JAKARTA – President Prabowo Subianto has dazed and confused many foreign policy observers with an apparent dramatic shift in Indonesia’s South China Sea policy while in Beijing.
Indonesia Foreign Ministry officials were caught off guard, if not shocked, after an official statement released on the final day of Prabowo’s trip appeared to recognize China’s expansive “nine-dash line” claim to most of the South China Sea, including part of Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
The announcement’s language was ambiguous so the practical implications remain unclear. The foreign ministry quickly released a clarifying statement rejecting any suggestion that Indonesia now recognizes China’s preferred map.
This, plus earlier signals Indonesia might be taking a tougher line on defending its maritime territory, has left many observers scratching their heads.
Was this a simple slapdash slip by a president determined to take the lead on foreign policy ahead of diplomatic bureaucrats? Or does it hint Prabowo is initiating a shift in Indonesia’s geopolitical positioning toward China?
Long-running dispute
At the heart of the controversy is a phrase in a joint statement released by China referring to a “common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims” with regard to maritime issues. This anodyne phrase carries potentially major implications.
China has long made expansive territorial claims to waters in the South China Sea that overlap with the territorial claims of several Southeast Asian nations. For Indonesia, the area of contention is in the North Natuna Sea, which China claims a slice of despite being in Indonesia’s EEZ.
Indonesia has not only always resolutely rejected this claim, but taken the unmovable position that there’s nothing to discuss since China’s claims have no basis in international law.
This is backed up by a 2016 ruling the United Nation’s Permanent Court of Arbitration based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Even Chinese overtures to begin discussions on the issue have been roundly rejected by Jakarta as a non-starter.
By putting his name to an official statement accepting the premise of “overlapping claims”, Prabowo seemed to accept that China has legitimate territorial claims in the North Natuna Sea, which if so would represent a major shift in Indonesian policy.
According to sources with knowledge of the matter, Indonesian foreign ministry officials lobbied hard for the language to be changed but ultimately failed. However, since then, the foreign ministry has issued a statement clarifying that the MOU on maritime cooperation “cannot be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the ‘9-Dash-Lines claim’” and, therefore, “has no impact on Indonesia’s sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction in the North Natuna Sea.”
The picture is further complicated by the fact that Indonesia had recently given signals it might be taking a tougher line on the North Natuna Sea.
On October 23, Indonesia’s Maritime Security Agency, Bakmla, announced that it had expelled a Chinese coast guard vessel that was encroaching on Indonesian territorial waters around Natuna and released videos of the incident.
Many took this as a sign that Indonesia was taking a more muscular approach under Prabowo, a former special forces soldier. Under his predecessor, President Joko Widodo, Indonesia was steadfast in its refusal to accept China’s maritime claims while also seeking to keep tensions low.
Strategic shift or rookie slip?
Observers and experts are grappling with what to make of the surprise announcement.
“With the newly released joint statement stating that we have an overlapping claim, that is very significant,” said Aristyo Darmawan, a lecturer in international law at the University of Indonesia and an expert on maritime law. He suggests there are two potential consequences of this statement.
The first would be that accepting an overlapping claim implies Indonesia might be open to negotiations on the maritime boundary. “And, I think it’s nonsense to negotiate a maritime boundary demarcation for a claim that is not based under international law,” said Aristyo.
The second potential implication would be opening the door to sharing resources in the area. Fisheries as well as oil and gas are mentioned in the two sides’ document but not explicitly mention in the joint statement.
“I think that’s something stupid,” said Aristyo. “It’s like a random person arguing that part of your house is theirs and, therefore, you should share some of the resources.”
Other experts took a slightly more sanguine view by questioning how much the statement actually means or changes facts on the ground. Indonesia’s accepting an area of overlap and opening the door to joint development would indeed be “a huge shift,” said Gregory Poling the director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. However, he added, the quick clarification issued by Indonesia’s foreign ministry suggests that in practice it is a “dead letter.”
Others suggested cooperation with China on the issue could bring advantages. “Prabowo’s administration is laser-focused on energy self-sufficiency, and exploring oil and gas in the North Natuna Sea is a big part of that plan. Working with China on these resources could bring practical benefits,” said Dedi Dinarto, lead Indonesia analyst at strategic advisory firm Global Counsel.
Some have chalked up the whole affair to the inexperience of Indonesia’s new Foreign Minister Sugiono, a protégé of Prabowo’s with no previous foreign policy experience.
According to a source familiar with the situation, Sugiono was advised by foreign ministry officials about the problematic language but he failed to push his Chinese counterparts to budge on the wording.
The source also blamed pressure from influential businessmen who traveled with Prabowo and were keen to keep things amicable. Some 156.19 trillion rupiah (US$10 billion) worth of deals were signed at the Indonesia-China Business Forum, though details were not publicly released.
Former leader Widodo managed to sign many such deals during presidential visits to China without making concessions on the sea issue. Many wonder if Prabowo’s statement should be chalked up to diplomatic inexperience or signals a desire to build even stronger economic relations with China.
Geopolitical sides
A final point of interest in the joint statement was a commitment to “carry out broader and deeper security cooperation in more areas.”
Indonesian and Chinese security cooperation has been extremely limited for nearly a decade, with joint exercises suspended in 2016 over Chinese claims to and incursions in the Natuna Sea.
Such a move would fit with Prabowo’s preference for defense diplomacy and apparent desire to signal a new degree of independence from Indonesia’s main United States security partner.
This was reflected in Indonesia launching its first-ever joint maritime exercise with Russia last week. Though given that Prabowo also oversaw the bolstering of security ties with America as the previous administration’s defense minister, this likely should not be over-interpreted.
In public statements, Prabowo has continued to embrace Indonesia’s long-standing commitment to non-alignment. However, that position does not preclude quiet geopolitical repositioning.
Under President Suharto, Indonesia cultivated extremely close relations with the United States. Under Widodo, Indonesia arguably leaned to China for investment. Prabowo, Suharto’s son-in-law and Widodo’s successor, is now being watched closely for how he might incline.
More signs may be coming. Just 19 days after his inauguration, Prabowo embarked on an extend international tour. After visiting China for three days, he has now landed in the United States, where he is expected to meet both President Joe Biden and President-elect Donald Trump.
His diplomatic tour will also take the newly inaugurated leader to Peru, Brazil, the United Kingdom and still undisclosed states in the Middle East.
