamoto, who argued that China and Japan are condemned by fate and physics to coexist—so they must learn to do so constructively.
The remark also stands in contrast to nationalist or triumphalist rhetoric that often defines Cross-Strait and East Asian discourse. It acknowledges limits. Neither Beijing nor Tokyo can wish the other away.
Hot historical grievances
But geographical realism cannot alone extinguish historical angst. Chinese public opinion continues to be shaped by the memory of Japan’s wartime occupation.
The Nanjing Massacre, Unit 731, and other atrocities are not distant footnotes in Chinese historiography—they are actively remembered and politically relevant. Occasional visits by Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine or attempts to revise textbooks often rekindle nationalist anger.
Conversely, Japan perceives a more assertive China with increasing alarm. Under former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and now Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Tokyo has accelerated defense reforms, increased military spending, and deepened security cooperation with the United States, Australia and the Philippines.
Its participation in the Quad and increased patrolling of disputed waters signal that Japan is preparing for an era of intensified strategic competition.
China interprets these developments as part of a US-led containment architecture. However, even as bilateral tensions simmer, China seeks to compartmentalize relations—keeping economic and diplomatic dialogues open even as strategic distrust lingers.
Economic stabilizing force
It is impossible to discuss Sino-Japanese relations without referencing their vast economic interdependence. Despite all political turbulence, China remains Japan’s largest trading partner.
Japanese corporations remain deeply embedded in China’s automotive, electronics, and high-end manufacturing sectors. Complex supply chains now stretch from Osaka to Chengdu to Southeast Asia.
In this context, Premier Li’s words also function as a reminder to safeguard economic engagement at a time when US-led decoupling pressures are mounting.
The US is encouraging Japan to join the “Chip 4” alliance to curtail Chinese advances in semiconductors. For Beijing, ensuring Tokyo does not fully align with Washington’s techno-nationalist agenda is of paramount importance.
Thus, Li’s tone suggests both a pragmatic acknowledgment of tensions and an appeal to maintain economic pragmatism.
ASEAN as strategic mediator
Li’s remarks should also be understood in a broader regional context. Both China and Japan are deeply invested in ASEAN—economically and diplomatically.
While China promotes its Belt and Road Initiative and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Japan continues to focus on high-quality infrastructure, vocational education and developmental aid.
This competition is not inherently zero-sum. In fact, ASEAN can benefit from it—so long as it does not become a theater of strategic polarization.
As chair of ASEAN in 2025, Malaysia has an opportunity to play the role of stabilizer. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s emphasis on multipolarity, civilizational dialogue and strategic equidistance aligns well with Li’s tone.
Track 1.5 diplomacy—semi-official dialogues involving academics, former officials, and policy thinkers—hosted in neutral venues such as Kuala Lumpur or Jakarta, could help China and Japan manage tensions.
Such efforts would be particularly valuable on non-traditional security issues such as maritime environmental protection, climate governance and crisis communication protocols in the East China Sea.
Geographic proximity to strategic partnership?
Ultimately, the future of the China-Japan relationship rests on whether the two sides can convert geographical inevitability into a foundation for stable coexistence. That requires strategic empathy, political maturity and a willingness to restrain nationalist impulses.
Li’s statement, stripped of bravado and couched in sober realism, offers a certain opening. It signals a potential shift away from US-led zero-sum thinking, at least in bilateral terms.
For Japan, the challenge will be to balance its alliance with the United States under Donald Trump while maintaining open communication with Beijing. For China, the task is to build trust—not just through words but through consistent maritime behavior, diplomatic discipline and economic transparency.
In the final analysis, the lesson is clear: China and Japan cannot ignore or outflank each other. They can either manage their rivalry or risk being overtaken by it.
Geography offers no exit—but it does offer a starting point for dialogue. As Asia braces for an uncertain decade, the world will be watching whether two of its greatest powers can indeed become “good neighbors.”
