In less than a week, China has initiated a series of naval drills in the South Pacific, Gulf of Tonkin, and off Taiwan’s southwest coast. These maneuvers demonstrated the capability of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to simultaneously operate across multiple theaters in the Asia-Pacific. What are the motives behind these maneuvers and what do they reveal about Beijing’s potential future moves in the region?
What Happened
At 9:30 a.m. on February 21, a PLAN flotilla consisting of the frigate Hengyang, cruiser Zunyi, and replenishment vessel Weishanhu began a naval drill in international waters, 346 nautical miles from Eden, Australia. The flotilla did not follow international standards in providing advanced notice, and Australian military leaders were unaware of the drills until 30 minutes later, when a commercial airline pilot alerted Airservices Australia. The unexpected exercise forced 49 flights to reroute. The next day, the PLAN flotilla conducted live-fire drills, causing further flight diversions until February 24. Prior to this incident, China had never held military exercises in the Tasman Sea.
On February 24, China announced the start of live-fire naval exercises southeast of Beihai, on the Chinese side of the Gulf of Tonkin, lasting until February 27. However, few details are available regarding this event.
At 8:42 a.m. on February 26, the Taiwanese military detected 32 PLA aircraft and seven warships conducting exercises 40 nautical miles from Kaohsiung and Pingtung counties, home to major military bases and ports. There are conflicting reports on whether live fire was employed, but China provided no prior notice regarding the commencement of the drills. At the same time, 13 PLA warplanes and seven naval ships were operating in other areas around Taiwan.
Besides the naval drills, starting February 24, PLA manned and unmanned aircraft conducted sorties above the East China Sea and the Philippines Sea, crossing into Japanese air space and prompting the scrambling of Japanese fighter jets in response.
Making Sense of the Drills
Compared to previous Chinese naval drills, which typically concentrated on one area, the successive maneuvers across multiple locations across the Asia-Pacific region warrant attention.
The drills in the Gulf of Tonkin and off Taiwan’s southwest coast appear to be expressions of displeasure to recent actions taken by regional governments. On February 21, Vietnam published a map defining its baseline claims in the Gulf of Tonkin, a belated response to China’s announcement of its baseline in 2024 that drew criticism from Hanoi. Although China and Vietnam have no major contentions in the Gulf of Tonkin, their broader dispute over the South China Sea remains unresolved. The declaration of Vietnam’s Gulf of Tonkin baseline likely triggered Beijing’s decision to conduct live-fire drills, signaling its resolve to defend its maritime interests.
Taiwan has long confronted Chinese “gray zone” tactics, in which China’s non-military assets work to disrupt and undermine Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities without crossing the threshold of war. In recent years, Taiwan has experienced numerous cases of undersea telecommunications cable malfunctions, with 2025 being the most severe year to date. Taiwanese authorities suspect China-linked commercial vessels are responsible, aiming to damage Taiwan’s critical infrastructure. On February 25, the Taiwanese Coast Guard seized the Togolese-registered cargo ship Hongtai, which is suspected of cutting the undersea cable connecting Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. The PLA drills on the following day were likely an intimidation tactic, signaling Beijing’s displeasure over the seizure of Hongtai.
However, the naval exercises near Australia and New Zealand were not in response to any specific recent conflict. Although China’s relations with these countries have been strained, no major incidents preceded the drills. Beyond functioning as expressions of displeasure over regional frictions, these exercises serve the purpose of: gaining operational experience, demonstrating Chinese military capabilities, asserting dominance in the region, and acting as probing operations.
The PLAN has achieved substantial growth in recent years. China now boasts the world’s largest navy and its shipyards remain highly productive. Moreover, the PLAN’s firepower is rapidly approaching that of the U.S. Navy. In the Asia-Pacific, the PLAN outclasses other navies in both quality and quantity. By conducting coordinated naval drills across the region, China seeks to enhance its naval readiness and showcase its expanding capability to competitors, particularly Australia and New Zealand, which might come to Taiwan’s aid in a future conflict.
Moreover, at a time when U.S. domestic and foreign policies are in disarray, China wants to assert dominance over U.S. allies in the region – including Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand. In recent years, Vietnam has sought to strengthen relations with the United States as well to offset China’s growing influence. By conducting exercises near the waters of these nations, China is flexing its military muscles and testing the resilience of U.S. partnerships – particularly as the Trump administration is destabilizing U.S.-led security structures.
Finally, these coordinated naval exercises serve as probing operations to test the reaction and resolve of the United States and its regional partners. As I have previously argued, the Trump administration’s volte-face on Ukraine threatens Taiwan’s security, prompting an increase in Chinese probing operations to examine U.S. commitment and the strength of its allies. As the U.S. continues to exhibit shaky support for traditional allies, China can gauge the feasibility of using force to reshape the Asia-Pacific balance of power through these probing operations.
On February 26, Trump refused to comment as to whether the United States would defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack and openly praised Xi Jinping. Such statements will embolden Beijing and engender further PLA probing operations as it prepares for a potential invasion of Taiwan.
What’s Next
Geopolitical risks are bound to escalate as the Trump administration actively dismantles U.S. federal agencies, shrinks its defense budget, and alienates allies worldwide. On the European front, the United States has turned against its NATO allies and sided with Moscow over Kyiv – even refusing to acknowledge the obvious fact of Russian aggression against Ukraine. Furthermore, Washington’s neocolonial demands for Ukraine’s resources have caused bitter disappointment in European capitals, further widening the transatlantic rift.
On the other end of Eurasia, besides threatening to impose tariffs on its East Asian partners, the United States has yet to outline clear policy priorities, leaving regional allies uncertain about Washington’s long-term commitment. Judging by Trump’s statements and behavior, U.S. relations with Asian allies are likely going to turn highly transactional and the abandonment of some allies is not out of the question.
Within this context, more instability in the Asia-Pacific is expected. More Chinese military drills similar to ones conducted recently are going to take place, both to demonstrate strength and probe adversaries. These exercises will continue until Chinese leaders determine that an opportune moment has arrived to forcefully reshape the Asia-Pacific status quo.
