North Korea made headlines earlier this year by reportedly officially allowing private individuals to register vehicles under their own names for the first time in 2025. However, a closer examination reveals that this “breakthrough” policy change may be more symbolic than substantive, highlighting the complex gap between legal frameworks and lived reality in North Korea.
Contrary to various commentaries and reporting about this being a complete reversal of policy, private car ownership has technically been legal in North Korea for decades. Article 58 of North Korean civil law has long permitted personal property ownership, including vehicles, provided they were acquired through legally recognized means such as labor, inheritance, or purchase.
The reality, however, has been far more complicated. Due to prohibitive costs, bureaucratic hurdles, and movement restrictions, most North Koreans who could afford vehicles chose to register them under state enterprises or government agencies instead. This practice created a system where cars were nominally institutional property but functionally operated as private vehicles.
One North Korea-based source recently told Daily NK, “Individual ownership was already possible before, but people simply chose not to do it for practical reasons.” In this light, the recent policy change appears to be less about expanding rights and more about formalizing existing informal arrangements.
According to this source in North Korea, the core barrier to private car ownership remains the requirement to prove legitimate funding sources. Prospective car owners must demonstrate exactly how they acquired the necessary funds, with authorities accepting only specific categories of “legal foreign currency income.” This typically includes overseas Koreans (2nd to 4th generation) with documented foreign earnings; workers who have completed authorized overseas labor contracts; or individuals with other state-approved sources of foreign currency.
For the vast majority of North Koreans, meeting these stringent financial documentation requirements remains virtually impossible, regardless of their actual ability to afford a vehicle.
Even when registration is possible, significant practical limitations make private car ownership unappealing.
Privately registered vehicles face strict limitations on inter-provincial travel, requiring special permits and facing restrictions at the “No. 10 checkpoint” system that monitors movement between administrative regions.
The costs associated with vehicle maintenance, fuel, and required approvals for travel make ownership economically challenging even for those who can afford the initial purchase.
Private car owners face increased state scrutiny, as personal vehicles are viewed as indicators of wealth and potential foreign connections.
Given these constraints, many affluent North Koreans continue to prefer registering vehicles under enterprise names, paying fees to borrow institutional license plates. This arrangement offers several advantages, including greater freedom of movement without individual travel permits, reduced scrutiny from authorities, easier navigation of checkpoint systems, and a lower bureaucratic burden for routine operations.
This system effectively creates a parallel ownership structure that serves the practical needs of car owners while maintaining the facade of state control over private transportation.
The limited scope of actual private car ownership reflects broader economic realities in North Korea. Only the donju (North Korea’s wealthy, entrepreneurial class), those with foreign connections, or individuals with access to hard currency can realistically consider vehicle ownership. For the general population, cars remain an unattainable luxury regardless of legal permissions.
Moreover, North Korea’s automotive market remains extremely constrained, with Pyeonghwa Motors holding exclusive production and sales rights, and overall vehicle availability severely limited by economic sanctions and domestic production capabilities.
North Korea’s reported formal recognition of private car registration represents an interesting case study in how authoritarian states can appear to liberalize while maintaining substantive control. By removing formal barriers that were already circumvented in practice, the government creates an impression of policy reform without meaningfully expanding access or freedoms.
The real story is not about new permissions, but about the persistence of structural constraints that continue to limit private car ownership to a small elite. The gap between legal possibility and practical accessibility remains as wide as ever, suggesting that this policy change may be more about administrative efficiency and international perception than genuine economic liberalization.
For most North Koreans, the dream of car ownership remains just that – a dream constrained not by legal prohibitions, but by economic reality and the enduring mechanisms of state control that shape daily life in the country.
