On August 23, Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar landed in Dhaka for a two-day official visit – the first by a Pakistani foreign minister to Bangladesh since 2012. During his visit, Dar met delegates from Bangladesh’s major political parties, including the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and the National Citizen Party (NCP). Afterwards, he met Bangladeshi Adviser of Foreign Affairs Md. Touhid Hossain, Adviser for Commerce Sheikh Bashiruddin, and finally Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus.
The high-profile visit has gained considerable attention in regional and international media, and generated various speculation about the implications not only for Bangladesh-Pakistan ties, but for the regional balance.
Between 1947 and 1971, Bangladesh formed the eastern wing of Pakistan; it became an independent state after a brutal war in 1971. Since independence, Bangladesh’s relations with Pakistan have witnessed several ups and downs. Under the previous Awami League-led government, relations between Dhaka and Islamabad took a nosedive owing to Bangladesh’s decision to prosecute alleged war criminals of 1971 and Pakistan’s strong opposition to the move. Relations started thawing by 2020, but did not fully recover under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.
After Hasina was driven from office by mass protests in August 2024, the new interim government, led by Yunus, undertook initiatives to improve ties with Islamabad. Its overtures have received an enthusiastic response from Pakistan.
Since August 2024, Yunus has met Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif multiple times, and diplomatic contacts have increased to a considerable degree. These meetings have resulted in concrete moves to grow bilateral trade (with a $3 billion target), start direct shipping between the two states, mutually lift visa restrictions, increase educational and cultural contacts, and enhance defense cooperation. Dar’s visit to Dhaka was a logical continuation of the ongoing normalization process in Bangladesh-Pakistan relations.
From the Pakistani perspective, the improvement in bilateral ties with Bangladesh, particularly after a period of prolonged crisis in relations, is a diplomatic success amid escalating strategic competition with India. Moreover, enhanced trade with Bangladesh is beneficial for Pakistan’s struggling economy, and growing cultural and educational ties reflect the enhancement of Pakistani “soft power.”
Notably, the agreements signed during Dar’s visit also focus on soft power. Bangladesh and Pakistan signed an agreement to exempt visa requirements for the holders of official and diplomatic passports of both states. They also concluded four MoUs to form a joint working group on trade, increase cooperation between the foreign service academies of both states, enhance collaboration between their national news agencies (the Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha and the Associated Press of Pakistan), and establish an institutional partnership between the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) and the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI).
From the Bangladeshi perspective, rapprochement with Pakistan is a pragmatic step designed to enhance and demonstrate the state’s strategic autonomy. Bangladesh can attain economic dividends by enhancing its trade partnership with Pakistan, while diversifying defense partners is necessary in the context of increasingly complex global and regional geopolitics.
During the previous government, Bangladesh shared unusually deep security cooperation with India, bolstered by cross-border connectivity projects. However, after the change of government, Bangladesh-India relations have cooled to a certain degree, with the Indian government undertaking some measures against Bangladesh (including the cancellation of transshipments) and the Indian media adopting a hostile stance. Under these circumstances, Dhaka had to look for new options in its foreign policy.
However, Bangladesh’s rapprochement with Pakistan should not be interpreted as its alignment with Pakistan or Pakistani strategic objectives in the region. Indian strategists are apprehensive about the possible use of Bangladeshi territory by Pakistan to wage a proxy war in Northeast India, just as they did in the 1960s. However, this is a gross misinterpretation of both Bangladesh’s intentions and the nature of the country’s current engagement with Pakistan.
As the interim government has repeatedly stressed, Bangladesh is strictly adhering to its traditional policy of nonalignment. This was illustrated by Bangladesh’s demonstrated neutrality during the India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025, during which India and Pakistan fought a brief but intense air war and border skirmish. Furthermore, Bangladesh’s nonaligned policy was demonstrated by its decision to avoid participation in a trilateral Bangladesh-China-Pakistan joint working group in the aftermath of the first trilateral summit between the three countries in June 2025. Dhaka worried that participation in the joint working group was being interpreted as alignment with China and Pakistan.
Also, while security cooperation between Bangladesh and India has decreased following the political transition in August 2024, it has not stopped completely. For instance, the Bangladesh Navy participated in a naval exercise, named Bongosagar 2025, and a coordinated patrol (CORPAT) with the Indian Navy in the Bay of Bengal in March 2025, which indicated continued maritime security cooperation between the two states. Moreover, Bangladesh strongly condemned the attack on civilians in Pahalgam in India’s Jammu and Kashmir in April 2025, and reiterated its stance on anti-terrorism. This clearly indicates that Bangladesh is willing to maintain balanced and good-neighborly relations with India.
After reviewing the policies of the interim government toward Pakistan and India, it is clear that Bangladesh is not leaning to any side in the India-Pakistan conflict. Bangladesh is pragmatically re-engaging with Pakistan out of economic and political considerations, but this re-engagement should not be interpreted as a full-fledged alignment with Pakistan, and neither is this re-engagement directed against any third country. Under the current regional and international circumstances, nonalignment, coupled with growing engagement with all states, remains the most pragmatic option for Bangladesh’s foreign policy, and Dar’s recent visit to Bangladesh has to be viewed in this broader context.
